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In his book entitled The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of 
Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008] Christopher Bennett at-
tempts to answer the legal theoretical question: ‘Why punish?’ In this aim, he 
develops an essentially retributivist argument that incorporates what he con-
siders to be useful insights of restorative positions. His long-winded reason-
ing rehearses and settles quite a few moral, philosophical and legal practice 
issues, and while it might not prove completely convincing from beginning to 
end, given its plausible lack of some middle term, it does bode excellent re-
sults for this type of approach, highlighting brilliantly how tackling meta-
physical problems can not only have an impact on practical or political 
debates, but also lead to specific conclusions. 
What the book intends to provide is an ideal or philosophical model, nei-
ther a historical nor a legal reconstruction of penal practices in Western socie-
ties. Such a model relies, as is the norm in this field, on presumably common 
intuitions, at least in liberal cultures, about moral emotions and their propriety, 
freedom of conscience, citizens’ autonomy, the domain of public wrongs, fair-
ness and proportionality and the like. On this basis, Bennett attempts to deduce 
a system of criminal justice capable of standing the test of ethical legitimacy. 
The need to overhaul the legal and moral underpinnings of criminal justice 
seems assumed by most, but not all, commentators. In Bennett’s case, this de-
mand stems from his global rejection of traditional justifications that conceive 
punishment as a convenient way to meet collective ends, such as crime pre-
vention or public edification and moral education, or psychological aims, 
such as wrongdoers’ moral improvement. 
The strategy of building on intuitions, values, widespread self-
understandings, existing consensus or the overlap of individual moral view-
points – explicitly endorsed in the comments of Martí, Duff and Pérez Bermejo 
– undoubtedly appears only superficially Hegelian. More genuinely Hegelian is 
the rationale offered for retribution: the public offender has a right to be pun-
ished, in accordance with his moral and rational status. Bennett seeks to 
avoid the traditional and crude retributivist motivation of making the offend-
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ers ‘pay dearly’ for their deeds, based on plain vengefulness or the victim’s 
possible satisfaction of ‘seeing (the wrongdoer) suffer’. Therefore, although 
he willingly admits his theory ‘looks back’ on the crime and on the reactions 
it might have elicited, it also ‘looks forward’ to restoring the moral and civil 
credentials of the convict. This compromise leads Bennett to draw on restora-
tive strategies and procedures in order to outline a reconfiguration of penal 
practices. In fact, the ‘apology ritual’ is thus named (instead of, say, the pub-
lic condemnation ritual) precisely because it rests on the normative theoreti-
cal idea of what the offenders could and should do in order to regain their 
fellow citizens’ confidence. 
According to the synopsis, the book lays out three distinct but inter-
woven arguments: the Apology Ritual Argument strictly speaking, the Pen-
ance Argument and the Right to Be Punished Argument.  
The first contends, on the one hand, that the symbols best suited to the 
public condemnation of crime may be found in the way we react spontaneously 
to everyday abuses. On the other hand, what matters for the state is the formal 
expression of censure, so the process of punishment does not require the amends 
– the apology – to be sincerely wanted by the offender: a ritual suffices. 
The Penance Argument claims the necessity of selecting, among avail-
able symbols of disapproval, those that show the offence is taken seriously 
and open the door to the offenders’ authentic ‘dissociation from the wrong.’ 
According to Bennett, such a separation is achieved when the wrongdoers in-
ternalise the withdrawal of their peers’ previous ‘goodwill’, and ultimately 
through their subjection to ‘something penitential.’ The withdrawal of ‘good-
will’ is justified by the offenders’ violation of the expectations generated by 
their participation in some relationship (in the final analysis, a civil or politi-
cal one), a situation that needs to be ‘marked’ by a certain suspension of rec-
ognition, though not by the offenders’ eviction as independent members of 
the relationship. 
The Argument of the Right to Be Punished does not aim to defend the 
inclusionary nature of punishment, in other words, the fact that by condemn-
ing, the state takes not only the crime but also the convict seriously as an ef-
fective member of the damaged relationship; this had already been made 
clear in the second argument, especially in the discussion on the internalisa-
tion of goodwill withdrawal. If anything, what Bennett still needs is to but-
tress his previous argument against sceptics who would question our ultimate 
control over our actions as well as our status of qualified participants in mo-
ral relationships. Bennett offers no metaphysical solution to those doubts, but 
skirts them by resorting to the erstwhile Kantian and, in any case, Hegelian rea-
sons for us to treat each other as rational and responsible agents who must be 
required to answer for their actions, for better or for worse. The ‘right to be 
punished’ concept would thus contain some truth, in Daniel Dennett’s sense 
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The contributors to the discussion cast doubt on several aspects of those 
arguments. Martí, to begin with, seems to question the need for a retributivist 
justification of punishment. According to him, coercion in general and penal 
practice in particular are sufficiently supported by our liberal sense of legiti-
macy, which entitles the state to coerce citizens into behaving correctly and 
to instil them some sense of justice, that is, to educate them. 
Martí, Duff and Pérez Bermejo also dissent to Bennett’s defence of the 
apology ritual, for complementary reasons. Duff asserts, convincingly, that 
imposed apology is doomed to be no more than mock apology. Martí adds 
that in moral relationships, where Bennett seeks a model for his criminal 
apology ritual, apology not only comes about independently of punishment, 
but usually avoids or substitutes it. Sandis seems to hint in the same direction 
when he suggests, following Winch and Weil, that someone who sincerely 
wishes to expiate guilt may no longer be expected to restore the breached re-
lationship. Martí believes that for the apology to be more than a heuristic tool 
in the hands of the judges who dictate punishment, in other words, for the 
apology to be effectively offered by the wrongdoer, it must be sincere and not 
ritualistic. Pérez Bermejo agrees about the need for Bennett’s apology to 
convey the highest possible sincerity, although he also doubts that the con-
vict’s forum internum should have a role to play in criminal justice and de-
plores Bennett’s support of restorative considerations in setting the quantum 
of punishment. 
In general, Pérez Bermejo and Duff, while explicitly approving of Bennett’s 
updated retributivist strategy, hold to an essentially communicative view 
of criminal prosecution (Sandis seems tempted by the same perspective). 
This being said, Pérez Bermejo’s version of communication tends to be more 
austere than Duff’s. The latter conceives it as a two-way process during 
which the offender’s display of specific responses is required, taken into ac-
count and encouraged, potentially leading to his ‘moral reparation’; the for-
mer, however, feels that the restorative elements in Bennett’s theory – those 
that look forwards – are at odds with the broader retributivist framework, in-
volving a relapse into instrumentalism, arbitrariness and, thereby, impairment 
of the rule of law. 
As for Rossell, he dedicates part of his contribution to criticising the 
Penance Argument. Instead of questioning the conceptual nexus between 
apology and punishment, he rebuffs the necessary link between condemna-
tion and punishment or, to be more precise, between condemnation and ‘suf-
fering-oriented adverse emotional reactions.’ In other words, he opposes the 
vindictive or retributive view of condemnation. Rossell deems that the often 
– legitimately – praised cases of Gandhi and King, cited in Bennett’s book, 
prove that genuine condemnation, even when it is moving and hits its target, 
does not automatically imply retribution for the harm inflicted. Whoever may 
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Martí’s cautiousness about taking the private cycle of condemnation and 
apology as a model for legal punishment. 
In the last contribution, Sandis discusses the very idea – aptly described 
as ‘elusive’ – of a right to be punished, thus touching obliquely on Bennett’s 
third argument. This notion, his comment shows, does not readily fit in the 
common understanding of rights as liberties, nor in the concept of inalienable 
rights such as life or freedom, taken as a whole. This, he reckons, must ex-
plain why the expression is usually found between quotation marks. In his 
analysis, Sandis identifies the disadvantages and counterproductive effects of 
two ways of conceiving the right to be punished, by seeing punishment either 
as a payment for harmful behaviour or as a path towards moral restoration (in 
Melden’s words, ‘moral ratification’). Regarding the first interpretation, he 
objects among other things – and for Wittgensteinian reasons – that it blurs 
the basically transgressive nature of crimes. As for the second one, he draws 
on examples from Woody Allen’s work to claim that the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for moral restoration cannot be determined. 
The book was presented and discussed in a symposium held by the 
Nomos Network for Applied Philosophy on the 27
th and 28
th of January, 
2011, at the University of Valencia. I would like to give thanks to the mem-
bers of the organizing committee for their invitation to edit these proceed-
ings, as well as to Luis M. Valdés, who participated in the sessions, for 
accepting to publish them in a special issue of Teorema. My gratitude also 
goes to the University of Valencia, the Ministry of Science and Innovation 
and the University of Barcelona, who supported the symposium, and to those 
who took part in the meeting: Josep Corbí, Manuel García-Carpintero, Carlos 
Moya, Fabian Dorsch, Francisco Javier Gil, Tobies Grimaltos, Jules Holroyd, 
Sandra Marshall, Adèle Mercier, Mari Mikkola, Pablo Rychter, Pepa Toribio, 
Jennifer Saul and Jordi Valor. 
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Christopher Bennett ofrece en su libro The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical 
Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008] una respues-
ta a la pregunta jurídico-teórica: ‘¿por qué castigar?’. Para ello, construye una 
justificación fundamentalmente retribucionista que integra los que él juzga 
aciertos de las posturas restauracionistas. El suyo es un argumento de largo 
aliento, que revisa y responde no pocas cuestiones filosófico-morales y de 
práctica legal, y que, si es difícil que convenza al lector de principio a fin, por 
la plausible falta de algún término medio, coloca bajo una luz muy favorable 
un acercamiento al asunto de esa índole, al tiempo que muestra asombrosa-
mente cómo la resolución de algunos problemas metafísicos, no sólo no deja 
intactas las cuestiones prácticas, públicas, políticas, sino que conduce a deci-
dirlas de cierto modo. 
La meta del libro es un modelo ideal o filosófico: ni una reconstrucción 
histórica ni legal de la práctica penal. Un modelo cuya definición, como es 
norma en este campo, se funda sobre intuiciones que se presumen corrientes, 
al menos en nuestro espacio cultural liberal, sobre las emociones morales y 
su propiedad, la libertad de conciencia, la autonomía de los ciudadanos, el 
ámbito de las ‘malas acciones’ de carácter público, la equidad y proporciona-
lidad y cosas semejantes. Sobre esa base Bennett intenta razonar un tipo de 
práctica penal que pueda superar la prueba de la legitimidad ética. 
La necesidad de revisar la justificación moral y jurídica de la justicia 
penal parece asumida por la mayoría de comentaristas, aunque no por todos. 
En el caso de Bennett viene determinada por el rechazo global de las justifi-
caciones que hacen de la pena un instrumento para lograr bien fines colecti-
vos, como la edificación o educación moral de la ciudadanía o la prevención 
de futuros crímenes, bien fines psicológicos, como la mejora moral de los 
condenados. 
La estrategia por la que se parte de intuiciones, valores, auto-compren-
siones comunes, del consenso o solapamiento de puntos de vista morales indi-
viduales, tiene seguramente un aspecto sólo superficialmente hegeliano (que, 
en todo caso, Martí, Duff y Pérez Bermejo aprueban explícitamente en sus 
comentarios). Más hegeliana es, desde luego, la razón para el retribucionis-
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mo: que el delincuente tiene derecho a ser castigado, de acuerdo con su ca-
rácter moral racional. Bennett quiere evitar, ciertamente, una motivación cru-
da y tradicional de la retribución, basada en el sentimiento (vengativo) de la 
necesidad de ‘hacer pagar’ por lo hecho o, no digamos, en la satisfacción que 
a las víctimas puede proporcionar ‘ver sufrir’. Por ello, aunque él mismo dice 
que su “teoría” mira hacia atrás, hacia el delito y hacia las reacciones que de-
be haber despertado, mira también hacia delante, hacia la restauración de las 
relaciones morales y civiles del acusado. Esta posición de equilibrio es la que 
mueve a Bennett a tener en cuenta las estrategias y procedimientos restaura-
cionistas en el rediseño –a grandes rasgos– de la práctica penitenciaria. De 
hecho, si la propuesta ha de denominarse ‘el ritual de la disculpa’ –y no, por 
ejemplo, el ritual de la condena pública– es porque la clave teórico-normativa 
la proporciona para Bennett lo que el delincuente puede y debe hacer para 
hacer posible la restauración de la confianza de sus conciudadanos en él. 
El libro consiste, según analiza el précis, en tres argumentos distingui-
bles pero imbricados: el Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa (estrictamente 
tomado), el Argumento de la Penitencia y el Argumento del Derecho a Ser 
Castigado.  
El primero defiende, para empezar, que los símbolos adecuados para la 
condena pública del delito hay que buscarlos en el modo en que reacciona-
mos cotidiana y espontáneamente a los atropellos, y, en segundo lugar, que, 
estando el Estado obligado a condenar o expresar censura, no es esencial al 
castigo que la enmienda –la ‘disculpa’– sea deseada por el delincuente, y por 
tanto basta que adopte la forma de un rito. 
El Argumento de la Penitencia ha de probar a continuación que entre 
los símbolos disponibles para expresar reprobación resultan obligatorios los 
que muestran que el delito es tomado seriamente y pueden además conducir 
al causante a ‘disociarlo del daño’. Esta disociación, según Bennett, la opera 
la interiorización de la retirada de la “buena voluntad” con la que los demás 
nos tratan habitualmente y, al fin y al cabo, por el sometimiento a “algo con 
carácter penitencial”. La retirada de esa “buena voluntad” se justifica como la 
consecuencia apropiada del hecho de que el delicuente haya violado las ex-
pectativas intrínsecas a la participación en cierta relación (en definitiva la re-
lación civil o política), hecho que ha de ‘marcarse’ por medio de cierto nivel 
de suspensión del reconocimiento que en otras circunstancias le corresponde-
ría, aunque no quede desahuciado como miembro (independiente) de ese tipo 
de vínculo. 
El Argumento del Derecho al Castigo, finalmente, no tiene por objeto la 
defensa del carácter incluyente de la pena: que, al condenar, el Estado no sólo 
toma en serio el delito, sino que toma en serio al condenado como miembro 
efectivo de la relación dañada, pues esto es algo que ha dejado ya claro el ar-
gumento previo (concretamente, la justificación de la interiorización de la re-
tirada de la buena voluntad). Si acaso, lo que resta es defender el argumento Introducción                                                                                                    69 
anterior de las dudas escépticas que puede despertar, tanto las relativas a 
nuestra falta última de control sobre lo que hacemos, como al carácter de par-
ticipantes cualificados –moralmente autosuficientes– en esas relaciones. 
Bennett no tiene una respuesta metafísica para estos recelos, pero se ve dis-
pensado de ofrecerla apelando a las en su día razones kantianas y, en todo ca-
so, razones hegelianas para tratarnos unos a otros como seres sensibles a 
razones y por ello responsables, a los que hay que pedir cuentas y exigir que 
respondan por lo que han hecho, para bien y para mal. Habría contenida en la 
idea de ‘derecho al castigo’ una porción de verdad: que, como ha defendido 
Daniel Dennett, los primeros interesados en que nos pidan cuentas por lo que 
hacemos somos nosotros mismos. 
Los participantes en la discusión siembran dudas sobre muchos aspec-
tos de estos argumentos. Martí, por de pronto, parece no sentir la necesidad 
de un argumento retribucionista a favor de las penas como el de Bennett, y 
defiende que la coerción en general y la práctica penal en particular están su-
ficientemente amparadas por nuestro sentido liberal de la legitimidad: que el 
Estado está facultado para coaccionar a los ciudadanos para que se compor-
ten correctamente y a promover un sentido mínimo de justicia entre ellos, es-
to es, a educarlos. 
Tanto Martí como Duff y Pérez Bermejo protestan además contra la de-
fensa del ritual de la disculpa que realiza Bennett, por razones complementa-
rias. Duff hace valer, verosímilmente, que una disculpa impuesta sólo puede 
ser un simulacro de disculpa. Martí añade a esto que la disculpa a la que recu-
rrimos en nuestras relaciones morales –según Bennett, el mejor modelo para 
el ritual de la disculpa penal– no sólo es independiente del castigo, sino que 
normalmente lo desactiva o evita. Sandis apunta en la misma dirección, pare-
ce, cuando sugiere, de acuerdo con Winch y Weil, que si alguien siente ver-
daderamente la necesidad de expiar una culpa, deja de parecernos necesario 
un castigo que restaure la relación que ha quebrado. Martí piensa que si la 
disculpa ha de ser algo más que un recurso heurístico para el juez o jueces a 
la hora de fijar una pena determinada, es decir, si ha de ser ofrecida de forma 
efectiva por parte del condenado, entonces ha de ser sincera y no meramente 
ritual. Pérez Bermejo piensa lo mismo: que Bennett debería favorecer en su 
teoría una disculpa con el más alto grado de sinceridad, en la medida en que 
se pueda llegar a ella, sólo que, por otro lado, rechaza que el fuero interno de 
los condenados tenga algún papel que desempeñar en la práctica penal y de-
plora en general la voluntad de Bennett de tener en cuenta propuestas restau-
racionistas en la fijación del quantum de la pena. 
En general, Pérez Bermejo y Duff, que simpatizan explícitamente con 
la estrategia retribucionista modificada de Bennett, prefieren una visión del 
enjuiciamiento criminal esencialmente comunicativa (también Sandis parece 
tentado por ella). Pero Pérez Bermejo diríase que vindica una versión más 
austera de la comunicación que Duff. Éste habla de un proceso bidireccional, 70                                                                                             Edgar Maraguat 
en que se tienen en cuenta, se exigen y se fomentan las respuestas específicas 
del condenado que pueden conducir a una “reparación moral”. Pérez Berme-
jo, por el contrario, considera que los elementos restauracionistas de la teoría 
de Bennett –los que miran hacia delante– no son coherentes con el marco re-
tribucionista general, y suponen una recaída en el instrumentalismo, la arbi-
trariedad y, por ende, el menoscabo del imperio de la ley. 
Rossell dedica parte de su contribución a objetar, más bien, contra el 
Argumento de la Penitencia. En lugar de poner en cuestión el vínculo con-
ceptual entre disculpa y castigo, él pone en duda la conexión necesaria entre 
condena y punición o, más precisamente, entre la condena y las “reacciones 
emocionales adversas orientadas al sufrimiento”. Dicho de otro modo, opone 
resistencia a una visión de la condena según la cual ésta es forzosamente vin-
dicativa o retributiva. Rossell juzga que los casos históricos –generalmente 
admirados– de Gandhi o King, a los que Bennett apela en su libro, prueban 
precisamente que la condena real –incluso cuando es conmovedora para su 
blanco y tiene en él el efecto que persigue– no tiene por qué implicar una re-
tribución por el daño recibido. Sea quien sea quien interprete adecuadamente 
esos casos, su objeción abunda en lo discutible del carácter modélico del ci-
clo privado de condena y disculpa para la punición legal, que tampoco aprue-
ban Duff o Martí. 
Sandis, por su parte, discute en la última contribución la idea misma –
que con tino califica de “elusiva”– de un derecho a ser castigado (y, así, aun-
que oblicuamente, el tercer argumento). Sus comentarios muestran que esta 
noción no se compadece bien con el entendimiento habitual de los derechos 
como libertades, pero tampoco con el concepto de derecho inalienable que 
aplicamos a la vida o la libertad, tomada como un todo. Esto explica, como él 
reconoce, que la idea aparezca en el libro, normalmente, entrecomillada. En 
su análisis se consideran las limitaciones o efectos contraproducentes de dos 
intentos de darle sentido: bien tomando los castigos como pagos por conduc-
tas en principio dañinas, bien tomando los castigos como ocasiones para la 
restauración moral o, en palabras de Melden, para la “ratificación moral”. En-
tre otras cosas, se objeta contra la primera interpretación que desdibuja el ca-
rácter transgresor de los delitos (por razones wittgensteinianas) y, contra la 
segunda, al hilo de algunas ilustraciones proporcionadas por la filmografía de 
Woody Allen, que no pueden determinarse condiciones necesarias y suficien-
tes para tal restauración. 
La presentación de la obra y su discusión fue objeto de un simposio ce-
lebrado los días 27 y 28 de enero de 2011 en la Universitat de València, or-
ganizado por la Nomos Network for Applied Philosophy. Quiero agradecer al 
resto de miembros del comité que preparó el encuentro la invitación a editar 
estas actas, y en particular a Luis Valdés, que participó en las sesiones, la vo-
luntad de acogerlas en un número especial de Teorema. Las instituciones que 
respaldaron el simposio –la propia Universitat de València, el Ministerio de Introducción                                                                                                    71 
Ciencia e Innovación, la Universitat de Barcelona– merecen también una pala-
bra de agradecimiento, así como todos los que tomaron parte aquellos días en la 
discusión del libro y los comentarios: Josep Corbí, Manuel García-Carpintero, 
Carlos Moya, Fabian Dorsch, Francisco Javier Gil, Tobies Grimaltos, Jules 
Holroyd, Sandra Marshall, Adèle Mercier, Mari Mikkola, Pablo Rychter, Pepa 
Toribio, Jennifer Saul y Jordi Valor. 
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RESUMEN 
En este trabajo resumo los argumentos principales de mi libro The Apology Ritual. 
Llamo la atención sobre tres líneas principales de argumentación, tomándolas en un or-
den inverso al de aparición en el libro. Primero, dirijo la mirada a la justificación expre-
siva-comunicativa del castigo por parte del estado que ofrece el libro. En segundo lugar, 
al argumento a favor de la afirmación de que sentirse verdaderamente arrepentido trae 
consigo la exigencia de que se asuma algún tipo de penitencia. Y, en tercer lugar, me 
ocupo del argumento a favor del “derecho a ser castigado”, tal y como lo interpreto, se-
gún el cual hay un estatuto importante asociado a que uno sea tratado como un agente 
responsable. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE:  castigo; justicia penal; retribución; emoción; responsabilidad; 
penitencia. 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I summarise the main arguments of my book The Apology Ritual. 
I draw attention to three main lines of argument, taking them in reverse order to that 
in which they appear in the book. First, I look at the book’s communicative-
expressive justification of state punishment. Secondly, I look at the argument for the 
claim that feeling properly sorry involves a requirement to undertake some sort of 
penance. And thirdly, I look at the argument for the “right to be punished”: as I inter-
pret it, that there is an important status associated with being treated as a responsible 
agent. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Punishment; Criminal Justice; Retribution; Emotion; Responsibility; 
Penance. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
In this introductory piece, I would like to set out three of the main argu-
ments from The Apology Ritual [C. Bennett, The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical 
Theory of Punishment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008]. I 
will start from the end of the book, as it were, hoping that this might shed 
73 74                                                                                        Christopher Bennett 
some fresh light on the topics the book covers. The book ends up with a the-
ory of state punishment that is in some key ways backward-looking or re-
tributive. That is to say, it defends a justification for inflicting some setback 
on the offender for their offence according to which such a response does jus-
tice to what the offender has done, rather than bringing about some further 
good. However, the argument for state punishment is meant to escape the pit-
falls of more basic forms of retributivist theory of punishment that rest on an 
unappealing brute claim that offenders deserve to suffer. The Apology Ritual 
argument sees the central aim of state punishment as proportionate condem-
nation of moral wrongs – or at least those moral wrongs that are the business 
of the collective (for which Duff [Duff (2001)] has appropriated the term 
“public wrongs”). And in explaining why condemnation has to involve pun-
ishment, it draws on a parallel between punishment and those retributive reac-
tions that seem appropriate in interpersonal interactions. Hence I will review 
the arguments of the book by starting with where I end up and working back 
through some of the steps to which my conclusion commits me. I will then 
show how I attempt to defend those commitments by looking at the parallel 
with interpersonal interactions. 
So the arguments we will look at here are: 1) the Apology Ritual argu-
ment; 2) the Penance argument; and 3) the Right to be Punished argument. 
Before going into these arguments in more detail, a quick overview of the 
way the three fit together might be helpful. 
The Apology Ritual argument tries to establish that the decent state 
needs a reprobative institution, and that such an institution will have to be re-
tributive to the extent of a) imposing hardship, and b) deriving its justifica-
tion for imposing hardship from the need to take the offence seriously. One 
key objection that reprobative theories of punishment face – for instance, in 
Joel Feinberg’s classic paper [Feinberg (1974)] – is the demand to explain 
why, if condemnation of an offence is necessary, it could not be issued ver-
bally, or symbolically. How does the argument that hardship is necessary re-
sist lapsing back into a more basic form of retributivism? The argument for a) 
in The Apology Ritual doesn’t take the common retributivist route of looking 
at the way in which something like outrage at an offence makes us want to 
inflict harm on offenders. Rather it derives from the fact that an appropriate 
response to the offence on the part of the offender will involve willingly as-
suming some burden as a way of making amends. Hence we need something 
like the Penance argument to explain why penitential amends proportionate 
to the offence are a necessary part of an appropriate response to that offence. 
The Penance argument needs to explain why a response to offenders that 
didn’t involve treating offenders in a certain way in order to do justice to 
their offence (such as the purely verbal or symbolic communication of con-
demnation) would fail to take the offender and offence seriously. Finally, the 
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for the offender. But this involves a certain view of identity and responsibil-
ity, and so we need an argument that spells out that view and defends it 
against some of the concerns that philosophers have traditionally had about 
moral responsibility. This is the role of the Right to be Punished argument, the 
conclusion of which is that we owe it to offenders that we should hold them re-
sponsible, on the grounds that doing so is constitutive of treating them as a 
capable and independently functioning member of a relationship. 
 
 
II. THE APOLOGY RITUAL ARGUMENT 
 
One way to motivate intuitions when dealing with a question like that 
of the justification of punishment is to attempt to put oneself, imaginatively, 
into a society in which the institution in which one is interested doesn’t exist, 
and then ask whether there would be a need for that institution. So: if pun-
ishment didn’t exist, would we need to invent it? The reason for trying this 
thought-experiment is not so that we will be in a position to assert the rational 
necessity, for all forms of human society, of the institution of punishment, let 
alone in order to make claims about the actual historical genesis of the insti-
tution of punishment. Rather the thought experiment, it is hoped, might illu-
minate the place of the institution of punishment in our values and our self-
understanding. For instance, one way of justifying punishment would be to 
show that, however unattractive or unpleasant punishment might be, it is in 
fact a necessary part of something else that is more uncontroversially good. If 
punishment really is a necessary part of that good then the appearance of un-
attractiveness can be dispelled. But such an account might also help us to un-
derstand better what punishment is really there for, and hence to understand 
how we might do it better, undistracted by other competing but false accounts 
of what it does. 
From the overview given in the first section, it might already be obvi-
ous that the strategy for the justification of punishment adopted in The 
Apology Ritual is to claim that punishment is necessary in order to take 
wrongdoing seriously. Taking wrongdoing seriously is something that many 
people will agree is an important aim. Therefore if punishment is necessary 
to do that – if the absence of punishment would be in some way to tolerate 
wrongdoing – then we could perhaps see that punishment, up to that point, is 
justified. (It is worth noting, at this point, that the same strategy goes through 
the whole book: the Penance and Right to be Punished arguments will also be 
found to rest on a conception of what it is to respond to human wrongdoing 
in a way that is sufficiently morally serious.) 
Let us start, then, with the notion of a decent society. I don’t mean “de-
cent” as a term of art, as in Margalit’s conception of the society that allows 
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mind a hopefully uncontroversial claim, that a decent society is one that 
won’t stand for, or won’t tolerate, certain things being done by its citizens. 
The decent society is one that is organised in line with certain values, and a 
reasonable view of these values will extend to the lives of its citizens (and not 
just its own citizens), their environment, the common institutions of society, 
the lives of future generations, and so on. Now because it is citizens them-
selves that have to be the agents of the promotion and respect of these values, 
it follows that a society that has values must hold that citizens ought not to 
act in certain ways: it will hold that citizens have responsibilities. 
Now imagine a society in which there was no system of criminal justice 
of any sort, by which I mean no mechanism in which society collectively 
takes action against someone who violates their responsibilities. The differ-
ence between our society and this alternative society is that in the alternative 
the society takes no action to mark the action as impermissible or intolerable. 
In such a society, it may be true to say that citizens have those responsibili-
ties, but it can’t be said that the society is one that, collectively, takes those 
responsibilities seriously. At any rate this society is not one that regards its 
citizens as bound by those responsibilities. If the society takes no action to 
mark the actions as impermissible or intolerable it is hard to see how that so-
ciety could be claimed to regard those responsibilities as binding. Otherwise 
put, the decent society has to condemn those acts that are intolerable. 
That will do at present for the argument that a state that takes a stand on 
certain values needs an institution of censure: an institution that marks certain 
acts as beyond the pale. The question now is whether punishment is neces-
sary for such censure to take place. The argument for this point begins with 
the observation that, for an act to be an act of condemnation, it must meet 
certain conditions, one of which is that it should be symbolically adequate. 
Like a well-formed proposition, it needs to take a certain form in order to 
have condemnatory meaning. Now, if this is accepted, the next question that 
arises is where the relevant symbols are to be found. The answer that the 
Apology Ritual argument gives is that the symbolism of condemnation will 
have to connect state condemnation of crime in some way with the way in 
which we react to wrongdoing in everyday life. Our intuitive expectations 
about reactions to wrongdoing are inextricably linked to the practices of deal-
ing with wrongdoing that we play out time and time again in interpersonal 
life. Thus, in order to find the symbolism that will express condemnation, we 
should look at the emotional behaviour that surrounds wrongdoing in non-
state situations. 
This should then direct our attention at the range of emotions that we 
experience towards wrongdoers. Of course, we should not be uncritical in our 
drawing on the emotions. Some emotions are mean-minded, ungenerous, ma-
licious, cruel, egoistic, and so on. But some emotions, it might be, can sur-
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on. Critical reflection on the emotions will look at a) how the emotion por-
trays the wrongdoer, and whether that is compatible with our considered 
view, and b) what is a proportionate emotional response to the situation. The 
idea is that we therefore come up with some view about what a proportionate 
and appropriate emotional response to wrongdoing would be, and seek in 
some way to replicate that in punishment. 
One way to do that would be to argue that emotions like blame and in-
dignation lead us to attack the wrongdoer and inflict suffering on him, and that 
in this way such emotions are directly analogous to punishment. However, it is 
not at all clear that blaming can justifiably lead to such aggressive responses. 
Blame, on my view, is characterised more by withdrawal from the offender 
than by the active infliction of suffering. My approach is rather to argue that 
we should look at the reaction that we think the offender should have to the 
offence. Self-blame, or guilt, I argue, leads to penitential action; and though 
penitential action can often get out of proportion, we have a fairly determi-
nate sense of how a person’s willingness to make amends should match the 
seriousness of their breach (such that an offer of insufficient amends can add 
insult to injury by showing that the offender has failed to grasp the serious-
ness of what they have done). In other words, the properly sorry person will 
be motivated to do something to make up for the offence. And it is this fact 
that gives us our symbolism for expressing proportionate condemnation. In im-
posing a certain level of amends on an offender we express condemnation in a 
symbolically adequate way: we condemn the wrong as being of a certain grav-
ity by expressing how sorry the offender ought to be for what they have done. 
Since the role of the state is simply to express censure, it is not essential 
to the success of punishment that the offender makes the amends willingly. 
The state’s role is simply to express censure, and it is not clear that it prop-
erly has a role of ensuring that the offender is truly guilty. Hence the process 
of making amends is one that the offender can engage in purely ritualisti-
cally, without appropriate motivations. Such a scenario would not be ideal; 
but it would not prevent the state from having expressed due condemnation 
of the act. 
The Apology Ritual argument raises various questions, of course. The 
one I want to concentrate on at the moment is the crucial question of why an 
offender who is properly sorry should be motivated to penitential action. This 
is an important claim because it is not enough for the Apology Ritual argu-
ment that the connection between having done wrong and making amends 
should be widely accepted, or that many people accept it. That might be 
enough if the point of punishment was to get people to realise that the state 
disapproves of an action, to communicate disapproval: if that was the point 
then the state should use whatever symbols the folk use. But the Apology 
Ritual argument is more ambitious, since it holds that, for some very serious 
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demn would be to acquiesce in the offence. Therefore the symbols used for 
condemnation have to be, not just those that happen to be in use, but those 
that actually dissociate us from the wrong. Penitential action seems like a 
candidate here; at any rate those who undertake it experience it as a way of 
dissociating themselves from their action. But the question is, are they right 
to experience it in that way? In order to answer that question, we need the 
Penance argument. 
 
 
III. THE PENANCE ARGUMENT 
 
The Penance argument states that penance is the offender’s withdrawal 
of goodwill from himself. It rests on an explanation of why withdrawal is an 
appropriate reaction to an offender; and then sees penance as the internalisa-
tion of this reaction. Penance occurs when the offender accepts blame. 
The argument in defence of this view starts from a claim about relation-
ships that a) are valuable in the sense that we look on them as part of what 
makes our lives good and worthwhile, and b) that are structured, in part, by 
one’s being subject to certain responsibilities. It looks at what is involved in 
being included in such relationships. When one is included by others in a cer-
tain relationship, I claim, they treat you in ways that mark you out as a mem-
ber of that relationship. Some of these forms of “special treatment” or 
“recognition” are things such as greetings, inquiries after one’s well-being, 
types of care and affection, etc., by which people affirm their shared partici-
pation in a relationship they regard as an important tie. But other marks of 
recognition have to do with being asked to perform the duties that are part of 
the relationship, or to get involved with the activities we are involved with as 
a member of that relationship. Friendship is a good example of this. To be a 
friend to someone is to recognise that there is such a thing as being a good 
friend to someone. That is to say, there are certain standards or responsibili-
ties to the relationship, standards the meeting of which is constitutive of be-
ing in that relationship. If one has no regard whatsoever for those standards, 
and if the person involved has no claim on your time and attention that marks 
them out as someone in that relationship with you, then it is not clear whether 
the relationship really exists. So the first premise in the argument is that there 
are marks of “recognition,” distinctive forms of treatment that one gets when 
one is a member of a certain relationship. 
Now in between the two extremes of being a truly good friend and be-
ing no friend at all, lies a large grey area where the question of what friends 
can reasonably demand of one another is settled. The part of this continuum 
in which I am interested, is that in which a person a) violates the basic stan-
dards that can be reasonably expected of her in the context of that relation-
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is not that she is (literally) no friend at all – she is, after all, still subject to the 
demands of the relationship. (The fact that the demands of that relationship 
still make a claim on her shows this.) However, the question arises how one 
should take that violation of friendship seriously – assuming, that is, that the 
friendship still holds, is still important, but has been violated. 
First of all, one might take various courses of prudential action, in order 
to protect one’s own feelings, say, or to stop wasting any more time in the re-
lationship. On those grounds they might withdraw from the relationship or 
break it off. However, I am interested in something different. As I have said 
before, I am interested in behaviour that is not forward-looking, but rather is 
constitutive of taking the violation of friendship seriously. And here the 
thought is that one wants to do something that prevents one acquiescing in or 
condoning what the other person has done. One wants to resist the claim, im-
plicit in the violation, that these are the terms on which the friendship might 
proceed. My claim is that the basic retributive intuition is that one should not 
simply remain on good terms with the person because that would be to imply 
that one went along with their way of behaving. If one has that intuition, 
there is a question how one should show one’s non-acquiescence. One might 
confront the person, explaining to them why one feels that their behaviour 
was beyond what is reasonable. However, I think that it will also be the case 
that, until the person has accepted the justice of your complaint, you will also 
find it necessary to alter the terms of the relationship with the person, and 
will do so by withdrawing some of the “marks of recognition” that you would 
have given the person otherwise. Hence the thought that moral disapproval 
expresses itself essentially in a withdrawal of goodwill or recognition. One 
withdraws from the relationship, partially and temporarily, not in order to 
protect oneself or save one’s precious time, but rather because to treat the per-
son as if nothing had happened would be to condone or acquiesce in the viola-
tion of the relationship. Therefore the terms of the relationship have to alter. 
It is important also to distinguish this backward-looking expressive be-
haviour from forward-looking communicative behaviour. The point is not 
that one wants to communicate one’s disapproval to the offender. For if this 
was the case the question would arise whether withdrawal of recognition was 
the best way to communicate disapproval: it would become a contingent 
question. Whereas the question of the fittingness of withdrawal behaviour has 
rather to do with the non-contingent matter of whether it does justice to the 
gravity of the wrongdoing. Blame is therefore not essentially communicative, 
but rather forms part of that large realm of expressive behaviour that is often 
neglected by moral philosophers, such as saying sorry, expressing gratitude, 
mourning, expressing joy, and so on. In this realm the standards of “getting it 
right” are akin to aesthetic standards; they have to do with whether the behaviour 
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When one is oneself the offender, what happens if one accepts the dis-
approval of others and takes their part? If my story is correct, one will with-
draw recognition from oneself. One will feel it impossible to be on good 
terms with oneself and give oneself the usual respect and good treatment. 
One way in which this will come out is the feeling of guilt which, as a num-
ber of writers have acknowledged, is a feeling of self-alienation, or self-
splitting. But this analysis also explains why the guilty person might feel 
compelled to undergo something penitential. The meaning of penance derives 
from the fact that one cannot be on good terms with oneself and will have to 
treat oneself less well until the offence has been dealt with. What this will 
actually involve in any particular instance is a large question, but it seems an 
observable fact about the phenomenology of moral experience that we judge 
the sincerity of a person’s remorse by their unwillingness to look for the 
normal benefits that accompany a good life, in a manner proportionate to 
their understanding of the seriousness of their wrong. 
All this suggests, then, that the imposition of penitential amends is an 
appropriate symbolisation of “how sorry one ought to be”: a certain amount 
of amends is what the “virtuous offender” would feel compelled to make in a 
situation of wrongdoing. 
 
 
IV. THE “RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED” ARGUMENT 
 
The argument so far has been that, with respect to interpersonal rela-
tionships, taking violations of the demands of a relationship seriously re-
quires blame (withdrawal) and hence penance on the part of the offender; and 
that, with respect to the decent state, taking “public wrongs” seriously re-
quires imposing penitential amends, in order to appropriately symbolise the 
necessary condemnation of the offence. But the retributive responses in 
which I am interested could also be seen as a way of taking the wrongdoer 
seriously, since seeing the action as an offence involves seeing it as the action 
of an agent bound by certain demands. The Penance Argument makes it clear 
that, in blaming, the offender is seen as a member of that relationship that has 
been violated. The argument therefore claims, contrary to many of the com-
mon criticisms of retributivism, that retributive responses can be inclusive – 
and, indeed, necessary for inclusion. That is the truth I claim can be found in 
the seemingly strange idea of the “right to be punished”. I now want to ex-
plain how this argument can be defended against two objections. 
The first objection is what in the book I call the “sceptical argument 
from luck”. It states that, since control is a necessary condition of true moral 
responsibility, the fact that we are not ultimately in control of what we do 
(because what we do is conditioned by who we are and how we think, and we 
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responsible, and that it is therefore unfair to blame anyone for wrong actions. 
One way to see what is wrong with this challenge is to ask how we should 
treat offenders (or “offenders”) if the conclusion of the argument were to be 
accepted. One possibility would be that we should, as far as possible, simply 
accommodate disruptive behaviour, as we might accommodate the disruptive 
behaviour of someone with Tourette’s Syndrome; and that insofar as we can-
not accommodate or tolerate it, we should take minimally harmful steps to 
protect ourselves against it. This is, indeed, to deal with “wrongdoing” as if it 
is analogous to a condition such as Tourette’s. The problem with this analogy 
is that it denies that we have an important form of freedom, and hence that 
we are free in respect of wrongdoing in a way that the Tourette’s sufferer is 
not in control of his shouting and swearing. The crucial difference between 
the Tourette’s case and that of the wrongdoer is that the person who does 
wrong does so because he thinks that it is all right to act in that way. Why is 
that a morally critical distinction? Because one might think that one is free in 
the sense that one has the ability, if one thinks about it well enough and 
imaginatively enough, a) to recognise that some acts are impermissible or in-
tolerable, and b) to conform one’s behaviour to what one thus recognises. 
What this ability amounts to can be seen if we look at our engagement in the 
practice of shared inquiry. Shared inquiry rests on the assumption that our 
conclusions can be guided by considerations that we can recognise in com-
mon. Only a person who is responsive to relevant considerations when they 
are put to her can seriously be engaged by others in a shared inquiry. Fur-
thermore the practice of shared inquiry into practical matters of what to do 
and feel is so essential to social interaction that the denial of freedom in this 
sense would limit one’s life chances severely. Therefore being treated as free 
in this sense – and hence responsible in the sense that one can be called to ac-
count for one’s beliefs and actions and expected to recognise relevant consid-
erations counting for and against acting that way – is an important form of 
inclusion and one that, when one has it, should be affirmed and recognised. 
The analogy between the Tourette’s sufferer and the wrongdoer threatens to 
overlook the importance of this distinction. 
We have now sketched the answer to the first objection. However, 
the second objection arises immediately from the response to the first. Let’s 
say we grant that it is important to treat the agent as free in the sense that she 
can engage in shared inquiry. In that respect we might draw the conclusion 
that a given agent has the “right to be treated as one who can appropriately be 
held to account.” But it does not give us a “right to be punished.” Rather it 
suggests a non-retributive response to wrongdoing, which is that we engage 
the wrongdoer in dialogue about why what she did was wrong, aiming to get 
her to engage imaginatively with the considerations that count against acting 
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form of social interaction requires that she be subjected to retributive reac-
tions such as blame and withdrawal. 
The response to this objection draws a distinction between being an 
agent who can be engaged in a practice of shared inquiry, and who is there-
fore capable of learning and adjusting their behaviour to what they learn, and 
an agent who is an independently functioning member of a particular rela-
tionship, capable by himself of recognising his responsibilities and conform-
ing with them. Thus in the book I distinguish between those who, with 
respect to the responsibilities of a particular relationship, are apprentices 
(who are capable of learning but need guidance), and those who are qualified 
practitioners (who can reasonably be expected to function independently). 
My claim is that the symbolism of withdrawal is appropriate for qualified 
practitioners, but not for apprentices, and that entering into dialogue about 
the wrong with qualified practitioners and without the symbolism of with-
drawal is inappropriate since it doesn’t recognise that, even if the agent acted 
as he did through a failure in imagination or moral understanding, the quali-
fied practitioner has a responsibility to take the necessary steps to full recogni-
tion of his responsibilities himself. If he needs guidance then it is up to him to 
seek guidance; therefore if he fails to seek guidance and thence does wrong, the 
wrong is a failure to do something that it was his responsibility to do. 
My interest is therefore in the importance within social interaction of 
our being treated as qualified practitioners, and hence as independently – with-
out guidance or intervention from others – capable of recognising what, in a 
given situation or relationship, can reasonably and justifiably be expected of 
us. My view rests on the claim that a) it is hugely important to be recognised, 
with respect to at least some areas of our lives, as qualified practitioners, 
since those who are not so qualified are not given the same liberty, privacy, 
and room for individuality and creativity, as those who are; and b) that when 
a qualified practitioner does wrong, they are in the position of being a mem-
ber of a relationship whose basic terms they have violated, and the appropri-
ate way to respond to that, in order not to accept or condone or acquiesce in 
it, is to withdraw (partially and temporarily) the marks of recognition that 
would normally go with membership of that relationship. That is the kernel 
of truth in the “right to be punished”.* 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I summarise the main arguments of my book The Apology Ritual. I 
draw attention to three main lines of argument, taking them in reverse order to that in 
which they appear in the book. First, I look at the book’s communicative-expressive 
justification of state punishment. Secondly, I look at the argument for the claim that 
feeling properly sorry involves a requirement to undertake some sort of penance. And 
thirdly, I look at the argument for the “right to be punished”: as I interpret it, that there 
is an important status associated with being treated as a responsible agent. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Punishment; Criminal Justice; Retribution; Emotion; Responsibility; 
Penance. 
 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo resumo los argumentos principales de mi libro The Apology Ri-
tual. Llamo la atención sobre tres líneas principales de argumentación, tomándolas en 
un orden inverso al de su aparición en el libro. Primero dirijo la mirada a la justifica-
ción expresivo-comunicativa del castigo por parte del estado que ofrece el libro. En 
segundo lugar, considero el argumento a favor de la afirmación de que sentirse verda-
deramente arrepentido trae consigo la exigencia de que se asuma algún tipo de peni-
tencia. Y, en tercer lugar, me ocupo del argumento a favor del “derecho a ser 
castigado” tal y como lo interpreto, según el cual hay un estatuto importante asociado a 
que uno sea tratado como un agente responsable. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE:  castigo; justicia penal; retribución; emoción; responsabilidad; 
penitencia. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCCIÓN Y PANORAMA 
 
En esta pieza introductoria me gustaría destacar tres de los argumentos 
principales de The Apology Ritual [C. Bennett, The Apology Ritual. A Philoso-
phical Theory of Punishment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008]. 
Empezaré por el final del libro, con la esperanza de, por así decir, arrojar al-
guna nueva luz sobre los asuntos que el libro abarca. El libro acaba con una 
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teoría del castigo por parte del estado que en ciertos aspectos clave es retros-
pectiva o retributiva. Esto quiere decir que defiende una justificación para in-
fligir algún tipo de revés al delincuente (offender) por su delito, según la cual 
esa respuesta hace justicia a aquello que el delicuente ha hecho y no se puede 
decir que produce en la misma medida un bien ulterior. Sin embargo, el ar-
gumento a favor del castigo por parte del estado se supone que evita los esco-
llos con los que tropiezan formas más básicas de la teoría retribucionista de la 
pena, basadas en la idea pura y dura y poco atractiva de que los delincuentes 
merecen sufrir. El argumento de The Apology Ritual considera que el propó-
sito más importante del castigo por parte del estado es la condena proporcio-
nada de las malas acciones (wrongs) morales –o, al menos, de las malas 
acciones morales que son asunto de la colectividad (para las que Duff [Duff 
(2001)] se ha apropiado del término “malas acciones públicas (public 
wrongs)”). Y, para explicar por qué la condena tiene que involucrar una pena, 
se apoya en el paralelismo que hay entre la pena y esas reacciones retributi-
vas que parecen apropiadas en las interacciones interpersonales. De ahí que 
vaya a revisar los argumentos del libro empezando por el final y desandando 
algunos de los pasos con los que mi conclusión me compromete. Luego mos-
traré cómo trato de defender esos compromisos examinando el paralelismo 
con las interacciones interpersonales. 
Así pues, los argumentos a los que prestaremos atención aquí son: 1) el 
Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa; 2) el Argumento de la Penitencia; y 3) 
el Argumento del Derecho a Ser Castigado. Pero antes de entrar en el detalle 
de estos argumentos podría servir de ayuda que proporcionara brevemente 
una visión de conjunto del modo en que los tres encajan entre sí. 
El Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa intenta establecer que un estado 
que es como debe ser (decent) necesita de una institución reprobatoria, y que 
semejante institución tendrá que ser retributiva hasta el punto de a) imponer 
sufrimientos y b) derivar la justificación para hacerlo de la necesidad de to-
marse el delito en serio. Una objeción clave a la que tienen que hacer frente 
las teorías reprobatorias de la pena –por ejemplo, en el trabajo clásico de Joel 
Feinberg [Feinberg (1974)]– es la exigencia de que se explique por qué, sien-
do la condena del delito necesaria, no se podría aplicar verbal o simbólica-
mente. ¿Cómo evita el argumento de que el sufrimiento es necesario una 
recaída en formas más básicas de retribucionismo? El argumento a favor de 
(a) en The Apology Ritual no sigue la vía retribucionista común de volver la 
mirada hacia el modo en que algo parecido a la indignación ante un delito nos 
hace querer infligir daño a los delincuentes. Más bien deriva del hecho de que 
una respuesta apropiada al delito de parte del delincuente involucrará la acep-
tación voluntaria de alguna carga a modo de reparación. Por tanto, necesita-
mos de algo parecido al Argumento de la Penitencia para explicar por qué las 
reparaciones de tipo penitencial proporcionales al delito son una parte nece-
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tiene que explicar por qué una respuesta a los delincuentes que no involucrara 
tratarlos de cierto modo para hacerle justicia al delito (tal y como lo sería la 
comunicación puramente verbal o simbólica de una condena) fracasaría a la 
hora de tomarse en serio al delincuente y el delito. Finalmente, el Argumento 
de la Penitencia supone que la exigencia de penitencia es obligatoria para el 
delincuente. Pero esto implica cierta concepción de la identidad y la respon-
sabilidad, así que necesitamos un argumento que explicite esa visión y la de-
fienda contra algunas de las preocupaciones que los filósofos han expresado 
tradicionalmente a propósito de la responsabilidad moral. Éste es el papel del 
Argumento del Derecho a Ser Castigado, cuya conclusión es que estamos 
obligados para con los delincuentes a hacerlos responsables, y esto sobre la 
base de que hacerlo es constitutivo de tratarlos como miembros capaces y 
funcionalmente independientes de una relación. 
 
 
II. EL ARGUMENTO DEL RITUAL DE LA DISCULPA 
 
Un modo de motivar intuiciones cuando tratamos de cuestiones como la 
de la justificación de la pena es intentar situarse uno mismo, imaginariamen-
te, en una sociedad en la que la institución por la que nos interesamos no 
existe y preguntarnos, entonces, si habría necesidad de una institución tal. Así 
pues, si no existiera la pena, ¿necesitaríamos inventarla? La razón para ensa-
yar este experimento mental no es tanto que [después de hacerlo] estaremos 
en condiciones de afirmar la necesidad racional, para todo tipo de sociedad 
humana, de la institución de la pena, no digamos ya de decir algo sobre su gé-
nesis histórica real. Más bien, se espera que el experimento mental ilumine el 
lugar de la institución de la pena en el conjunto de nuestros valores y nuestra 
comprensión de nosotros mismos. Por ejemplo, un modo de justificar la pena 
consistiría en mostrar que, a pesar de lo poco atractiva y desagradable que la 
pena puede ser, es de hecho una parte necesaria de otra cosa que es buena en 
un sentido menos controvertido. Si la pena fuera realmente una parte necesa-
ria de ese bien, entonces la apariencia de falta de atractivo podría conjurarse. 
Pero tal concepción podría ayudarnos además a comprender mejor para qué 
existe la pena y, por tanto, a entender cómo podríamos mejorarla, no tentados 
ya por otras concepciones, rivales pero falsas, de su función. 
A la vista del panorama ofrecido en la primera sección, podría resultar ya 
obvio que la estrategia para la justificación de la pena adoptada en The Apology 
Ritual es afirmar que la pena es necesaria con vistas a tomar el delito seria-
mente. Tomarse el delito seriamente es algo que mucha gente estará de 
acuerdo en que es un fin importante. Por consiguiente, si la pena es necesaria 
para hacerlo, si la ausencia de pena significa, en algún sentido, que el delito 
es tolerado, entonces podríamos entender que la pena está, hasta ese punto, 
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el libro: los Argumentos de la Penitencia y del Derecho a Ser Castigado ven-
drán también a descansar sobre la concepción de en qué consiste responder al 
delito del hombre de un modo que sea moralmente serio). 
Empecemos, pues, por la noción de sociedad que es como debe ser (de-
cent). No utilizo ‘decent’ como si fuera un término técnico, como ocurre en 
la concepción de Margalit de una sociedad que permite a los ciudadanos vivir 
libres de humillaciones [Margalit (1998)]. Tengo en mente, simplemente, una 
afirmación que espero que no sea controvertida: que una sociedad que es como 
debe ser es una sociedad que no respaldará, o que no tolerará, que los ciudada-
nos hagan ciertas cosas. Una sociedad así es tal que está organizada de acuerdo 
con ciertos valores, y una concepción razonable de esos valores se extiende por 
la vida de los ciudadanos (y no sólo de sus ciudadanos), a su entorno, a las ins-
tituciones comunes de la sociedad, a las vidas de generaciones futuras, etcétera. 
Pues bien, puesto que son los ciudadanos mismos quienes tienen que ser los 
agentes de la promoción y el respeto de estos valores, se sigue que una socie-
dad que tiene valores debe sostener que los ciudadanos no deberían actuar de 
ciertos modos: sostendrá que los ciudadanos tienen responsabilidades. 
Imaginemos ahora una sociedad en la que no existe un sistema de justicia 
penal de ningún tipo, y con ello me refiero a un mecanismo por el que la socie-
dad emprende colectivamente acciones contra quien conculca sus responsabili-
dades. La diferencia entre nuestra sociedad y esa sociedad alternativa es que en 
la alternativa la sociedad no hace nada para señalar tal acción como inadmisible 
o intolerable. En semejante sociedad podría ser correcto decir que los ciudada-
nos tienen esas responsabilidades, pero no se puede decir que la sociedad es tal 
que, colectivamente, se toma en serio esas responsabilidades. En cualquier ca-
so, esa sociedad no considera que sus ciudadanos estén sujetos a esas responsa-
bilidades. Si la sociedad no hace nada para señalar las acciones como 
inadmisibles o intolerables, es difícil ver cómo se puede decir que la sociedad 
considera que esas responsabilidades son vinculantes. Dicho de otro modo, una 
sociedad que es como debe de ser tiene que condenar esos actos intolerables. 
Esto funciona por ahora como argumento a favor de que un estado que 
se posiciona con respecto a ciertos valores tiene necesidad de una institución 
de censura: una institución que marque ciertos actos como extralimitaciones. 
La cuestión ahora es si la pena es necesaria para que esa censura tenga lugar. 
El argumento a favor de esto parte de la observación de que, para que un acto 
sea un acto de condena, tiene que satisfacer ciertas condiciones, una de las 
cuales es que debe ser adecuado simbólicamente. Como una oración bien 
formada, tiene que adoptar cierta forma con vistas a tener un significado con-
denatorio. Pues bien, si esto se acepta, la siguiente cuestión que se plantea es 
dónde se pueden encontrar los símbolos relevantes. La contestación que el 
Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa ofrece es que el simbolismo de la con-
dena tendrá que conectar de alguna manera la condena del delito por parte del 
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Nuestras expectativas intuitivas sobre las reacciones ante el delito están inex-
tricablemente vinculadas a las prácticas de tratar con delitos en las que parti-
cipamos una y otra vez en la vida interpersonal. Así pues, con vistas a dar 
con el simbolismo que expresará la condena, hemos de considerar el compor-
tamiento emocional que rodea al delito en situaciones que no son competen-
cia del estado. 
Esto ha de dirigir nuestra atención hacia el espectro de emociones que 
experimentamos hacia quienes delinquen. Por supuesto, no deberíamos dejar 
de ser críticos cuando recurrimos a las emociones. Algunas emociones son 
mezquinas, no generosas, maliciosas, egoístas, etcétera. Pero algunas emo-
ciones, podría ser, pueden sobrevivir a la reflexión crítica. Es a esas emocio-
nes a las que queremos recurrir. La reflexión crítica sobre las emociones 
considerará a) cómo la emoción retrata al delincuente, y si es compatible con 
el punto de vista que estamos considerando, y b) cuál es una repuesta emo-
cional proporcionada a la situación. La idea es que, así, llegaremos a tener 
una visión sobre cuál sería una respuesta emocional proporcionada y apro-
piada, y buscar entonces un modo de reproducirla en la pena. 
Un modo de hacer esto sería argumentar que emociones como la censura 
y la indignación nos conducen a atacar al delincuente y a causarle sufrimientos 
y que, en este sentido, esas emociones son directamente análogas a la pena. Sin 
embargo, no está en absoluto claro que censurar pueda conducir justificada-
mente a tales respuestas agresivas. La censura, desde mi punto de vista, se ca-
racteriza más por un rechazo del delincuente que por causar activamente 
sufrimiento. Mi enfoque consiste más bien en argumentar que deberíamos con-
templar la reacción que pensamos que el delincuente debería tener ante el deli-
to. La auto-censura, o la culpa, razono, conduce a la acción penitencial; y 
aunque la acción penitencial rebase a menudo la proporcionalidad, tenemos un 
sentido bastante determinado de cómo la disposición de una persona a llevar a 
cabo una reparación debe corresponder a la seriedad de su infracción (de modo 
que una oferta de reparaciones insuficientes puede agregar sal a la herida, al 
mostrar que el delincuente no ha logrado captar la seriedad de lo que ha hecho). 
Con otras palabras, la persona genuinamente arrepentida estará motivada a 
hacer algo para compensar el delito. Y es este hecho el que nos proporciona el 
simbolismo para expresar una condena proporcionada. Al imponer cierto nivel 
de reparaciones al delincuente expresamos condena de un modo simbólicamen-
te adecuado: condenamos el mal causado como algo que tiene cierta gravedad 
al expresar cuán apenado debería estar el delincuente por lo que ha hecho. 
Puesto que el papel del estado es simplemente el de expresar censura, 
no es esencial para el éxito de la pena que el delincuente haga la reparación 
de modo voluntario. El papel del estado es puramente el de expresar censura, 
y no está claro que tenga el de asegurar que el delincuente se sienta verdade-
ramente culpable. Por eso, el proceso de reparación es tal que el delincuente 
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pondientes. Semejante escenario no sería el ideal; pero no impediría que el 
estado hubiera expresado la debida condena del acto. 
El Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa suscita varias cuestiones, por 
supuesto. Una en la que me quiero concentrar ahora es la cuestión crucial de 
por qué un delincuente que se siente propiamente apenado por lo que ha 
hecho debería estar motivado para actuar penitencialmente. Esto es importan-
te, porque no es suficiente para el Argumento del Ritual de la Disculpa que la 
conexión entre haber actuado mal y la reparación sea ampliamente aceptada, 
o que mucha gente la acepte. Tal cosa podría bastar si el objeto de la pena 
fuera que la gente se diera cuenta de que el estado no aprueba una acción, 
comunicar desaprobación: si ese fuere su objeto, el estado debería usar cual-
quier símbolo empleado por la gente. Pero el Argumento del Ritual de la Dis-
culpa es más ambicioso, pues sostiene que, con respecto a algunas acciones 
muy serias, los actos que constituyen la condena son necesarios, porque no 
condenar vendría a ser condescender con el delito. Por lo tanto, los símbolos 
usados para condenar han de ser, no los que sucede que están en uso, sino los 
que nos disocian efectivamente del daño realizado. La acción penitencial pa-
rece aquí una buena candidata; en todo caso, quienes emprenden tal acción la 
experimentan como un modo de disociarse de su acción previa. Ahora bien, 
la cuestión es: ¿tienen derecho a experimentarla de ese modo? Y para contes-
tarla, necesitamos del Argumento de la Penitencia. 
 
 
III. EL ARGUMENTO DE LA PENITENCIA 
 
El Argumento de la Penitencia establece que la penitencia consiste en 
que el delincuente retira la buena voluntad con que se trata a sí mismo. Des-
cansa sobre la explicación de por qué la retracción es una reacción apropiada 
hacia el que delinque; y luego ve la penitencia como una interiorización de esta 
reacción. La penitencia tiene lugar cuando el delincuente acepta la censura. 
El argumento en defensa de esta concepción parte de una afirmación 
sobre las relaciones: a) que son valiosas en el sentido de que las considera-
mos parte de lo que hace nuestras vidas buenas y dignas de ser vividas, y b) 
que están estructuradas, parcialmente, por la sujeción a ciertas responsabili-
dades. Contempla lo que está implicado en estar incluido en tales relaciones. 
Cuando uno está incluido por otros en una cierta relación, sostengo, es trata-
do de maneras que lo distinguen como miembro de la relación. Algunas de 
estas formas de ‘trato especial’ o ‘reconocimiento’ son cosas tales como sa-
ludos, preocupación por el bienestar de uno, ciertos tipos de atención y de 
afecto, etc., por medio de los cuales la gente afirma su participación común 
en una relación que es considerada un lazo importante. Pero otras señales de 
reconocimiento tienen que ver con que se demanda que se cumpla con los 
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que trae consigo la relación. La amistad es un buen ejemplo de esto. Ser el 
amigo de alguien pasa por reconocer que existe algo así como ser un buen 
amigo de alguien. Esto significa que hay ciertos estándares o responsabilida-
des para con la relación, estándares cuya satisfacción es constitutiva de la 
participación en la relación. Si uno se desentiende totalmente de esos están-
dares, y si las personas implicadas no tienen derecho alguno sobre tu tiempo 
y atención que las distinga como personas que mantienen cierta relación con-
tigo, entonces no está claro que la relación exista realmente. Así pues, la pri-
mera premisa del argumento es que hay señales de ‘reconocimiento’, formas 
distintivas de trato que se le otorgan a uno cuando participa en cierta relación. 
Ahora bien, entre los extremos de quien es verdaderamente un buen 
amigo y quien no es un amigo en absoluto hay una gran área gris en la que se 
decide la cuestión de qué pueden los amigos exigir razonablemente. La parte 
de este continuo por la que me intereso es aquella en que una persona a) con-
culca los estándares básicos a los que está sujeto lo que puede esperarse ra-
zonablemente de ella en el contexto de la relación, pero b) sin por ello dejar 
de mantener esa relación. En tal caso, no ocurre que (literalmente) esa persona 
no sea amiga en absoluto – después de todo, está todavía sujeta a las exigencias 
de la relación. (El hecho de que las exigencias de esa relación todavía la inter-
pelen es una muestra de ello). Sin embargo, la cuestión que se suscita es cómo 
se debería tomar en serio la violación de la amistad – dando por supuesto que la 
amistad subsiste, que es importante todavía, pero que ha sido quebrantada. 
Antes que nada, se podrían adoptar diversas medidas de prudencia con 
vistas a, digamos, proteger los propios sentimientos, o a dejar de perder el 
tiempo en esa relación. Sobre esta base, uno podría renunciar a la relación o in-
terrumpirla. No obstante, me intereso por otra cosa. Como he dicho, me inter-
esa el comportamiento que no mira hacia delante, sino que es constitutivo del 
tomarse en serio la violación de la amistad. Y lo que se piensa aquí es que uno 
quiere hacer algo que evite la condescendencia con, o la convalidación, de lo 
que ha hecho la otra persona. Uno quiere ofrecer resistencia a la pretensión, 
implícita en la violación, de que estos sean los términos en los que podría con-
tinuar la amistad. Mi postura es que la intuición retributiva básica es que uno 
no debería sin más mantenerse en buenos términos con la persona, porque eso 
implicaría que uno consiente ese modo de comportarse. Si se tiene esa intui-
ción, se plantea la pregunta por cómo uno debería mostrar su propia intoleran-
cia. Podría enfrentarse a esa persona, explicarle por qué uno siente que su 
comportamiento ha traspasado los límites de lo razonable. Sin embargo, creo 
que también ocurrirá que hasta que la otra persona haya aceptado la justicia de 
nuestra queja nos parecerá necesario alterar los términos de la relación con ella, 
y lo haremos retirando algunas de las ‘señales de reconocimiento’ que de lo 
contrario le concederíamos. De ahí que se piense que la desaprobación moral se 
expresa esencialmente por la retirada de la buena voluntad o el reconocimiento. 
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se o a ahorrarse un tiempo precioso, sino más bien porque tratar a esa persona 
como si nada hubiera ocurrido sería condonar o tolerar la violación de la rela-
ción. Por lo tanto, los términos de la relación han de cambiar. 
También es importante distinguir este comportamiento expresivo que 
mira hacia atrás del comportamiento comunicativo que mira hacia delante. El 
asunto no es que uno quiera comunicar la propia desaprobación a quien co-
mete un delito. Pues si ése fuera el caso, se plantearía la pregunta de si la reti-
rada del reconocimiento era la mejor manera de comunicar la desaprobación: 
eso se convertiría en una cuestión contingente, mientras que la cuestión de la 
oportunidad de la retracción tiene más bien que ver con la cuestión no con-
tingente de si hace justicia a la gravedad del delito. La censura no es, por tan-
to, esencialmente comunicativa, sino que forma parte más bien de un amplio 
espacio de comportamiento expresivo que es con frecuencia olvidado por los 
filósofos morales e incluye la expresión de disculpas, la expresión de grati-
tud, los lamentos, la expresión de gozo, etcétera. En este espacio los estánda-
res de ‘corrección’ están emparentados con los estándares estéticos; tienen 
que ver con si el comportamiento le hace justicia a la situación o la ‘capta’. 
Este comportamiento no tiene un propósito prospectivo. 
Si uno es quien delinque, ¿qué ocurre cuando acepta la desaprobación 
de otros y se pone en la piel de ellos? Si mi reconstrucción es correcta, él 
mismo se retirará el reconocimiento. Sentirá que es imposible mantenerse en 
buenos términos consigo mismo y concederse el respeto y buen trato habi-
tual. Esto puede resultar en un sentimiento de culpa que, como muchos auto-
res han reconocido, es un sentimiento de auto-alienación o auto-escisión. 
Pero este análisis explica también por qué la persona culpable podría sentirse 
empujada a soportar algún tipo de penitencia. El significado de la penitencia 
deriva del hecho de que uno no puede estar en buenos términos consigo mis-
mo y de que tendrá que tratarse peor hasta que se haya resuelto lo que ha 
hecho. Qué haya de implicar esto, de hecho, en un caso particular es una 
cuestión muy amplia, pero me parece que es un hecho observable de la feno-
menología de la experiencia moral que juzgamos la sinceridad del remordi-
miento de una persona por la falta de pretensiones con respecto a los 
beneficios normales que acompañan a la vida buena, de un modo proporcio-
nado a su comprensión de la seriedad de la injusticia. 
Todo esto sugiere, pues, que la imposición de reparaciones penitencia-
les simboliza apropiadamente ‘cuán apenado se debería estar’: una cierta can-
tidad de reparaciones es lo que el ‘infractor virtuoso’ debería sentirse forzado 
a realizar en una situación de delito. 
 
IV. EL ARGUMENTO DEL ‘DERECHO A SER CASTIGADO’ 
 
Hasta aquí la argumentación ha sido que, con respecto a las relaciones 
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censura (retirada o rechazo) y por tanto penitencia de parte del delincuente; y 
que, con respecto al estado que es como debe ser, tomarse en serio las ‘malas 
acciones públicas’ exige imponer reparaciones penitenciales, con vistas a 
simbolizar apropiadamente la condena necesaria del delito. Pero las reaccio-
nes retributivas en que estoy interesado podrían verse también como modos 
de tratar al delincuente en serio, ya que considerar una acción como un delito 
implica que sea vista como la acción de alguien que está sujeto a ciertas obli-
gaciones. El Argumento de la Penitencia deja claro que, al ser censurado, el 
delincuente es visto como miembro de una relación que ha sido violada. El ar-
gumento afirma, por ello, en contra de muchas de las críticas comunes al retri-
bucionismo, que las respuestas retributivas pueden ser incluyentes y que, de 
hecho, son necesarias para la inclusión. Ésta es la verdad que digo que puede 
hallarse en la idea aparentemente extraña de un ‘derecho a ser castigado’. Qui-
siera explicar ahora cómo puede defenderse este argumento de dos objeciones. 
La primera objeción es lo que en el libro denomino ‘el argumento es-
céptico a partir de la suerte’. Dice que, puesto que el control es una condición 
necesaria de la verdadera responsabilidad moral, el hecho de que no contro-
lemos en última instancia lo que hacemos (porque lo que hacemos está con-
dicionado por lo que somos y cómo pensamos, y no tenemos un control 
último sobre eso) indica que no somos en última instancia responsables, y 
que por tanto es moralmente injusto censurar a alguien por sus malas accio-
nes. Un modo de ver en qué falla este cuestionamiento es preguntar cómo de-
beríamos tratar a los delincuentes (o “delincuentes”) si hubiera que aceptar la 
conclusión del argumento. Una posibilidad sería que tuviéramos simplemen-
te, en la medida de lo posible, que acomodar el comportamiento disruptivo, 
como hemos de hacer con el comportamiento de quien padece el síndrome de 
Tourette; y en la medida en que no pudiéramos acomodarlo o tolerarlo, ten-
dríamos que dar los pasos menos gravosos posibles para protegernos de él. 
Esto es, en efecto, habérselas con el ‘delito’ como si hubiera una analogía en-
tre él y una condición como la de Tourette. El problema de esta analogía es 
que niega que tengamos un tipo de libertad importante, que seamos libres con 
respecto al delito en el sentido preciso en que el paciente de Tourette no lo es 
respecto del gritar y el maldecir. La diferencia crucial entre el caso Tourette y 
el del delincuente es que la persona que actúa mal lo hace porque piensa que 
está bien actuar así. ¿Por qué es esta una distinción moral crítica? Porque uno 
podría pensar que es libre en el sentido de que tiene la capacidad, si piensa 
empleando suficiente imaginación y como es debido, de a) reconocer que al-
gunos actos son inaceptables e intolerables, y b) adaptar el propio comporta-
miento a lo que así se reconoce. Se puede entender lo que significa esta 
capacidad si observamos nuestra implicación en la práctica de la investiga-
ción compartida. La investigación compartida se asienta sobre el supuesto de 
que nuestras conclusiones pueden guiarse por consideraciones que pueden 
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consideraciones relevantes puede participar seriamente con otras en una in-
vestigación compartida. Es más, la práctica de la investigación compartida 
sobre cuestiones prácticas respecto de qué hacer y sentir es tan esencial a la 
interacción social que la negación de la libertad en este sentido limitaría seve-
ramente las oportunidades vitales. Por tanto, ser tratado como libre en este 
sentido –y por ello como responsable en el sentido de que a uno se le pueden 
pedir explicaciones por lo que cree y hace y se espera que identifique las con-
sideraciones relevantes a favor y en contra de actuar de cierta manera– es una 
forma importante de inclusión, una forma que, cuando se disfruta de ella, de-
bería ser afirmada y reconocida. La analogía entre el paciente de Tourette y el 
delincuente amenaza con pasar por alto la importancia de esta distinción. 
Con esto he bosquejado una respuesta a la primera objeción. No obstan-
te, la segunda objeción surge inmediatamente de la respuesta a la primera. 
Aceptemos que concedemos la importancia que tiene que el agente sea trata-
do como libre en el sentido de que puede participar en una investigación con-
junta. En ese sentido, podríamos sacar la conclusión de que un agente dado 
tiene ‘derecho a ser tratado como alguien al que se le puede, apropiadamente, 
pedir cuentas’. Pero eso no nos proporciona un ‘derecho a ser castigados’. 
Más bien favorece una respuesta no retributiva al delito, que consiste en en-
tablar un diálogo con el delincuente sobre por qué lo que hizo estuvo mal, 
con la intención de que tome en consideración, con imaginación, ciertas co-
sas que hablan en contra de lo que hizo. No está claro por qué la inclusión del 
delincuente en una forma importante de interacción social tendría que reque-
rir que fuera sujeto a reacciones retributivas como la censura y el rechazo. 
La respuesta a esta objeción traza una distinción entre ser un agente que 
puede participar en la práctica de la investigación, y es por ello capaz de 
aprender y ajustar su comportamiento a lo que aprende, y un agente que es un 
miembro funcionalmente independiente de una relación particular, capaz por 
sí mismo de reconocer sus responsabilidades y atenerse a ellas. En conse-
cuencia, distingo en el libro entre aquellos que, con respecto a las responsabi-
lidades de una relación particular, son aprendices (quienes son capaces de 
aprender pero necesitan de guía) y quienes son participantes cualificados (de 
quienes se puede esperar razonablemente que funcionen independientemen-
te). Mi tesis es que el simbolismo del rechazo es apropiado para los partici-
pantes cualificados, pero no para los aprendices, y que entablar un diálogo 
sobre lo que se ha hecho mal con los participantes cualificados y sin el sim-
bolismo del rechazo es inapropiado, puesto que no reconoce que, incluso 
cuando el agente actuó como lo hizo por un déficit de imaginación o com-
prensión moral, el participante cualificado tiene la responsabilidad de dar los 
pasos necesarios para reconocer plenamente y por sí mismo sus responsabili-
dades. Si necesita guía, entonces le toca buscarla; por lo tanto, si no la busca 
y en consecuencia hace algo malo, la maldad obedece a que no hizo algo que 
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Mi interés reside, por ello, en la importancia que tiene dentro de la in-
teracción social que seamos tratados como participantes cualificados y, por 
consiguiente, como seres capaces de reconocer de forma independiente –sin 
guía ni intervención de otros– qué se puede esperar razonable y justificada-
mente de nosotros en una situación o relación dada. Mi visión se basa en la 
afirmación de que a) es enormemente importante ser reconocido como parti-
cipante cualificado, al menos en relación a algunas áreas de nuestra vida, ya 
que a quienes no lo son no se les otorga la misma libertad, privacidad y espa-
cio para la individualidad y la creatividad que al resto; y b) que cuando un 
participante cualificado hace algo mal, está en una situación en la que es 
miembro de una relación cuyos términos básicos han sido violados, y que el 
modo apropiado de responder a eso, con vistas a no aceptarlo, condonarlo o 
tolerarlo, es retirar (parcial y temporalmente) las señales de reconocimiento 
que acompañarían normalmente la implicación en la relación. Éste es el nú-
cleo de verdad que hay en el ‘derecho a ser castigado’. 
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RESUMEN 
El siguiente análisis comparte la defensa de Bennett del retribucionismo y, con-
cretamente, de su versión denunciatoria. El problema es que, para resolver los pro-
blemas de estas versiones, Bennett confía en las teorías de la “justicia restauradora”, y 
asume algunos de sus postulados doctrinales. El resultado es una teoría compleja que, 
tal vez, pueda reconstruir adecuadamente algunas prácticas morales, pero que tropieza 
con serios problemas de consistencia con la práctica jurídica. 
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ABSTRACT 
The following comments side with Christopher Bennett’s defence of retributivism 
and his preference for a denunciatory version. Unfortunately, Bennett resorts to the so-
called restorative theories as a theoretical complement of this version of retributivism, 
and borrows from them some important assumptions. The result is a complex theory 
that could be an accurate reconstruction of some moral practices, but has problems of 
adequacy regarding some features of legal practice.  
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This paper contains an important level of agreement with The Apology 
Ritual. With regards to the philosophy of punishment I am also a retributivist, 
and the following ideas do not express a deeply confrontational approach. In 
coherence with this position, the first part of this essay contains a defence of 
the main theses of Christopher Bennett’s book.  
After the first section, I will add a second and a third part in which I 
will make explicit some disagreements with Bennett’s position. It is relatively 
simple to outline the focus of the discrepancy. Bennett sides with a denuncia-
tory version of the retributivist theory, and contributes with a sophisticated re-
construction of this version which apparently overcomes some of its traditional 
difficulties. This reconstruction borrows some assumptions from the so-called 
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restorative theories: the belief that any offender owes a sincere apology to the 
victim, which involves a disposition to make amends and to restore the rela-
tionships that have been damaged by his action. I agree with Bennett that the 
denunciatory branch of retributivism is partially correct, but also an incom-
plete explanation of punishment. We need a theoretical supplement to com-
plete this explanation. However, the restorative models are not the best 
candidate to play this role.  
Following this outline, the second part of my comments focuses inter-
nally on Bennett’s answer to the question ‘why punish?’ I maintain that Bennett’s 
theory could be an accurate reconstruction of some moral practices, but 
it has problems of adequacy regarding some features of legal practice. In the 
third part, I focus upon the source of many of the problems of the theory, the 
unnatural alliance of a retributivist theory with the restorative theories.  
 
 
I. IN PRAISE OF BENNETT’S THEORY 
 
A theory of punishment explores basically why, when, and how much 
we should punish. It is commendable that the book focuses on the first of 
these questions. In other terms, it does not dissolve the problem ‘why punish’ 
in the problem ‘when we should punish’. We fall into one of these amalga-
mating theories when we maintain that the entire reasoning behind any justi-
fied punishment of an action is that this action is wrong, so that the real 
problem of a theory of punishment is to establish a list of moral wrongs.
1 
However, these theories skip the relatively independent question of what is 
the legitimacy of the practice of punishment as a whole, regardless of the mo-
rality or immorality of any single action that might be classified as a crime by 
any single criminal law. 
Bennett is clear and unambiguous on the nature of the theory he pur-
sues: his book is a normative construction and not just a description or an 
analysis of the existing practices [Bennett (2008), p. 197]. This is again 
praiseworthy as methodological ambiguities are not uncommon in this sub-
ject.
2 But, assuming that the author and I agree upon the importance of nor-
mative theory, I will seize the chance to highlight one of the attributes of any 
normative theory. A normative theory must satisfy a dimension of minimal fit 
with the practice it refers to, and it cannot be incompatible with its necessary 
elements. We do not construct our theories under the dictates of reality; how-
ever neither do we write them on a completely blank paper. The aim of this 
warning is not to deny the aspiration to bind within our normative theory all 
the positive legal practices. I concur with Bennett that legal practice is a 
moral practice [Bennett (2008), p. 166]. However, we should also admit that 
legal practice is a peculiar moral practice and, if we suggest a moral justifica-
tion of punitive practice, it must be a theory fitting with these peculiarities.  Some Familial Problems in the Retributivist Theory                                   97 
If the issue of minimal fitness is problematic for Bennett’s theory it will 
be addressed throughout this commentary. But, for the time being, my con-
clusion is that this particular issue plays an important role in his favour. More 
specifically, the general description of legal practice fits very well with Bennett’s 
strategies to reject scepticism and instrumentalism, for which he dis-
plays solid and convincing arguments.
3  
Ruling out scepticism, I also support the dedicated search for a moral 
justification of legal punishment. The book does not consist in a purely defi-
nitional strategy reduced to an analysis of general legal concepts. Moral strat-
egy is necessary because law is basically a moral practice. But it is also 
necessary because we cannot make a purely legal theory of punishment with-
out being involved in a vicious circle: in this case, we would probably define 
‘punishment’ appealing to the notion of ‘crime’ or ‘offence’;
4 but, if we want 
to define ‘crime’ or ‘offence’ in purely legal terms, it would probably be un-
avoidable to resort to the concept of punishment [Kelsen (1960), p. 114]. 
And ruling out instrumentalism, my following comments regard re-
tributivism. Bennett considers generally two retributivist roads of moral justi-
fication: firstly that punishment is based on the principles of fairness and 
secondly that punishment is conceived as an expression of our disapproval, 
reprobation or reproach for the moral wrong contained in the crime. Basi-
cally, he rejects the first road, and assumes that the moral answer to the ques-
tion ‘why punish?’ must come from the second branch of retributivism, from 
a denunciatory theory of punishment.
5  
Denunciatory theories have traditionally been objected to for several 
reasons. Bennett focuses on the most important criticism:
6 that these theories 
may explain why we express moral disapproval, condemnation, resentment... 
but the question ‘why punish?’ still remains. Does moral denunciation really 
demand the imposition of pain and suffering?
7 There seems to be here a logi-
cal gap that should be filled with an additional justification which would in-
evitably be more urgent in legal punishments. Answers to this thorny 
question have many times been disappointing.
8 Bennett openly faces this 
challenge, and we will now consider if his accomplishments provide a con-
vincing answer. 
 
 
II. BENNETT’S RETRIBUTIVIST PROPOSAL 
 
For a legal philosopher, a good reason to enjoy Bennett’s work is that it 
is easy to detect in its pages many echoes of some of the most important de-
bates of contemporary jurisprudence.  
Firstly, Bennett’s strategy to justify punishment is an analysis of moral 
rules and practices constructed from the point of view of their participants, 
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in an offence. This method reminds us of the analysis from the internal, her-
meneutical point of view suggested by Hart to understand what sharing a so-
cial rule means. Following Bennett and Hart, we would say that, if we 
participate together in a moral practice under important moral rules, and if you 
break one of these rules, ‘I do necessarily disapprove of your doing (If I don’t 
disapprove, it turns out that I don’t adhere to that standard)’ [MacCormick 
(2008), p. 168],
9 and, if I really respect you as a moral agent with which I 
share the moral practice, I will have to express my condemnation, and to ex-
pect from you some feelings of blame, guilt and, finally, the acceptance of 
punishment as a justified response. 
Secondly, Bennett’s representation of the practice of punishment fits 
perfectly with one of the main claims of Ronald Dworkin’s legal theory: that 
we have to portray any legal or moral practice in its best light. If we are go-
ing to reconstruct a social practice like the practice of punishment, we cannot 
simply focus on the empirical routines or the daily habits of most of the par-
ticipants; we have to start putting in order the main principles and values that 
inspire it [Dworkin (1986), p. 52]. Bennett therefore attempts to draw on 
good examples of moral practice. We could define these examples as prac-
tices where the participants sincerely aspire to fulfil and satisfy the moral 
demands and expectations of the practice. Focusing on the best examples of 
punitive practices and its moral demands, Bennett concludes that the moral 
way of dealing with an offender is not by teaching him values or criticising 
morally his behaviour, which would offend his autonomy and full member-
ship: it is by condemning him and demanding that he makes amends. On the 
other hand, a moral participant cannot simply accept his degradation in the 
practice; the moral way of redeeming himself is by saying sorry [Bennett 
(2008), p. 110]. And, when an apology is sincere, it expresses suffering, and 
involves a disposition or an expectancy of receiving it, which is equivalent to 
the acceptance of ‘making some amends’. That is why our practice of punish-
ing can be morally justified: this practice is justified because it represents or 
symbolizes this virtuous performance of our moral practices. It is useless to 
reply that most of our criminals do not intend to say sincerely sorry, or to ob-
ject that, by presuming apologies or urges of redemption, we are taking for 
granted a strong moral consensus which is far from our contemporary plural-
istic societies, where we do not appreciate social denunciation of all the 
crimes [Nino (1980), p. 277]. We reconstruct a theory of punishment from a 
virtuous example of moral practice, one that works out correctly the princi-
ples, demands and expectations that inspire it. The result is a normative pro-
cedure, a protocol or a ritual of imposing punishments that perfectly 
represents these principles, demands and expectations. Bennett’s theory is not 
constructed from the point of view of the victim, because it does not forget 
the offender.
10 However, it is not made either from the point of view of the 
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practice that, in the case of the offender, is named the ‘virtuous offender’ 
[Bennett (2008), p. 177]. 
I will start precisely with this point of view of the virtuous offender to 
challenge the adequacy of the theory in the legal domain. This model as-
sumes in the offender not just the expression of a claim of forgiveness; if an 
apology is morally sincere, it must be the result of an internal attitude includ-
ing an acknowledgment of the wrongness of the behaviour and some sincere 
states of shame, guilt and affliction. The virtuous offender does not only do 
the right thing (to express an apology): he does it from the right psychologi-
cal impulses. The problem is that, as it is remarked from Kant, law is only 
concerned with the forum externum, and not with the forum internum [Kant 
(1907-1914), p. 214].
11 To obey a legal rule is related to external actions, and 
it does not include conditions such as the performance for the right reasons, 
or the personal adherence to the content of the rule. Sensu contrario, it does 
not require from the offender to recognize that he made a wrong action, or 
the mental states of guilt, shame... basically, we cannot construct a fitting 
theory of punishment on the presupposition of a sincere apology. Any theory 
dependent on internal states does not fit with the fact that many of our crimi-
nals are unable to satisfy these internal conditions. It could be replied that 
Bennett’s theory is a normative theory constructed from what we demand 
morally each other, and we would not treat the offenders morally if we would 
not expect and demand from them these attitudes. But the answer is that legal 
practice cannot and actually does not demand these attitudes, and it does 
enough to respect citizens as moral agents just by demanding an external ac-
tion of conformity and punishing them when this action is not performed. 
Two illustrations could show that legal practice cannot either expect or de-
mand these internal attitudes. The first one is the offender we could define as 
recalcitrant or incorrigible: it is not that he wrongly abstains from showing 
the required feelings; he is in fact unable to show them, and it is unlikely to 
presume them. The second is clearer, and consists in cases where we can de-
tect an incompatibility between the morally virtuous offender – from whom 
Bennett constructs his theory – and obedience to law. As we know, we live in 
very pluralistic societies respecting morality and conceptions of the good, so 
that our laws are in a substantial part a kind of overlapping consensus called 
for many authors a merely ‘political’ consensus. It is not an exceptional case 
– on the contrary, as our pluralism is deeper and deeper, it is a more and more 
frequent situation – that there is a serious discontinuity between the personal 
conception of the moral life and the demands of law.
12 Of course, I am not 
suggesting that all these individuals make a good exercise of practical reason 
by disobeying law; the only implication is that we cannot likely expect or 
demand from them sincere feelings of shame, guilt or sincere claims of apol-
ogy. It could be true for many people that our emotional attachments are 
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life, but I do not think we can generalize this assumption, and to construct a 
theory around it. Even in the most ideal of the contexts, you cannot expect or 
represent a sincere apology from a doctor that, for moral reasons, practices an 
abortion where it is a crime, or vice versa, or from an objector of conscience, 
or from a civil disobedient, or from any case belonging to the growing pack-
age of conflicts between law and moral conception of the good.
13  
Leaving aside the problems of elementary fitness with our legal prac-
tice, the complex framework of internal feelings and mental dispositions in-
volves the theory in some ambiguities and conflicts that could have been 
avoided in a more economical model.  
Bennett says emphatically that his theory does not pursue the offender’s 
repentance as a psychological fact. More specifically, he says that his theory 
does not look for repentance because it is not a ‘communicative’ theory, a 
message to the offender in order that he can understand the reasons of the 
punishment and adopt the proper attitudes: it is simply an ‘expressive’ theory 
in which we try to represent the right terms of the relationship between state 
and offender. Bennett’s precautions with the concept of repentance are ex-
plainable: some authors, even retributivists, hesitate to punish the repented 
offender,
14 and some others, because they link clearly ‘punishment’ to ‘exter-
nal imposition’, consider that the central model of punishment does not in-
volve the cases where there is repentance and voluntary disposition to make 
amends.
15 However, we heard before that Bennett’s theory represents what he 
called the normative expectations and the emotional structure derived from 
the wrongdoing considering the virtuous participants in moral practice. If one 
of my normative expectations is that you should say sorry, why should a the-
ory of punishment dispense with repentance? Which would in this case be the 
role played by the ‘virtuous’ offender? We know that often it is not realistic 
to expect from the offender a sincere repentance. However, in a theory where 
the attitudes of blame and apology are contemplated as the right attitudes, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that repentance should be pursued when-
ever it is possible and as much as possible. Probably, this aim would require a 
dialogue with the offender and her active participation, as well as institutional 
arrangements to implement these demands. The conclusion is that the princi-
ples of Bennett’s theory push the institutional demands much closer to the re-
storative models than Bennett avows. Nevertheless, Bennett tries to escape 
from a general and broad commitment in practice with the restorative models, 
and his elusive strategy is to adopt an expressive theory in which we simply 
represent ‘the adequate symbols for condemnation’ rather than the search for 
repentance, reform and reconciliation as ‘something actually to be achieved’ 
[Bennett (2008), p. 197]. But the first question is, once again, what would be 
the use of this concern with the proper attitudes of the offender if punishment 
is just an expression of whoever condemns. An expressive theory could have 
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p. 386]. The second question is how we are going to claim the frustration of a 
normative expectation if it is not through a communication, a message ad-
dressed to the offender. If our legal system is a set of general norms, it is be-
cause our legal practice is an exchange of reasons where our actions and 
positions must be accounted for with the right reasons, with norms previously 
recognized as valid and binding. When the action consists in removing some 
fundamental rights and downgrading the status of one of our co-participants 
in a social practice, our duties of accountability are even more demanding. It 
means that this practical decision must be especially reasoned and supported 
with general arguments previously recognized by the own offender as rules 
of the game, and not just with simple expressions. We condemn with rules 
because we have a duty of accounting for and justifying our decision, and 
rules play this role because they are abbreviations of moral reasoning. An ex-
pressive theory jeopardizes the whole enterprise of justifying punishment, of 
giving appropriate reasons to the question ‘why punish’. Against Bennett, it 
is apparent that a communicative theory is unavoidable; but a communicative 
theory does not need to go more deeply into the forum internum of the of-
fender: it can restrict itself with the point of view of the sender of the mes-
sage, regardless of the attitudes of the recipient. I think the purely 
denunciatory theory agrees better with this simple communication of a de-
nunciatory message from the sender – the authority – to the wrongdoer.  
Bennett’s theory also embraces the concept of suffering as a necessary 
ingredient. To represent what we may call a sincere apology means to repre-
sent a mental state of affliction in which the wrongdoer accepts some un-
pleasant burdens [Bennett (2008), p. 121]. Punishment is not for Bennett a 
simple return of suffering: he only sustains that, morally speaking, a disposi-
tion to suffering is a necessary part in the ritual we call the practice of pun-
ishment. However, once again, the theory’s internalism brings some 
problems. Especially in a legal practice, punishment is a deprivation of some 
rights, and if this normative and objective deprivation is subjectively or psy-
chologically viewed by the criminal as a suffering is a contingent matter. We 
can assume that it will happen in most of the cases, but it might not happen in 
some others. At least for the recalcitrant offenders, punishment is the lesser 
of two evils, because for them it is worthwhile to keep on offending despite 
being punished, so punishment cannot be interpreted as a utility loss. Modern 
legal systems avoid degrading punishments; however, even when they forget 
this aspiration, they avoid presenting them as mere exhibitions of suffering 
and pain: lethal injection aspires to be a painless execution of a sadly degrad-
ing penalty. Punishment is not administered thinking about the infliction of 
subjective or empirical pain: it makes justice, estimates and imposes the right 
price or the right payment owed to society in terms of its legal measures of 
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Finally, the internalism of Bennett’s theory has further unwelcome con-
sequences. For example, a theory of punishment coherently inserted in a 
whole theory of state coercion is preferable to another one in which princi-
ples of criminal law would be substantially different to the principles ruling 
the security and public order. Obviously, we are talking about different ac-
tivities. But, although different, there are clear similarities: they both consist 
in limitations of rights for disturbances in the exercise of other people’s rights 
and for which state does not have to compensate economically; repression 
must be proportionate to these disturbances, and we reject any instrumentalist 
view of public order in which the goal could legitimate any mean: on the con-
trary, these activities are surveyed later by the judges, who check if repres-
sion was proportionate and justified. However, because Bennett’s theory of 
punishment is overburdened with internal attitudes, it has to separate drasti-
cally the practice of punishment and activities of public order: as Bennett 
cannot distinguish attitudes of sorry and shame in the last examples, he even 
compares these activities with the public decision of keeping some individu-
als in quarantine for medical reasons [Bennett (2008), p. 196]. This depiction 
reduces public order operations to crude instrumentalism.  
The conclusion is that Bennett’s theory does not provide a complete 
structure of reasons to justify legal punishments. The question ‘why deprive the 
offender of some fundamental rights instead of simply expressing our disap-
proval?’ still remains.  
We said before that, respecting its institutional consequences, Bennett’s 
concepts should lead to a more restorative theory he declares. In fact, restora-
tive theory is the most important partner of Bennet’s theory. However, this 
partnership is unable to solve the problems of denunciatory theories.  
 
 
III. BENNETT’S NON-RETRIBUTIVISM 
 
In Bennett’s Introduction we can read an unambiguous statement: puni-
tive legal system should be ‘as restorative as possible’ [Bennett (2008), p. 5]. 
However, Bennett’s doctrine is substantially different to the restorative ver-
sions we are accustomed to read: it is formalised, centralised and coercive, 
feels uneasy with the hypothesis of shows of repentance from the victim 
[Bennett (2008), pp. 139, 148], and does not leave a broad space for private 
arrangements in which state agents are just mediators.
16  
Bennett represents what we would call a deep application of restorativism 
in criminal institutions under the label laissez-faire conceptions of restorative 
justice. He rules out these conceptions as fundamental criminal answer; but, 
even when he rejects them, he remarks some advantages involved in its im-
plementation: a) it enlarges our experience and information: for example, the 
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amends he could make; b) it promotes the recognition of the other [Bennett 
(2008), p. 176]. These advantages explain why he reserves a non trivial role 
to private arrangements between victim and offender, concretely the specifi-
cation of the quantum of punishment: the judge could indicate the broad mar-
gins of the penalty, and victim and offender could privately pinpoint the 
exact amount within these margins [Bennett (2008), p. 180]. Finally, what 
underlies these concessions is the mediation of another view of punishment 
not exactly fitting with the retributivist one, and for which the aim of pun-
ishment is essentially restorative, because it tries to repair the relationships 
broken by the offense [Bennett (2008), p. 154]. 
Sadly, the marriage with restorative punishments reveals again impor-
tant problems of adequacy with legal practice. We talk about making 
‘amends’, which basically means to fix or to repair some damage, either the 
private damage inflicted to the victim or the public damage consisting in the 
loss of confidence in public relationships. The problem with this conception, 
especially regarding the relationships with the victim, is that it is a departure 
from the public nature of criminal institutions, and it is more like an approach 
to civil compensation that we can find in tort law. This restorative interpreta-
tion of punishment fits with the private law principles of corrective or restitu-
tive justice, but not with retributive justice. In this interpretation, punishment 
is a way of compensating for damages. However, the wrongness of the crimi-
nal offence is not linked to a material or subjective harm, but to an objective 
violation of rights, or, in other words, an attack against the most important 
moral values of the community. The second problem, especially regarding 
the relationships with the community, is that the theory comes dangerously 
close to instrumentalism: at least the quantum of punishment does not look to 
the past, but the future, because how much we have to punish is a function of 
our purpose of re-establishing the relationships of confidence between of-
fender and community, and not strictly the seriousness of the offence.
17 
Once this restorative view of punishment is rebutted, both supposed ad-
vantages of the laissez-faire models are not available. In a public law like 
criminal law and in public procedures like criminal procedures is a mistake to 
suppose that the more we hear from the interests of the victim the more we 
know of the crime and the most appropriate will be the punishment. These 
considerations are relevant for the civil compensation of a material damage, 
but not for a public criminal matter consisting essentially in the transgression 
of a community value. As we know, it is quite possible that the private victim 
did not suffer any damage,
18 did not feel any offence at all,
19 or felt the of-
fence, but forgave the offender... and, despite all these circumstances, the 
criminal process starts and finishes with a punishment.
20 Bennett shows knowl-
edge of these circumstances [Bennett, 2008, p. 136], but he does not take them 
properly into account: there is no room in the criminal context for the ‘restitu-
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category in which we could include the contracts on quantum of punishment 
suggested by Bennett.  
This public nature of punishment and criminal procedure makes 
Bennett’s concessions to dialogue and communication between private victim 
and offender irrelevant. As we have seen, the subjective feelings of victims 
are often misleading respecting the violation of law. In the example of Judith, 
Bennett regrets that, with our current methods, she would be involved in a 
very unpleasant duty of proving the culpability of the offender. I do not see 
how a process of face to face debate with the offender could be less unpleas-
ant. Finally, a long discussion about nature of rules could be brought out 
here. It is only possible to hint that rules work as exclusionary or pre-emptive 
reasons [Raz (1979), pp. 21-23],
21 and, unlike other kind of norms, their ap-
plication blocks any deliberation on their underlying moral reasons: as we 
said before, rules are the abbreviations and conclusions of a moral reasoning, 
and that is why they satisfy a need of accountability and justification; how-
ever, they also are conclusions because, due to the institutional dimension of 
law, they conclude the moral debate. A new debate within a court about the 
reasons of the rightness of the rules and the offensive nature of the behaviour 
is in my view completely at odds with a system of rules like criminal law. 
As well as a conflict with the public nature of criminal law, to empower 
the victim with an entitlement to determine the quantum of punishment jeop-
ardizes the strict interpretation of the rule of law in criminal law, captured by 
the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Restorative theories are a 
grievous departure from this principle.
22 We have to remember here that any 
return to ‘private’ justice blurs the differences between revenge and punish-
ment [Nozick (1980), p. 368]: determination of punishment is a historical 
conquest of justice against public and private abuses, and any surrender to 
private agreements or to the imagination of the judge would be a step back in 
justice leading to different punishment in identical cases, Mikado style pun-
ishments,
23 incoherence and arbitrariness. Bennett avows some of these dan-
gers in his limited devolution model, but accepts them as a price worth paying 
[Bennett (2008), p. 180]. In his Introduction, he judges as a danger our ten-
dency to reduce punishments to jail and fines [Bennett (2008), p. 9]. How-
ever, we have reasons to be happy with the strict determination, and even 
with the historical process that contradicts his judgment: the unification and 
convergence of punishments in a small list. 
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NOTES 
 
1 In my view, Michael Moore’s theory is a clear example of this procedure. 
Moore also assumes a perfectionist theory of law and state according to which ‘be-
cause an action is morally wrong there is always a legitimate reason to prohibit it with 
criminal legislation’ [Moore (1997), p. 70]. Therefore, he willingly accepts a very dis-
turbing consequence: there are reasons that moral misdemeanours or minor peccadil-
loes, such as family lies, should be punished by the state. It is true that other 
considerations can defeat the need of punishment, but this need is undoubtedly bind-
ing [Ibid. 640 y ss]. 
2 Hart [(1968), p. 236], for example, is supposed to provide a purely normative 
theory; however, he refutes some views of the theory of responsibility offering a sin-
gle argument: the existence of a positive and highly controversial institution of Eng-
lish law, the crimes of strict liability. For a ‘normative’ refutation of this figure, see 
Nino (1980), pp. 183 y ss. 
3 As the famous ‘Jacques the Fatalist’ said, ‘rewards are just illusions of good-
hearted people, and punishments the expression of fear of the mean people’ [Diderot 
(2008), p. 229 (my translation)]. 
4 Flew (1954), pp. 291 ss.; Hart (1968), pp. 4-5. 
5 ‘Censure-theories are the most promising way of developing the retributivist 
tradition’ [Bennett (2008), p. 186]. 
6 Therefore, he does not consider other important objections. It could be said, 
for example, that denunciatory theories jeopardize the legal principle of retroactivity 
because immorality exists before and after the enactment of the legal rule. It could be 
said too that, being the only justification of punishment, these theories bear reasons to 
relax the principle nulla poena sine lege when moral condemnation in a particular 
crime would be especially and unpredictably intense. 
7 Feinberg (1970), p. 101; Hanna (2009), p. 242. 
8 For example, to say that punishment is necessary to reinforce social solidarity 
or to give cohesion to the moral practices turns the theory into a variety of instrumen-
talism in which we graduate the scale of punishment according to a prospective goal, 
and we view denunciation as a kind of stimulus to induce obedient behaviour [Hart 
(1968), p. 235; Moore (1997), p. 90]. Other versions search for a different goal: moral 
improvement of offender; they are included by Nozick in ‘teleological retributivism’ 
[Nozick (1981), p. 371]. Other ways of filling this gap between ‘denunciation’ and 
‘infliction of pain’ are not more satisfying. To say that punishment works as a symbol of 
communitarian condemnation does not explain its necessity: Nino (1980), pp. 205-6. 
Some authors have given up any hope of a self-sufficient retributivist theory, and con-
fess that, answering this question, retributivism must be completed with an instrumen-
talist model of general prevention [Von Hirsch (1998), pp. 39ff.]. 
9 Following Hart’s theory, we would add that primary social rules (rules impos-
ing duties) require analytically a secondary rule imposing punishments to the breakers 
of primary duties. 
10 Von Hirsch (1998), pp. 28-9, warns against theories that interpret practice of 
punishment as something we do against them. 
11 Bennett separates his rituals from the exhibitions of ‘inner attitudes’ [Bennett 
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feelings and expected psychological attitudes: ‘But it draws its symbols from emo-
tions and expectations that are deeply intuitive’ [Ibid., p. 149]. 
12 On these concepts see Rawls (1991), pp. i-xxvii, 35-40, 133-168. 
13 The list of counter-examples is not vulnerable to the accusation of not being a 
list of central cases of legal punishment. It could be admitted if punishment were con-
troversial in some or all of these situations. And it is true that a minority of these cases 
is controversial, but controversy is not about why punish, but about how much. Even 
in civil disobedience it is commonly required the disposition to accept the punishment 
as a bond or guarantee of the civility of the action, so that the disobedient could obtain 
a diminished penalty [Bedau (1961), p. 661; Nozick (1981), p. 390; Rawls (1969), p. 
247; Wasserstrom (1963), p. 796]. 
14 What Nozick calls ‘teleological retributivism’ is in trouble to justify this pun-
ishment, and the the rest of retributivists, according to Nozick, are uncomfortable jus-
tifying it [Nozick (1980), p. 365]. 
15 Lucas (1980), p.125; Betegón (1990), p. 195. 
16 ‘Restorative justice would not be the major or fundamental criminal justice 
response’ [Bennett, (2008), p. 144]. Immediately after, he judges his theory as ‘an al-
ternative to restorative justice’ [Ibid., p. 146]. 
17 ‘After all, restorative justice is in some way forward-looking’ [Bennett 
(2008), p. 22]. 
18 See ‘profound offences’ [Feinberg (1985), Vol. II, pp.50ff.]. 
19 Feinberg enhances that wrong is an objective concept attached to a violation 
of rights, [Feinberg (1985), III, p. 2]. We see examples of a pro-active defense of the 
offender by his victims in many of the so called ‘domestic violence’ cases. 
20 There is an important exception in the so called Spanish law ‘private’ and 
‘semi-private’ crimes. In the first ones (slander and libel), charges must be submitted 
to the tribunal by the victim (not by the public prosecutor), and punishment is ex-
cluded if she pardons the offender [see 215, 1 of Spanish Criminal Code]. However, 
these crimes are not less public in nature than the rest; what is private is the mean of 
proof: it happens that a third person cannot proof the happening of a real slander, and 
we need an action from the victim to confirm it. 
21 Even Dworkin [(1986), p.143] acknowledges that the exclusion of underlying 
moral reasons must be radical in a peculiar department: criminal law. 
22 [Zehr (1990), pp. 185-6)] even rejects the concept of crime, and suggest the 
broader concept of ‘harmful behaviour’. The most, he adds, we can accept ‘crime’, al-
though not in technical legal terms, but in full context: moral, social, economic, politi-
cal, etc. 
23 This danger is visible when Bennett demands community services ‘with 
symbolic link to the nature of the offence’ [Bennett (2008), p. 178]. He even let 
restorative justice outweigh the demands of legal consistency in many situations [Ibid., 
p. 181]. 
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RESUMEN 
Bosquejo aquí una ruta alternativa hacia una concepción del castigo penal muy 
semejante a la de Bennett, aunque basada más en una concepción política de la comu-
nidad política y sus ciudadanos que en una concepción moral de nuestras relaciones 
sociales como individuos, y dando más importancia de lo que él le da al proceso pe-
nal. Pero además sugiero que necesitamos revisar algunos aspectos importantes de su 
concepción para explicar cómo la pena puede imponerse justamente a un delincuente 
que no coopera, en línea con el tipo de concepción que yo favorezco y que él critica. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: castigo, disculpa; ritual; proceso judicial; responsabilidad. 
 
ABSTRACT 
I sketch an alternative route to an account of criminal punishment very like 
Bennett's, though drawing more on a political conception of a polity and its citizens 
than on a moral conception of our social relations as individuals, and placing more 
importance than he does on the criminal trial; but I suggest that we need to revise cer-
tain important aspects of his account to explain how punishment can be justly im-
posed on an unwilling offender — in line with the kind of account for which I have 
argued, and which he criticises. 
 
KEYWORDS: Punishment; Apology; Ritual; Trial; Responsibility. 
 
 
 
There is much with which to agree, and to admire, in Bennett’s fine 
book [Bennett (2008)]:
1 in this brief paper I sketch an alternative route to an 
account of criminal punishment very like his, though drawing more on a po-
litical conception of a polity and its citizens than on a moral conception of 
our social relations as individuals (both dimensions are crucial to an adequate 
understanding of criminal punishment); but I suggest that we need to revise 
certain important aspects of his account — in line with the kind of account 
for which I have argued, and which he criticises.
2 
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I. TAKING CRIME SERIOUSLY 
 
Normative theorising must start from where we are. We can therefore 
begin with the idea of a liberal polity, of the kind in which we can plausibly 
aspire to live.
3 This will be a republic of citizens — of members who for the 
most part recognise each other as fellows who are engaged together in a 
common project, a civic enterprise, of living together as citizens. Its core val-
ues will include the equal concern and respect that citizens owe each other 
[Dworkin (1989)], as well as individual freedom and privacy. Given such a 
concern for freedom and privacy, and a familiar liberal commitment to plural-
ism, the civic enterprise that constitutes its public life (its members’ lives as 
citizens) will be limited in its scope and its claims: it will encompass only a 
limited dimension of citizens’ lives, most of which will be lived in the other, 
smaller practices and communities to which they also belong; nor will it take an 
interest (as illiberal political communities might) in the deeper or more inward 
aspects of their lives — in their souls, as one might put it. Nonetheless a liberal 
polity will have a public realm, constituted by the civic enterprise, and struc-
tured by the values by which the polity defines itself — values that must in fact 
be shared by most of its members, and that must be able plausibly to claim the 
allegiance of all members. 
The public realm is the realm of matters that are ‘public’ in the sense 
that they properly concern all citizens, simply in virtue of their membership 
of the polity. A central task for the polity, as for any community, is therefore 
to work out what falls within the public realm, and what is rather a ‘private’ 
matter that should not concern the whole polity. It must work out an account 
of the res publica: of what is our collective business in the civic enterprise. 
Likewise, a university must decide what belongs to its public realm as an 
academic community: which aspects of its members’ lives and activities are 
of proper interest to the academic community, and which should rather count 
as private. In a properly democratic polity, the structure and scope of the 
civic enterprise will be determined by public deliberation (a deliberation that 
is itself an essential part of the civic enterprise). We cannot discuss the char-
acter or the likely results of such a deliberative democracy here [see Pettit 
(1999), Martí (2006)], but must ask what role (if any) such a polity would 
find for a system of criminal law and punishment. 
Much of the polity’s public business, much of what goes on in the civic 
enterprise, does not immediately create a role for criminal law. A polity will, 
for instance, see it as part of its business to protect its members against vari-
ous kinds of harm (both those that can flow from natural causes and those 
that can flow from human action); it will also plausibly see it as part of its 
role to provide and sustain procedures through which citizens can try to re-
solve disputes and conflicts peacefully and to secure compensation for harms 
they suffer at others’ hands. In further specifying, and then pursuing, such ends Penal Coercion and the Apology Ritual                                                       111 
as these the polity might of course come to find a role for the criminal law, 
but as so far specified they do not point us in that direction. We come closer 
to finding a role for criminal law, as a distinctive mode of law, when we note 
that a decent polity will be concerned not only with harms and their preven-
tion or remedy, or with disputes and their peaceful resolution, but with 
wrongs done or suffered by its members, and with the provision of an appro-
priate response to such wrongs. It will not of course take an interest in all 
wrongs: for many wrongs are, as far as the polity is concerned, private 
wrongs that are not its business.
4 But it will take an interest in wrongs that are 
public in the sense that they violate the values that define and structure the 
civic enterprise: for to ignore such wrongs would be to betray the values that 
are violated, to which the polity is supposedly committed; and it would be, as 
we will see, to betray both victims and perpetrators of such wrongs. 
Three questions now arise. First, how should a liberal polity and its 
members respond to public wrongs committed by and against its members? 
Second, how should the perpetrators of such wrongs respond to their own 
wrongdoing? Third, how (if at all) should the polity’s collective response be 
related to or determined by the way in which the perpetrators either do or 
should respond? One of the merits of Bennett’s book is that it shows the im-
portance of the third of these questions — a question that theorists of pun-
ishment too often ignore, by talking of punishment simply as something that 
‘we’ inflict on ‘them’.
5 
A plausible liberal republican answer to these questions gives the 
criminal law a central role. The first distinctive task of a system of criminal 
justice, discharged by the substantive law, is to define the range of public 
wrongs, of violations of the polity’s defining values, that merit a formal, pub-
lic response. These are the wrongs of which we have decided that we must 
take collective notice as wrongs. They should not be ignored, or treated 
merely as sources of harms that require repair or as private conflicts to be re-
solved (perhaps with our collective help) by those directly involved; they 
should be publicly defined and condemned as wrongs. Those public defini-
tions constitute the core of the substantive criminal law, which defines the 
whole range of criminal offences (as well as the defences that can negate the 
wrongfulness of the commission of such offences). 
Second, the criminal law must also make provision for an appropriate 
public response to the commission of such public wrongs: if we take such 
wrongs seriously, as violations of the values that define our polity (and of 
their victims’ rights), we cannot merely condemn them in advance and in the 
abstract, or seek to prevent them; we must also respond after the event to 
their concrete commission. Central to this response, in a liberal republic, is 
the criminal trial, understood as a process of calling to public account [Duff 
et al. (2007)]. The trial summons an accused person to answer to a charge of 
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and to answer for that wrongdoing if it is proved against him — to answer for 
it either by offering a defence which shows his commission of the offence to 
have been justified or excused, or by accepting conviction and the formal 
censure that a conviction communicates. Trials as thus understood are a 
proper way of taking public wrongs seriously. They do justice to the victim, 
as someone who has been not merely harmed but wronged, by trying to iden-
tify the wrongdoer and call him to account; and they do justice to the wrong-
doer by treating him as a responsible citizen who can be held to account for 
his actions. A crucial feature of trials as callings to account is that they are in 
this way inclusionary: they display a recognition of the victim as a fellow 
whose wrongs we make our own, and of the wrongdoer as a member of the 
polity who is answerable to his fellow citizens.
6 
The culmination of the criminal trial is the verdict: either an acquittal, 
which declares that the presumption of innocence to which the defendant was 
entitled remains undefeated; or, if guilt is proved, a conviction, which 
amounts not merely to a factual finding that the defendant committed the 
crime charged, but to a formal condemnation of that commission, and so also 
a formal censure of the defendant for committing it. A ‘Guilty’ verdict and 
the condemnation it contains are addressed to the defendant, as marking a 
judgment on his conduct that he should make his own — which will involve 
coming to accept and feel his own guilt. This is a matter on which I think 
Bennett goes wrong, in portraying blame (of which the criminal conviction is 
a formal version) as having an intrinsically exclusionary character, and the 
acceptance of guilt as involving a kind of self-lowering. Blame, he argues, 
involves the ‘withdrawal of the respect’ or ‘recognition’ to which the wrong-
doer would otherwise have been entitled [pp. 105-7]; and this seems to be-
come a ‘withdraw[al] from’ the offender, which is naturally (but not 
inevitably) expressed by ‘cutting’ him [p. 108; see p. 147]. If the wrongdoer 
recognises his own guilt, and blames himself, this then involves ‘withdrawal 
of that respect for oneself that one would have been due’, and that remorseful 
recognition will be properly expressed in ‘penitential behaviour’ that might 
seem, and that would otherwise be, ‘servile or masochistic’ [pp. 116-7]. Now 
blame, of others or of oneself, can take these forms: it is all too tempting to 
exclude or demean the wrongdoer, and to expect him to debase himself. But 
in a liberal polity that takes seriously an idea of equal concern and respect, 
these are temptations that we should resist (as we should in our private lives): 
it is possible (albeit often difficult, especially when faced by heinous wrongs) 
for blame to be a mode of communication with a fellow member of the nor-
mative community whom we still respect as such — to be an inclusionary 
rather than an exclusionary response; and it is possible (although often diffi-
cult) for a wrongdoer to express her apologetic recognition of what she has 
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This now gives us an initial answer to our three questions. First, we 
should collectively respond to public wrongs by calling those who commit 
them to public account. Second, the wrongdoers should themselves respond 
by being willing to answer, through such a public process, for what they have 
done. Third, our collective response should be such as to call, enable and per-
suade the wrongdoers to answer for what they have done; that is why crimi-
nal trials are legitimate only if they do give the defendant a fair chance to 
answer the charge. 
But what of punishment, the deliberately burdensome imposition that 
typically follows on a criminal conviction? A major challenge for a liberal 
republic is to work out whether and how criminal punishment can treat those 
subjected to it with the respect and concern that is due to them as citizens. 
Punishment as actually imposed in our existing systems is of course all too of-
ten exclusionary in its meaning, and oppressive and demeaning in its impact. If 
that is what criminal punishment as imposed by the state must always be, then 
it has no place in a liberal republic; but perhaps it need not be like that. 
 
 
II. FROM CENSURE TO PUNISHMENT VIA APOLOGY? 
 
Why should the criminal process not end with the defendant’s formal 
conviction: why should we go on to impose the material burden of punish-
ment? Is this to be explained instrumentally, as a way of deterring or hinder-
ing future wrongdoing (in which case it will be hard to justify as something 
that citizens could respectfully impose on each other or on themselves)? 
An initial answer is that if punishment is to express condemnation ade-
quately, it must do so in an appropriate language, and that penal hard treat-
ment of appropriate kinds constitutes a language of condemnation that both 
offenders and victims can be expected to understand. But Bennett also ar-
gues, insightfully, that in trying to understand what punishment can be and 
can do we must also look at what the offender owes to those whom she has 
wronged — both to the direct victims of her crime, if there are any, and to her 
fellow citizens. What she owes is some form of apology — an apology that 
must, if it is to have the weight and seriousness required, be expressed in 
some kind of burdensome penitential action. It is by undertaking such actions 
that the wrongdoer can restore herself to community with those whom he 
wronged; and so, Bennett argues, it is appropriate that the punishment we 
impose on the offender should consist in what she ought to do to make 
apologetic amends for her offence — that it ‘mak[es] her act as she would 
were she genuinely sorry for her offence’ [p. 146; see also pp. 147, 171]. 
Now this seems to me just the right move to make if we are to show criminal 
punishment to be something that liberal citizens can impose on each other, 
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the previous section of how a liberal polity should respond to public wrongs. 
What we must try to do is to bring the offender to answer for her actions; that 
involves, from our side, an attempt to bring her to recognise the wrong she 
did, and to accept her own culpable responsibility; and, from her side, a re-
morseful recognition of her wrongdoing and an attempt to make amends for 
it. Punishment, of a suitable kind,
7 can serve both these goals at once: it can 
give appropriate material form to the message that we must try to communi-
cate to the offender, and constitute an appropriate moral reparation from the 
offender to the polity. However, Bennett’s explanation of this ‘Apology Ritual’ 
raises one puzzle, whose resolution will require some amendment to his 
account. 
The puzzle is this. Apology, whether purely verbal or given material 
expression in some kind of penitential act, is something that the apologiser 
does. If the wrongdoer owes apology to those whom he wronged, we can 
properly tell him that this is what he ought to do; we can even demand that he 
do it, on pain of further criticism if he refuses: but we cannot do it for him; nor 
can we do it to him — nothing we do to him can constitute him apologising to 
us. In the case of our formal public responses to public wrongdoing, the same 
thing is true. Through the criminal court, we can collectively tell the con-
victed offender that he ought to apologise for what he has done. Since we are 
dealing here with public apology between people who are relative strangers 
(related only as fellow citizens), the apology will properly be expressed in a 
formal, public language, and the court can properly prescribe what it should 
be: this, the court can say, is what you must do to make amends for your 
wrong; and ‘this’ might consist in, for instance, undertaking a number of 
hours of unpaid community service of a suitable kind, or in paying a suitable 
amount of money, or even in putting oneself into penitential isolation for a 
period of time. This would be a system of non-coercive self-punishment: 
offenders would be told what they must do, by way of an Apology Ritual; and 
it would be up to them, on pain of further censure if they refuse or fail, to un-
dertake it.
8 
But criminal punishment is not like that. Some sentences, as things are 
now, are simply imposed on an essentially passive offender: he is taken from 
court to prison to serve his time; or his fine is deducted from his wages. Other 
sentences, it is true, are initially required rather than imposed, and this could 
be made true of all sentences: the offender is required to turn up to undertake 
his community service or to meet his probation officer; he can be required to 
pay the fine himself; and he can (as happens in some jurisdictions for some 
offences) be required to present himself on a specified date to serve his term 
of imprisonment. But even when the offender is required to undertake his 
sentence, rather than passively suffering its imposition, the punishment re-
mains coercive; for he knows that if he fails to do what he is required to do 
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which will itself in the end be imposed on him if he remains recalcitrant. 
Now when what is required of a person is that he pay for the harm he has 
caused, by way of damages awarded in a civil suit, it is not crucial that he 
make the payment himself: damages can be imposed rather than just required 
(his bank accounts or possessions can be sequestered), since what matters is 
that the cost falls on the person who culpably caused the harm — not that he 
actively pay the cost. But apology is different: nothing that is simply done to 
the offender, or imposed on him, can constitute his apologising for his crime. 
It is true that even if he undertakes his sentence only because he is threatened 
with some coercive imposition if he fails, we can still say that he has apolo-
gised — he has undertaken the Apology Ritual; a key feature of rituals is that 
they can be undertaken reluctantly, unwillingly, or under duress. But what is 
simply imposed, as punishments may in the end be imposed, cannot be an 
apology. 
Bennett does not take sufficient notice of this problem. He talks of what 
an offender must ‘undertake’ by way of apologetic ritual, and of ‘making’ or 
‘undertaking’ amends; but he also talks of ‘impos[ing] amends’ on the of-
fender [p. 148], and this should strike us as incoherent: amends, of their na-
ture, must be made or undertaken; they cannot be imposed. 
One way to resolve this problem would be to abandon the attempt to 
justify punishment as a coercive institution, and argue that we cannot justify 
anything more than a non-coercive requirement that offenders undertake the 
Apology Ritual. Such a radical solution would be in various ways problem-
atic, not least because we would probably find (as abolitionists often find) 
that coercive punishments are simply replaced by other, non-punitive ways of 
coercing actual or potential offenders — ways no less morally problematic 
than punishment. But we can avoid this conclusion by taking a path that Ben-
nett rejects [pp. 188-97] — by seeing criminal punishment as an enterprise in 
communication, which is intended not merely to express our condemnation to 
the offender, but also to elicit an appropriate response (recognition, remorse, 
and apologetic reparation) from her. Punishment, on this view, aspires to be 
or become a two-way process of communication: a process through which 
the polity seeks to communicate to the offender a morally adequate grasp of 
her wrongdoing, and through which she can, if she does recognise it, com-
municate her apology to the polity. This might sound, and indeed is, very 
close to Bennett’s view, but it differs in the small but crucial respect that it 
focuses not merely on expression, but on communication. Expression is a 
one-way process: it does not of its nature seek any specific response from the 
person (if there is one) to whom it is made. By contrast, communication 
seeks a response: it is, or aspires to be (since the response might not be forth-
coming) a two-way process.
9  
The criminal trial, as normatively described in the previous section, is a 
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to answer for his actions if he is proved to have committed the offence. A 
conviction similarly seeks a response, of remorseful recognition of guilt, 
from the defendant. If we are then to justify the burdensome punishment to 
which the convicted defendant is sentenced, it seems to me that we cannot 
adequately do so in the purely expressive terms that Bennett uses: it is not 
enough to say that this is the appropriate way to express our response, since 
other ways, including symbolic punishments that involve no material burden, 
are available. Nor is it enough to add that what we impose on the offender is 
what he should anyway undertake for himself by way of apologetic repara-
tion, since we have seen that what is merely imposed cannot constitute an 
apology. But what we can say, perhaps, is that the burdensome punishment 
constitutes a communicative attempt to persuade the offender to face up to 
his crime, and to accept (indeed, to undertake or undergo willingly) his 
punishment as appropriate reparation for that wrongdoing. That attempt might 
fail, in which case the wrongdoer has not apologised: but given the impor-
tance of trying to bring him to recognise and respond appropriately to his 
own wrongdoing (which is in part a matter of taking him seriously as a fellow 
member of the normative community), the attempt can still be justified, with-
out having to claim that it constitutes the amends that the offender is refusing 
to make.
10 
I cannot discuss or defend this account further here. All I hope to have 
argued here is that whilst Bennett’s account of punishment is imaginative, 
important, and largely plausible, the idea of the apology ritual cannot do as 
much work as he wants it to do. In particular, it cannot as it stands justify im-
posing punishment on the offender who refuses to undertake the ritual for 
himself: to justify that, I suggest (if it can be justified), we need to turn back 
to the more ambitiously communicative kind of account that Bennett rejects. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Future bare page references in the text are to this book. 
2 See Duff (2001) and (2007): Bennett (2008), pp. 188-97.
 
3 As always in normative theorising, the scope of this ‘we’ is problematic; my 
only hope here is that most readers of this comment will recognise the ‘we’ as includ-
ing them.
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4 The chief error of traditional legal moralism [Moore (1997)] is not to think 
that the criminal law is properly focused on wrongdoing, but to think that all wrong-
doing is, in principle, the criminal law’s business.
 
5 Others who do attend to this question, though with results very different from 
Bennett’s, include Adler (1992) and Tadros (2011).
 
6 I talk here of the criminal law as dealing with wrongs committed by citizens 
against each other. We must also explain its authority over temporary residents who 
are not citizens; we should see them as guests.
 
7 We should think here not of such problematic punishments as imprisonment, 
but of more suitable sentences such as Community Service Orders.
 
8 Furthermore, since we are dealing with a public ritual, we need not inquire 
into the offender’s sincerity: so long as he does undertake the ritual, that is enough.
 
9 Another difference is that communication is essentially a rational process that 
appeals to the other person’s understanding, whereas expression might aim only to 
arouse (or manipulate) emotions.
 
10 It is still true, however, that what we impose on or require of the offender 
must be something that would be appropriate, were he to undertake it himself, as 
moral reparation for his crime; and that from respect for the privacy of individual con-
science, we should not inquire intrusively into whether he is undertaking it, in the ap-
propriate spirit, for himself: this should meet some of the objections that Bennett and 
others raise to this communicative conception of punishment. See further Duff (2001), 
pp. 115-29; (2011), pp. 372-7. 
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RESUMEN 
Este artículo plantea cuatro observaciones o comentarios sobre el libro The 
Apology Ritual de Christopher Bennett. Primero, defiende la existencia de diversos 
conceptos de disculpa, todos ellos relevantes, que sin embargo no aparecen suficien-
temente distinguidos en el libro. Segundo, sostiene que no resulta claro el por qué la 
disculpa debería desempeñar un papel tan central en los ámbitos jurídicos, y estar 
conceptualmente relacionado con la idea de castigo, especialmente cuando al menos 
en los casos paradigmáticos desarrollados de la práctica de la disculpa, que tienen lu-
gar en ámbitos no jurídicos, la disculpa y el castigo parecen excluirse mutuamente. 
Tercero, objeta la idea de ritualidad, afirmando que nuestros sistemas jurídicos pena-
les no deberían abstenerse de requerir, al menos idealmente, sinceridad y firme con-
vicción en la práctica de pedir disculpas por parte del que comete un delito. Y, 
finalmente, se opone a la argumentación de Bennett sobre lo que una democracia libe-
ral puede hacer legítimamente a la hora de intervenir sobre las razones, actitudes u 
opiniones de sus ciudadanos. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper sets out four brief remarks or comments on Christopher Bennett’s 
book The Apology Ritual. First, it argues that there are different relevant concepts of 
apology, which are not differentiated in the book. Second, it claims that it is not clear 
why the role for apology in legal contexts needs to be so central and conceptually re-
lated to punishment, especially when, at least in its paradigmatic cases developed in 
non-institutional contexts, apology and punishment seem to be inimical. Third, it ar-
gues against rituality, stating that our penal systems should not refrain from requiring, 
at least ideally, sincerity and firm conviction in apologies by the offender. And it fi-
nally opposes Bennett in the idea of what a legitimate liberal democracy is allowed to 
do in terms of intervening in its citizens’ reasons, attitudes or opinions.  
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Christopher Bennett’s The Apology Ritual is an engaging, persuasive 
and thought-provoking book [Bennett (2008)]. In a highly worked and re-
worked field such as the theory of punishment, it is stimulating to read ambi-
tious and general theories like the one advocated by Bennett. This book 
brings some fresh air, even when it is significantly and admittedly grounded 
or aligned with Antony Duff’s communicative theory of punishment [cfr. 
Duff (2001, 2007, 2010)].  
Bennett’s main argument is Hegelian – and Duffian – in inspiration: 
punishment is justified because it is something we owe to the offender in or-
der to treat her as an autonomous person and to restore her status as a full 
member of our political community [Bennett (2008), p. 8]. It should be based 
on “a cycle of blame and apology,” and more concretely on a ritual of apol-
ogy. When someone commits a crime this is violating one of the most central 
rules in a democratic society, but she still deserves respect as a fully autono-
mous citizen. We must therefore express our censure for what she did; other-
wise we would be treating her as a child who is unworthy of any explanation of 
our reaction, not as an autonomous person [Bennett (2008), p. 8]. And since 
the practice of blaming seems pointless unless we inflict some punishment, 
what we owe the offender is also some kind of “symbolically adequate” and 
proportionate punishment, even if it is some kind of hard treatment. 
As Bennett suggests, “the appropriate symbols are to be found in the 
practice of apology.” In other words, “expressing the need for apology is the 
central motivation of punishment” [Bennett (2008), p. 8]. The adequate 
amount and kind of punishment is, ideally, the one that a wrongdoer who sin-
cerely apologizes to the victim expressing her guilt and repentance would 
deem and make an appropriate amend for her crime. And this entails, in al-
most all cases, hard treatment. A simply symbolic or formal expression of 
censure or blame would be insufficient. That is why, again, for Bennett the 
basis for punishment must be an adequate cycle of blame and apology. Apol-
ogy is “our fundamental means to ‘make things right’ in the face of having 
done wrong” [Bennett (2008), p. 7].  
Although I agree with much of what Bennett maintains in this book, the 
aim of this comment is to introduce, not necessarily criticism, but at least 
some points for discussion. Thus, with no other introduction, I will present 
my four different and brief remarks.  
 
 
I. THE CONCEPT OF APOLOGY 
 
My first remark has to do with the concept of apology itself. The term 
“apology” is not univocal, but rather it seems to refer to two different concepts, 
or two variants of the same concept. The difference between them lies in the in-
tention or the purpose associated with apology, and is relevant to my comments The Limits of Apology in a Democratic Criminal Justice                            121 
below. The first concept, which I will call “expressive,” views apology as 
something that the apologizer needs to do for herself without expecting or re-
questing any particular reaction from the addressee of that apology. Thus, as-
suming its sincerity, apology would serve the purpose of expressing the sort of 
remorseful feelings that its author possesses about what she intentionally or 
negligently did wrong. These feelings can be of sorrow, guilt, remorse, regret 
or even repentance – a list of emotions that appear without being distinguished 
from one another indistinctly in several parts of Bennett’s book. Apology so 
understood is an act of communication because it contains a message that the 
apologizer wants to be made known to the addressee of the apology, but it does 
not require any specific response from the addressee. It is only unidirectional 
communication. Apology serves here purely expressive purposes. And this 
practice has some value, we may accept, independently of whether the ad-
dressee accepts the apologies or not, whether he forgives the offender or not.  
In contrast, sometimes we apologize with a different purpose: we at-
tempt to generate or provoke a particular response in the addressee. This is 
the case, for example, when we apologize and request forgiveness from the 
victim, something that could be called a “requesting apology,” since it re-
quests the addressee to say or do something in particular. In cases of a “re-
questing apology,” we may also find expressions of sorrow, guilt or repentance 
on behalf of the apologizer. But they are not necessary. Perhaps, we may con-
cede, that the offender actually have feelings of guilt or remorse is a necessary 
condition of a sincere apology, but the expression of such feelings, at least for 
this second concept, remains nevertheless contingent. Sometimes it will be con-
venient to express such feelings as a means to achieve the aim of obtaining a 
requested response, but at times this may be even counterproductive.  
There is also communication in this second concept of apology, but one 
of a different kind: bidirectional or interactive communication. The request-
ing element introduces the expectation of a response from the addressee. He 
can, of course, accept or reject the apology, forgive or not forgive the wrong-
doer, but he is invited to say something in response. It is interesting to note 
that in the case in which the apologizer is looking for forgiveness and the ad-
dressee of the apology does not forgive the wrongdoer, we can affirm that the 
apology has been somehow frustrated. 
Finally, two conditions of requesting an apology will be important for 
another of my comments later on. First, in contrast to the purpose of expres-
sive apologies, the final aim of a sincere requesting apology from the point of 
view of the apologizer must be some sort of reconciliation, or at least some 
improvement in her personal relationship with the addressee. Second, both 
the apologizer and the addressee of the apology need to enjoy a minimal de-
gree of autonomy. A completely insane individual cannot meaningfully 
apologize. Similarly, a non-minimally-autonomous person cannot be the ad-
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in a meaningful way. This required degree of autonomy, though, might be 
very minimal. My 3-year-old Pablo is not a fully autonomous person, but he 
certainly is the author of some wrongdoings. And I believe, and try to teach 
him, that he has the duty to apologize for them, as well as the right to receive 
apologies from me when I do something wrong which harms him.  
Now, Bennett does not distinguish between these two concepts of apol-
ogy. He seems to presuppose that the expressive element is always present in 
the practice of apology, but his main argument in the book depends entirely 
on the second concept of apology, more concretely, on a particular variant of 
it. The ideal of apology envisaged by Bennett is one in which the apologizer 
not only feels and expresses sorrow, guilt, remorse and repentance, and not 
only asks the victim for forgiveness, but she also proposes to make some kind 
of amend or penitence to compensate for the wrong she committed in order to 
recover her status as a full member of a particular community. The request, 
then, goes beyond the mere asking for forgiveness. Apology, so understood, 
looks for some kind of acceptance from the addressee about the appropriate-
ness of the proposed penitence – what according to Bennett would constitute 
the ideal punishment that can rightly be inflicted on the wrongdoer.  
In this variant of the second concept, the addressee might consistently 
respond by denying his forgiveness for the wrong committed, and accepting 
at the same time the proposed penitence or punishment. For the same reason, 
the apologizer might request the addressee to accept his amends or punish-
ment in compensation for the produced harm, without accompanying this re-
quest with the expression of certain feelings of guilt or repentance, or without 
asking for forgiveness. What is more, a wrongdoer might well say, a) that she 
does not feel sorrow, nor guilt, nor remorse, nor repentance; b) that she is ac-
cordingly not looking for forgiveness of any kind; but c) that she recognizes 
that she did something that produced harm and is willing to compensate the 
victim for that harm. The question is, though, if this constitutes a case of 
apology. And I do not think it does.  
This case will preserve the central element in Bennett’s argument on the 
justification and determination of punishment under ideal conditions, which in-
clude the wrongdoer’s recognition of having produced harm and her disposition 
to somehow compensate the victim for it, on the one hand, and the victim’s ac-
ceptance of such amends, on the other. But this is not necessarily connected to 
the practice of apology. If this is true, apology – actual or ritual – has only a 
contingent role to play in the justification of punishment. 
 
 
II. THE EXTENSION OF APOLOGY TO LEGAL CONTEXTS 
 
We have developed our practice of apology in non-institutional or non-
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of communication between the author of a wrongdoing and the victim of it, 
especially in contexts in which legal institutions are absent. When someone 
commits a wrong harming someone else, if they minimally respect each 
other, and especially if they care about the future of their relationship, it may 
certainly be adequate to begin to talk about what happened with an apology. 
This is true in cases in which the committed wrongdoing is moral in kind, 
even when it does not have any legal relevance. But it seems also appropriate 
in other cases with no moral relevance at all, as in most of the situations in 
which I want my son Pablo to apologize. I take these non-institutional cases 
to be the paradigmatic cases of our social practice of apology, since it is in 
these contexts in which such practice has developed and is statistically more 
frequent.  
The absence of institutionalized response gives apology a centrality that 
virtually disappears as soon as some kind of legal institution intervenes. In 
private moral relations with no legal relevance, there is no other punishment 
or sanction apart from social reprobation or the victim’s negative reaction. In 
these cases, a requesting apology seems especially important. It may be pre-
cisely intended to avoid such social reprobation or such victim’s reaction. 
Thus, at least in these cases, apology seems an instrument to avoid punish-
ment, rather than a vehicle conducive to, or a justification of, such punish-
ment. Consider the case of my son Pablo again. I normally punish him when 
he does not want to apologize. And I exonerate him from punishment as soon 
as he truly apologizes and repents. We might therefore conclude that at least 
in these paradigmatic cases apology seems inimical, rather than congenial, to 
punishment.  
Now, Bennett proposes extending the practice of apology from these 
non-institutional cases to the legal processes of criminal responsibility, in 
which they currently play no role at all. What is more, he wants to give it a 
central role in the justification and determination of punishment. So, he needs 
to provide a double argument. First, he needs to prove that it may be desir-
able to extend this practice to legal cases, and more specifically to criminal 
legal cases. Let us concede that point. I agree with Bennett on the importance 
of leaving some room for apology in legal contexts. I would defend its appli-
cation to help solve conflicts of both private and public law, for instance, like 
those concerning a tort law liability case, or a breach of contract, or a traffic 
violation, or tax evasion. And I am willing to accept its role in criminal jus-
tice processes too. 
But Bennett needs to provide an argument for a second claim: that the 
ritual of apology must have a central role in criminal justice, and that far 
from being inimical to punishment, as it seems to be in the paradigmatic 
cases of the practice of apology, here it lies at the basis of the justification 
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Now, whatever the reason may be for extending the practice of apology 
to legal contexts such as those mentioned two paragraphs above, it does not 
seem to be necessarily related to punishment, since there is no punishment in 
private law cases nor in many public law ones. Even in the context of crimi-
nal justice, if it seems appropriate to leave some room for the practice of 
apology, it is apparently so regardless of the presence or absence of punish-
ment. The example Bennett uses to open his book, the Bryson and Judith 
case, is compelling to show why we should leave some room for apology in 
many legal contexts, but it still does not show why the ritual of apology oc-
cupies such a central role that would make it worthy of justifying and deter-
mining criminal punishment.  
 
 
III. THE RITUALITY OF APOLOGY 
 
Imagine that Bennett is right in placing apology at the center of our jus-
tification of criminal punishment. What he defends is nevertheless a ritual 
view of apology, not necessarily an actual one. And this produces some im-
portant ambiguity in his theory. Part of his examples try to show why we 
should introduce some room for apologies in our criminal justice processes, 
like the Bryson case. But he also states in several parts of the book that apol-
ogy does not need to be even present in our actual processes of responsibility. 
The book’s title itself claims for some ritualistic view of the importance of 
apology. But this leads to an obvious question: what does ritual apology 
mean here?  
According to Bennett, we need apology as a ground for determining the 
symbolically adequate blaming reactions that we owe to a wrongdoer [Bennett 
(2008), p. 8]. An ideal wrongdoer who sincerely feels guilt and repen-
tance would freely make the kind of amends and accept the just penitence 
that would achieve atonement. And this is consequently the kind of punish-
ment we owe to such a wrongdoer. A ritual apology would be, therefore, 
nothing other than a heuristic device that legislators and judges need to use in 
order to justify in abstraction and concretely determine the punishment to be 
inflicted in a particular case. We do not expect real wrongdoers to apologize 
and to themselves propose the punishment they have the right to receive. Nei-
ther do we expect also the public to explicitly express its outrage towards the 
wrongdoing that she committed. That’s why the Apology Ritual “is an artifi-
cial and symbolic procedure” [Bennett (2008), p. 149]. Moreover, Bennett is 
explicit in saying that:  
 
this account is compatible with freedom of conscience in that, although it fo-
cuses on making offenders undertake apologetic action, the action has to be 
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is sincere. It is for this latter reason that the view is called the Apology Ritual: 
rituals are often castigated as empty and formal because they need not engage ‘in-
ner’ attitudes, but it is precisely this vice that is a virtue in this context, since – it 
might be argued – the state […] has no business giving our sentences the explicit 
aim of which is to make offenders genuinely penitent [Bennett (2008), p. 154; 
see also p. 172ff]. 
 
I disagree with Bennett, though, in this respect: I think the idea of ritual 
here is not a virtue but as much of a vice as in some other contexts. But let 
me first ask again what this rituality means. Although this quote is quite 
explicit, it still does not completely disambiguate Bennett’s theory. Is the 
Apology Ritual just a counterfactual procedure, as Bennett sometimes 
qualifies it, that officials – legislators and judges, mainly – need to follow 
to justify and determine punishment? Is it only a heuristic device? If so, no 
specific rituality must take place in actual criminal justice processes. Or is it a 
ritual procedure that offenders need to follow, doing and saying certain 
things, even if they are not sincerely felt? 
If it is only a heuristic device to be used by officials, apology – actual 
or ritual – does not need to play a role at all in actual legal contexts. It is 
something that needs to take place only in judges’ heads. But this seems not 
to leave any role to rituality. Moreover, I cannot see then why Bennett insists 
in several parts of the book on the idea that his theory is close to a particular 
interpretation of restorative justice, one for which the actual communication 
between the wrongdoer and the victim becomes important and has some im-
portant room for actual processes of apology [Bennett (2008), p. 175-183]. 
Or why he uses the Bryson case to convince us of the appropriateness of 
leaving some room for actual apology to occur in criminal justice processes. 
If, on the contrary, apology needs to be importantly present in our ac-
tual processes of criminal responsibility, in the form of something that the of-
fender is encouraged or required to say to the victim, I do not see then why 
the rituality might be considered a virtue rather than a vice. When I teach my 
son Pablo to apologize for something he did, I need to make him understand 
that apology has value only if he is sincere in his expression of sorrow and 
guilt. Insincere apology seems a perversion of such value, and instrumentali-
zation of the practice of apology in the wrongdoer’s benefit, that far from 
helping reconciliation, far from restoring the previous relationship or status, 
far from fixing things, may make them much worse if detected. Thus, the 
practice of apology in real processes of criminal responsibility cannot be 
merely ritual.  
Finally, if it is actual apology the one which is valuable, and not a ritual 
one, why can Bennett affirm that apology is the key element to justify and 
determine punishment? He is certainly not claiming that we need to impose 
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apologize. He is aware that we cannot rely on this actual procedure to deter-
mine sanctions. But this leads us to the counterfactual or heuristic procedure 
to be used by the judge again. And this means that either Bennett is right in 
emphasizing the rituality dimension, in which case apology becomes nothing 
more than a device of counterfactual reasoning that loses an important part of 
its relevance, or else apology itself is really valuable, in which case we must 
drop or at least lessen the idea of rituality and we lose its connection with the 
determination of punishment. 
My hunch is that Bennett emphasizes the idea of rituality because of a 
wrong view of what liberal legitimacy requires. This is, at least, what I un-
derstand from his response to the objection I reproduce here [Bennett (2008), 
pp. 172-173]. He seems to presuppose that requiring sincerity to apologizers 
would be a form of interference in their freedom of conscience. He says that 
“to make offenders genuinely penitent” is not the state’s business [Bennett 
(2008), p. 154], and that “the state must regard the offender restored simply 
by virtue of having completed the sentence” [Bennett (2008), p. 173]. But 
this is not, in my opinion, what a liberal view of legitimacy and freedom of 
conscience requires, which leads me to my next and final remark. 
 
 
IV. DEMOCRACY, LEGITIMACY AND A SENSE OF JUSTICE 
 
Republicans and many liberals, among others, have stressed the idea that 
for the democratic state to survive it is necessary that citizens display a certain 
degree of civic dispositions or virtues. As the republican view – which I favor – 
may turn out to be more controversial in this respect, let me just outline a typi-
cal liberal response to this problem. A liberal state must remain neutral re-
garding the conceptions of the good advanced by its citizens to be legitimate 
[Rawls (1971), pp. 27-30, 392-394]. To express it in Rawlsian popular terms, 
the law and the state must refrain from adopting any particular comprehen-
sive doctrine [cfr. Rawls (1993), Lectures IV and V]. Any state that violates 
this principle will be operating as a perfectionist state and cannot be legiti-
mate. Among other implications of this anti-perfectionist view, some basic 
freedoms such as freedom of conscience or freedom of religion must be guar-
anteed by the law. Liberal legitimacy, consequently, will prohibit any attempt 
of the state’s institutions to force their citizens to adopt any particular moral 
view, and more precisely any particular conception of the good.  
Now, this does not mean that the state cannot intervene at any rate to 
favor or even impose a particular conception of the right. On the contrary, 
from the liberal point of view legal coercion it is legitimate to enforce pre-
cisely those principles which comprise the liberal conception of the right, or 
the content of a political overlapping consensus among reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines. The state is certainly entitled to coerce its citizens in order The Limits of Apology in a Democratic Criminal Justice                            127 
to make them behave rightly. This is exactly what a legitimate criminal law 
must do. But it is not only this. The liberal state is also allowed to use appro-
priate means to make it possible for citizens to understand and accept the rea-
sons why this particular conception of the right needs to be enforced, as well 
as the personal disposition to act according to it. It needs to promote such a 
minimal and shared sense of justice among its citizens, as Rawls has called it, 
since otherwise it would not have stability, which is in turn a further condi-
tion of its political legitimacy [Rawls (1971), pp. 41, 236, 274-275, 295-296, 
442, and (1993), p. 19, 35, 77, 141].  
True, direct coercion cannot rank as “appropriate means” in order to 
promote such sense of justice. Moreover, personal autonomy would some-
how be compromised if we tried to do this. But only because part of what it is 
valuable in having such dispositions and beliefs is the fact that one has 
achieved them autonomously. Instruments like education seem much more 
acceptable – and effective. But we should not restrict the idea of education to 
something that happens within the walls of schools, or even colleges and uni-
versities. Why should our criminal justice processes not incorporate an edu-
cational dimension articulated through not mere rituality, but through a truly 
and sincere exchange of beliefs and opinions?  
In effect, the state cannot legitimately aim to have its citizens oppose 
murder because of a particular moral or religious conception of the sacred-
ness of human life. But the state of course can require not only that its citi-
zens not commit murder, but that they understand and accept the reasons why 
murder is forbidden; which are, in short, the reasons why it is legitimate to 
forbid murder, or even, the reasons why murder is a public wrong. From this 
point of view, the liberal state is entitled to seek that citizens’ recognize it as 
a wrong and feel sorrow and guilt when they commit it, and why not, that 
they express such feelings publicly when they are blamed for that wrong. I 
am not saying that the state may legitimately force the offenders to sincerely 
apologize. As I said, that would violate their autonomy, and would be inef-
fective too. But why should it not leave some room for sincere apology and 
congratulate it when it does happen?  
Bennett states that “Whether [the offender] is genuinely remorseful or 
not is not relevant to his relations with the state” [Bennett (1998), p. 173]. 
But it is one thing to say that the state cannot coercively impose such remorse 
and quite another that having it is irrelevant for his relations with the state, 
which is, by the way, one of the victims of the public wrong. The state might 
well welcome sincere apologies from the offender by, for instance, lessening 
or reducing the punishment. And, in any case, the state is certainly allowed to 
promote the conditions under which all citizens may share a minimal sense of 
justice and understand and accept the reasons why the overlapping consensus 
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Let me expand a little bit this last idea. In a fully democratic commu-
nity, the use of coercion to ensure the respect and obedience to law is legiti-
mate, since this is what legitimacy precisely means. If a citizen commits a 
public wrong, we – as a community – need reasons to justify the imposition 
of punishment. These reasons, of course, depend ultimately on a particular 
theory of legitimacy as well as on a justificatory theory of punishment. But I 
do not need to enter now into such complexities. If the criminal law is legiti-
mate, then by definition we possess reasons to justify its imposition. What we 
owe to the offender, before punishing her, is to offer her such reasons, that is, 
to provide her a public justification of the measures to be taken.  
Now, offering reasons to the wrongdoer about the legitimacy of the 
punishment we are going to inflict involves some kind of deliberative proc-
ess. It cannot be only unidirectional communication from the judge to the of-
fender, in which the former “ritualistically” reads some section of the law, 
with no care about whether the offender endorses or accepts, or even under-
stands, what she is being told. It entails a much richer notion of what a proc-
ess of criminal responsibility aims at. It means to transform such a process 
into a genuinely deliberative procedure; a procedure in which the offender, 
the state and the direct victim of the public wrong actively participate, having 
the chance to expose and discuss their respective views.  
Of course, such a deliberative process must leave a privileged role for 
the expression of censure or blame towards the committed public wrong. 
What is more: being involved in a deliberative process as such does not mean 
that the judge needs to be disposed to be convinced by the offender, for in-
stance, of the illegitimacy of the criminal code. The offender has the right to 
receive explanations of the reasons why such a code as well as the punish-
ment to be imposed are legitimate. But the criminal justice process is not the 
institutional moment to challenge the legitimacy of the law.  
In any case, I am convinced that in criminal justice processes like this 
one an important place for apology must be reserved. The expression of guilt, 
remorse and repentance by the offender may turn out to be very important for 
achieving a mutual understanding of the wrong committed and the legitimacy 
of the punishment to be inflicted. But apology only has value in this context 
when it is actual, not ritual, and honest or sincere. I am not denying that some 
elements of rituality may help to make things easier. Judicial processes in 
general are highly ritualized, and for good reasons. But the central value of an 
apology in a legal process, as in the most paradigmatic cases developed in non-
institutional contexts, depends entirely on its sincerity, among other things.  
To recognize this does not compromise liberal legitimacy. It does not 
entail adopting a perfectionist view. It does not violate state’s liberal neutral-
ity. To take care of the sincerity of the offender’s claims during a trial, even 
of those related to her personal feelings and attitudes, is not “interfering in 
her freedom of conscience,” at least when they are related to a public wrong. The Limits of Apology in a Democratic Criminal Justice                            129 
To take care not only of its citizens’ behavior, but also of their beliefs and at-
titudes towards the conception of the right (or towards those public wrongs), 
is the state’s business.*  
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Responding to Wrongdoing: 
Comments on Christopher Bennett’s The Apology Ritual 
 
Sergi Rosell 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
En este artículo se presentan tres dificultades principales para la posición de 
Bennett. En primer lugar, ¿no está el retributivismo en una situación peor si se admite 
(como hace Bennett) que aquello por lo que somos moralmente responsables, y culpa-
bles, está en gran medida sujeto a la suerte? En segundo lugar, nuestras prácticas mora-
les incluyen reacciones a las malas acciones, que consideramos apropiadas y a menudo 
admirables, en las que no parece haber presente ningún elemento de hostilidad. Final-
mente, existen diferencias importantes entre la censura y el castigo que ponen en cuestión 
la meta de entender y justificar el castigo legal como una mera proyección de la censura. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: censura, castigo, retribución, responsabilidad moral, suerte. 
 
ABSTRACT 
I present here three main difficulties for Bennett’s account. First, it seems that 
retributivism is in a worse position if we admit (as Bennett does) that that for which 
we are morally responsible, and blameable, is to some extent subject to luck. Second, 
our moral practices include reactions to wrongdoing in which no vindictive element 
seems to be present, and we still regard them as appropriate and often admirable. Fi-
nally, there are important differences between blame and punishment that make prob-
lematic the aim of understanding and justifying legal punishment as a mere projection 
of blame. 
 
KEYWORDS: Blame, Punishment, Retribution, Moral Responsibility, Luck. 
 
 
Christopher Bennett’s aim in The Apology Ritual (2008) is to put forward 
a philosophical theory of punishment which is fundamentally retributivist, al-
though it also includes significant insights from restorative justice. In particu-
lar, he offers an account of legal punishment modelled on the ordinary 
practices of blame and apology. So, a first key point is for him to show that 
there is an appropriate link between legal (formal, state) punishment and the 
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ordinary notions of blame (as a kind of moral or interpersonal sanction) and 
apology (as the wrongdoer’s morally expected response to her own wrong in 
interpersonal contexts). Additionally, Bennett argues that blame involves ad-
verse reactive attitudes by whose expression we withdraw our goodwill or re-
spect to the wrongdoer, which in turn involves a commitment to retribution, 
i.e. to hard treatment or to making the wrongdoer suffer. On this view, when 
we genuinely blame someone, we are necessarily treating her harshly or in-
tending to make her suffer, as something we owe to her. So, a second key 
point is for him to convincingly argue that blame is non-contingently con-
nected to the idea of hard treatment or the willingness to see the offender suf-
fer (in response to wrongdoing), since this connection seems essential for a 
theory to count as retributivist. Both points are crucial for the success of the 
book’s overall argument. 
I have to confess that I tend to sympathise with much of what Bennett 
has to say, especially regarding his account of moral responsibility and his 
reply to the sceptical Argument from Luck. But beyond this general sympa-
thy, I have some particular reservations regarding the two crucial steps of his 
account that I have mentioned — i.e. the analogy between ordinary blame 
and apology, and state punishment, on the one hand; and the commitment to 
hard treatment, on the other — on which I want to press here. I will start by 
commenting on Bennett’s answer to the luck argument and will then move on 
to discuss his account of blame, and will finish with the issue of the projec-
tion of this account to legal punishment. 
 
 
I. ‘THE ARGUMENT FROM LUCK’ 
 
Both Bennett’s articulation of the sceptical argument against moral re-
sponsibility and his answer to it are quite remarkable. Instead of framing the 
discussion about the possibility of moral responsibility in the traditional 
terms of whether this is or is not compatible with determinism, Bennett shifts 
the scenery and rephrases the debate in terms of luck — or lack of control, 
luck and control being antithetical. This has an evident advantage, which is 
the inclusion of cases of agents acting in indeterministic scenarios in which 
control is also absent. The real issue, at the end of the day, is the challenge 
that lack of (full) control poses on moral responsibility. Interestingly too, he 
puts the challenge in terms of fairness: ‘only if we had ultimate control over 
ourselves could it be just or morally appropriate to treat us in that way: the 
presence of luck makes that [hard] treatment unjust’ [p. 50].  
In answering this challenge, Bennett puts forwards a novel defence of 
Peter Strawson’s (1962) account of moral responsibility which relies on the 
idea of the wrongdoer’s ‘right to be punished’ and is also an argument for the 
need of retribution. I will discuss this argument in the next section. At present Responding to Wrongdoing:…                                                                     133 
I want to propose a distinction regarding the role of luck in moral responsibil-
ity judgments which, subsequently, I will apply to Bennett’s reply to the Ar-
gument from Luck. 
One evident way in which the presence of luck is disturbing regarding 
moral responsibility is that it could undermine the kind of freedom or control 
required for moral responsibility. This is what is typically at issue in the scep-
tical challenges to moral responsibility and the point is that if we lack the 
kind of freedom or control required for moral responsibility we are not mor-
ally responsible at all, with the result that moral responsibility is an illusion. 
But there is another way in which luck can interfere in moral responsibility, 
which is the way involved in the so-called issue of moral luck. Even if we 
were morally responsible agents who were real originators of our actions and 
character, some accidental or circumstantial factors could still interfere with 
our actions and even our character, so that cases of moral luck could anyhow 
be presented. Take for instance the case of an influent libertarian like Robert 
Kane [see esp. Kane (1996)], who must accept that, in his self-determining 
and self-forming willings and actions, what action the agent specifically ends 
up performing is partially a matter of luck, even though she had good reasons 
for willing and performing any of the different actions at stake and is no doubt 
morally responsible for the one actually performed, independently of which 
one it is. Of course, compatibilists are in general supposed to be more ready to 
accept the existence of (at least, some kinds of) moral luck. The issues of 
moral responsibility scepticism and moral luck are thus partially independent, 
despite the fact that both questions are connected and the further back we go 
in uncovering aspects of agents’ actions and character, the closer the sceptical 
challenge to moral responsibility and the moral luck issue become — to the 
extent that, at some point, both questions may rest on the same issue. 
Now, it seems to me that Bennett mainly focuses on the first issue — his 
Argument from Luck is certainly a reformulation of the sceptical argument — 
and does not clearly address the second — the moral luck issue. But this sec-
ond issue is also a potential problem for the fairness of retribution, independ-
ently of the first one. Let us accept that his reply to the Argument from Luck 
is sound (as I mainly regard it to be). Nevertheless it seems that moral luck 
— particularly, in the circumstances we face and in the consequences of our 
actions — raises extra doubts about the fairness of retributive responses, 
since agents may still not be equally in control of their actions and character 
or may be more or less lucky in the circumstances that they have to face or in 
the results of what they do.  
I find difficult to infer from what Bennett says in the book what his po-
sition concerning moral luck (in its different kinds) is. Maybe we should con-
jecture from his answer to the sceptical argument (especially after its 
restatement on pages 59 to 62) a favourable disposition to endorse moral 
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which people will be subject to the reactive attitudes, since these are responsive 
to the agent’s exhibition of the character trait that reflects her response to the 
moral demands and having this trait or not may not be her fault [pp. 61-2]. An-
other clue, though it is not clear to me where it points to, comes from his re-
marks about the need to take some account of luck, in order to discount 
accidental action, action from ignorance and the like, or the lack of the capac-
ity for full engagement in interpersonal relationships and moral capacities. The 
rationale for discounting these cases is that luck is conditioning features which 
are irrelevant to the assessment of the quality’s of a person’s will [p. 62]. So, in 
a plausible interpretation, this account would not exclude circumstantial moral 
luck, but would surely reject consequential moral luck, since consequences 
(at least those unforeseeable) may be supposed to be irrelevant to assess 
one’s quality of will. 
To restate my main point in this section, even if Bennett has success-
fully showed that the sceptical argument illegitimately infers from our ab-
sence of ultimate control that we are not morally responsible at all, he has 
acknowledged that a lot of luck enters into the sphere of moral agency; so 
that his opponent could just say: ‘Ok, I accept that (a certain amount of) luck 
does not preclude moral responsibility, but it definitely calls for a milder re-
action to wrongdoing, since luck is unequally distributed.’ Therefore, a suc-
cessful reply to the sceptic is still far from paving the way for retribution. I 
move on then to Bennett’s direct argument for retributivism. 
 
 
II. BLAME AND RETRIBUTION 
 
Building on Strawson’s insights, Bennett argues for retributivism by 
presenting an interpretation and defence of the idea that a wrongdoer has ‘the 
right to be punished’ — or, more exactly, ‘the right to be evaluated as a 
member of moral relationships’ [p. 62]. Each of us, as rational and morally 
capable agents, has the right to be taken seriously as a member of moral rela-
tionships, and this involves not suspending expectations and demands toward 
someone who does not meet previous expectations or demands, but rather 
holding her accountable for her deeds. So, the proper reaction to wrongdoing 
is to withdraw our goodwill, which is the way we have of showing our disap-
proval of this person’s not meeting the relationship’s demands. Not to blame 
wrongdoers would amount to fail to recognise or respect them as full mem-
bers of valuable social relationships. Moreover, we express this withdrawal 
through adverse reactive attitudes, such as indignation and resentment. And 
these reactive attitudes are retributive in nature. Thus, Bennett reconstructs 
Strawson’s account as ‘a normative argument in favour of retributivism, or at 
least in favour of certain emotional attitudes that we can see as the basis of 
our sense of retributive justice’ [p. 51].  Responding to Wrongdoing:…                                                                     135 
I tend to agree with most of this story. However, my doubt is whether it 
is not possible for us to blame (or to judge morally blameworthy) someone, 
without expressing (or just feeling) any kind of suffering-aimed adverse emo-
tional reactivity towards her. Indeed some historical morally admirable fig-
ures, like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, are supposed to have 
maintained this kind of non-vindictive response to wrongdoing — at least in 
certain crucial occasions. It is assumed that their condemnation of their op-
pressors or opponents lacked any adverse reactivity in the way retributivism 
requires. They apparently attempted to change their oppressors’ behaviour by 
appealing to their conscience, i.e. through dialogue and mere moral argu-
ment, avoiding any wish of making them suffer. 
Bennett presents a dilemma in understanding King’s and Gandhi’s atti-
tudes: either their responses were retributive in a minimal sense, and this is 
the only way of recognising their adversaries as qualified members of some 
shared moral relationship; or they were not retributive at all, but then they were 
disrespectful to those towards whom they were addressed [pp. 109-110]. Cer-
tainly, this last interpretation would imply that Gandhi and King considered 
themselves as morally superior to their adversaries, but this seems contrary to 
our natural understanding of their conducts and the admiration they generate. 
So, it may seem that the first interpretation is the right one. 
I agree that the second interpretation is inappropriate — it clearly con-
tradicts our intuitions about the case — but also is Bennett’s final judgment 
that King’s and Gandhi’s attitudes involved a minimal retributive aspect. The 
crucial point is whether we can interpret their attitudes as expressing the right 
respect owed to qualified members of the relationship, i.e. as taking seriously 
enough their actions as self-governing, without these attitudes having to in-
volve any retributive element. On a non-vindictive view of blame, King and 
Gandhi did change their attitudes toward their oppressors, as a response to 
their abuse or deterioration of the relationship, but they did it with no need of 
expressing any retributive attitudes. If this characterization is plausible (and 
this is the issue), it seems that it clearly fits better with our shared under-
standing of King and Gandhi’s attitudes and the merit we confer to them. 
Let us consider the following speech, from Anton Chekhov’s short 
story New Villa, which I take as representing a clear case of the kind of non-
vindictive blame that I have in mind. The engineer Kutcherov and his wife 
arrive at a little village with the governmental mission of building a bridge. 
Once there, they get captivated by the countryside charm and decide to build 
their own house near the village. The Kutcherovs want to establish a good re-
lationship with the villagers, but the villagers misuse the Kutcherovs’ good 
will and, after some time of unfruitful trying, the engineer goes to meet the 
villagers and addresses them: 
 136                                                                                                   Sergi Rosell 
I’ve been waiting to talk to you for some time, lads,’ he went on. ‘The thing is, 
your cattle have been in my garden and woods every day since early spring. It’s 
all been trampled up. Your pigs have dug up the meadow, they’ve ruining the 
vegetable plot, and I’ve lost all the saplings in my wood. I can’t get on with 
your shepherds, they bite your head off if you ask them anything. You trespass 
on my land every day, but I do nothing, I don’t get you fined, I don’t complain. 
Now you’ve taken my horses and bull — and my five roubles. 
‘Is it fair, is it neighbourly?’ he went on, his voice soft and pleading, his glance 
anything but stern. ‘Is this how decent men behave? One of you cut down two 
young oaks in my wood a week ago. You’ve dug up the Yeresnevo road, and 
now I have to go two miles out of my way. Why are you always injuring me? 
What harm have I done you? For God’s sake, tell me! My wife and I do our ut-
most to live with you in peace and harmony; we help the peasants as we can. 
My wife is a kind, warm-hearted woman; she never refuses to help. That is her 
dream—to be of use to you and your children. You reward us with evil for our 
good. You are unjust, my friends. Think of that. I ask you earnestly to think 
over it. We treat you humanely; repay us with the same coin. 
[…] Rodion, who always understood everything that was said to him in some 
peculiar way of his own, heaved a sigh and said: We must pay. “Repay in coin, 
my friends”… he said [Chekhov (1998), pp. 210-1]. 
 
It is clear in the story that Rodion the blacksmith — leader of this side of the 
villagers — does not really understand what he and his fellows are being told. 
Kutcherov does not seem to be looking for retribution, but is just prompting 
them to think about all the wrong things they have been doing to him. Some 
may say that this is more a sort of complaint than proper blame, but it defi-
nitely appears to be a reaction that is responsive to the wrong done, but non-
vindictive at all. My point is not that this kind of non-retributive response is 
the only appropriate one ever, but that non-retributive blame is also a genuine 
kind of blame, together with retributive blame.
1 And if this is so, then blame 
is not necessarily retributive (nor characteristically retributive, since cases 
like this are significant), although it might still be typically or more fre-
quently retributive. Kutcherov just wants them to realize how badly they have 
been acting, and then to stop acting like that. I can’t find this disrespectful to 
them as full, qualified members of the relationship.
2  
In short, I find Bennett’s answer to the challenge arisen by King and 
Gandhi cases unappealing because either our praise for them is due to the 
kind of non-retributive dialogue that they propose; or, if this praise could be 
made compatible with a minimal retributive factor, then it would be a some-
what trivial one, in order for the case not to lose its intuitive appeal — an ap-
peal which lies in the contrast between their calm attitudes (or low tone in 
adverse feelings where the retributive element, if any, is definitely negligi-
ble), and clearly overt retributive responses or ‘vindictive sentiments.’ It 
seems to me then that Bennett, in accordance with his own account, should 
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amples of a superior or even appropriate form of blaming behaviour which 
merits imitation — or that Kutcherov’s second reaction (see footnote 1) is al-
ways more appropriate than the first one. If our responses to wrongdoing 
ought to be proportional, in terms of showing the right amount of retributive 
reactivity or of making the wrongdoer suffer, then King and Gandhi re-
sponses are clearly inadequate. 
An additional reason that Bennett offers for considering King and Gan-
dhi’s response as retributive is their thinking that their oppressors had the ob-
ligation to put things right in order to redeem themselves, ‘for this would be a 
sign that, however they expressed it, they did blame their enemies in the 
sense of seeing distance between them that had to be made up before they 
could treat one another normally’ [p. 111]. But this argument is unacceptably 
assuming that any recognition of an offence and of the obligation of putting 
things right involves a commitment to retribution. It sounds like taking for 
granted that only the presence of retributive aspects can make the difference, 
when we are precisely investigating whether a kind of blame that dispenses 
with retribution is viable. 
 
 
III. FROM BLAME TO PUNISHMENT 
 
The final point that I want to address is that of the continuity between the 
notions of blame and apology, and state punishment — as an institutional ver-
sion of the former [p. 152 ff]. Certainly, there exist both important analogies 
and disanalogies between them, and actually Bennett’s argument relies on a 
shared general structure, modelled upon ordinary blame and apology, but it also 
stresses important differences which mean that that structure should be only 
ritualistically projected to legal punishment — resulting all together, it is fair to 
say, in a nicely and robustly articulated account.
3 However, it is still true that a 
crucial difference between them could turn out to be fatal for the project of 
grounding legal punishment on an account of ordinary blame and apology, so 
that they may require independent and distinct justifications. I will conclude, 
therefore, by putting forward a possible crucial difference regarding the distinct 
effect of blame and punishment on their receiver. 
I find it plausible to assume that blame and punishment have different 
sorts of success or felicity conditions. In particular, I am thinking of the dif-
ferent role played by the recipient in blame and punishment. Even if blame 
and punishment are both ways of responding to wrongdoing, blame seems to 
depend upon the recipient’s attitude in a way that punishment does not. This 
is because, in order to actually impact on the recipient, blame needs to be ac-
knowledged by her. I do not mean that a person cannot actually be blamed 
unless she acknowledges the blame, but just that blame does not affect the 
blamed person if she does not perceive it as just or justified.
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tends to blame me, but I regard this blame as unjust, I will not typically feel 
blamed. Punishment, however, does not depend to the same extent on the re-
ceiver’s response to it. A person will be punished –– in the sense that she will 
be hard treated, as retributive punishment implies –– even if she does not rec-
ognise this punishment as justified. In this sense, and very roughly put, blame is 
subjective (or requires some kind of rational endorsement by part of the recipi-
ent), whereas punishment is objective (i.e. it is independent of the subject’s ap-
praisal). And this is surely related to the fact that blame calls for a kind of 
internal response to wrongdoing, which appeals to reason; whereas punishment 
is only externally connected to wrongdoing and not in the space of reasons. 
Of course, there are some complications here. It is true that the same 
objective punishment can be differently experienced by different people, 
bringing about lower or higher rates of suffering. In addition, blame can also 
have a social force independent of an individual’s endorsement. But putting 
these complications aside, the point generally holds: blame does not impose 
by itself a burden on the wrongdoer; it rather requires the addressee’s grasp-
ing of its moral force, leaving it up (to a significant extent) to the wrong-
doer’s conscience coming to accept it or not. 
Now, the consequence that I want to draw is that, because legal pun-
ishment has a more objective, externally imposed impact on the recipient 
than blame, which makes it potentially more harmful and less rationally con-
trollable by its recipient, it is then not unreasonable to think that its justifica-
tion cannot be a mere projection of the very justification of blame, but it 
rather requires a distinctive ground. If this is so, then Bennett’s (and other 
blame-based punishment theorists’) agenda should be radically amended.
5 
There is definitely a lot to praise in Chris Bennett’s sophisticated book, 
which is much richer than what can surely be inferred from my comments here 
— featuring notable arguments for the importance of the restorative part of 
the cycle of blame and apology, or the ritualistic and expressive aspects of his 
account. I hope these comments may prompt him to further clarify some fun-
damental aspects of his view.
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NOTES 
 
1 In fact, after this first reproach proving useless, Kutcherov will utter a more 
outraged kind of blame some days later: Responding to Wrongdoing:…                                                                     139 
He fixed his indignant gaze on Rodion. ‘My wife and I have treated you as human beings, 
as equals,’ he went on. ‘But what about you? Oh — what’s the use of talking? We shall 
end up looking down on you, very likely — what else can we do?’ Making an effort to keep 
his temper, in case he said too much, he turned on his heel and marched off [Chekhov 
(1998), p. 216]. 
 
Very likely, this is a more typical or overt blaming response, but I can’t see why here 
the blaming person is more respectful to the addressee’s standing in their relationship. 
Indeed, in this case no further expectation in recovering the relationship seems to be 
present, what surely makes more difficult subsequent apology and reconciliation. 
2 This sort of blame should not be simply understood as merely aiming at moral 
(re)education. In my view, the most plausible interpretation of Gandhi and King’s ap-
peal to conscience is as aiming at moral improvement, which can be construed as a 
cooperative task between equals, in which qualified participants are not prevented 
from engaging. 
3 Exploring and accounting for these analogies and disanalogies is Bennett’s 
main task in Part III. 
4 I am not referring to the felicity conditions of the very speech act (of blaming) 
— i.e. those conditions that must hold for a speech act of a particular kind to count as 
such — but to the further conditions for the success of the particular kind of moral 
address which blame consists in. 
5 Bennett might acknowledge this disanalogy and consider it as actually confer-
ring more support to the necessity of a merely ritualistic implementation of the blame 
model for punishment. My worry with this is that an account that takes every analogy 
as giving support to the projection and every disanalogy as supporting the different 
(ritualistic/non-ritualistic) implementation of the common model would be a non-
falsifiable account. 
6 I am grateful to Chris Bennett and Josep Corbí for their comments on early ver-
sions of this paper, as well as to the audience of its oral presentation at the V Nomos 
Meeting. I also thank support coming from the research project ‘Alternatives, Belief, 
and Action’ (FFI2009-09686), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Com-
petitiveness, and the Generalitat Valenciana’s VALi+d Programme. 
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The Public Expression of Penitence 
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RESUMEN  
Este trabajo explora críticamente la comprensión expresivista del castigo que 
está en el corazón del libro de Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual. Parece haber 
una tensión en el tratamiento simultáneo por parte de Bennett de los delincuentes co-
mo gente a la que, por un lado, se le ofrece la oportunidad de ejercer su derecho a re-
parar el daño y, por otro, como sujetos que son sentenciados por mor de una expresión 
apropiada de su condena. Defiendo, en cambio, que el castigo infligido por el estado 
no puede realizar la función de purga, que quienes comenten un delito no lo necesitan 
para redimirse y que no confiere la redención, automáticamente, como algo que fuera 
de suyo, a alguien que no se arrepiente. Si, como Bennett parece sugerir, el ‘derecho a 
ser castigado’ tiene que incluir una dimensión ética, no puede ser simplemente un de-
recho a sufrir por lo que uno ha hecho, pues la reacción éticamente apropiada al cri-
men tiene que respetar también el derecho que uno tiene a ser reconocido como el 
criminal que fue y a que se le dé ocasión de reparar públicamente el daño que causó. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: penitencia, justicia restauradora, derecho al castigo, castigo co-
municativo, restauración. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper critically explores the expressivist understanding of punishment 
which lies at the heart of Christopher Bennett’s book The Apology Ritual. There 
seems to be a tension in Bennett’s simultaneous treatment of offenders as people who 
are, on the one hand, being offered the opportunity to exercise their right to make 
amends and, on the other, being sentenced for the sake of an appropriate expression of 
their condemnation. I propose instead that state-inflicted punishment cannot easily 
serve a purging function, that offenders do not need it to redeem themselves, and that 
it does not automatically bestow redemption on the unrepentant as a matter of course. 
If, as Bennett seems to suggest, the ‘right to punishment’ is to include an ethical di-
mension, it cannot simply be a right to suffer for one’s deeds, for the ethically appro-
priate reaction to crime must also respect one’s right to be recognised as the criminal 
that one is, and be given a chance to make public amends for it. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Penitence, Restorative Justice, Right to Punishment, Communicative 
Punishment, Restoration. 
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The notion of obligations comes before that of rights, 
which is subordinate and relative to the former.  
 
SIMONE WEIL, The Need for Roots, 1942-3. 
 
 
 
I. DECENT OFFENDERS AND THE DUTY TO PUNISH 
 
Christopher Bennett’s The Apology Ritual is motivated by an important 
yet frequently neglected concern regarding the obstacles that certain legal pro-
cedures create for decent offenders who wish to apologise for their crimes and 
make appropriate amends. Bennett illustrates this with the following narrative: 
 
When taken away by the police car, Bryson was in the middle of an apology to 
the victim, an apology that he no doubt sees as inadequate to the situation, but 
which he feels compelled to make nevertheless...Under our present system, the 
police bundle Bryson off and from that point on he has little or no chance to 
have contact with Judith...the severity of the sanction may make it less likely 
that he ever expresses how sorry he is to his victim [Bennett (2008), p. 4].  
 
According to Bennett, the problem is best addressed by striking a balance be-
tween retributive and restorative theories of justice by means of state-
sanctioned apologies which respect wrongdoers as agents whose actions are 
subject to moral and rational evaluation [Ibid, p. 41ff].This is to be achieved, 
he suggests, by sentencing them to serve whatever punishment decent people 
– such as Bryson in the example above – would freely choose for them-
selves.
1 Such apology rituals enforce criminals to act as if they are sorry, re-
gardless of whether or not they actually are so. 
Bennett’s proposal is intended to respect the fact that we have a duty to 
punish offenders and consequently wrong them if we pardon crimes against 
their wishes, compelling them to accept an unwanted gift. Inter alia, Bennett 
argues not only that apology rituals enable us to express a condemnation owed 
to offenders, but that such expression is the chief purpose of punishment: 
 
[...] a good way to express how wrong we think an act is would be by making 
the offender do what we think someone who was sorry enough for their offence 
would feel it necessary to undertake by making amends [Bennett (2008), p. 
146] [...] the fundamental job of the criminal sanction [...] is simply to express 
proportionate condemnation [Ibid, p. 148] [... ] the main purpose of punishment 
is condemnation of the offender for a “public wrong”‘ [Ibid, p. 152] [...] Setting The Public Expression of Penitence                                                             143 
an amount of amends is an ‘intuitive way of expressing condemnation’ [Ibid, p. 
174] [...] there is a role for the criminal sanction – understood as what I have 
called the apology ritual – as an expression of collective condemnation of 
crimes [Ibid, p. 175].  
 
This expressivist understanding of punishment lies at the heart of Bennett’s 
suggestion that state-sanctioned apologies should be ritualistic. Yet there is a 
tension in the simultaneous treatment of offenders as people who are, on the 
one hand, being offered the opportunity to exercise their right to make 
amends and, on the other, being sentenced for the mere sake of an appropriate 
expression of their condemnation. The extent to which this tension can be re-
lieved hangs on the precise sense that we give to the elusive notion of a ‘right 
to punishment’.
2 What follows is an exploration of certain details of Ben-
nett’s proposed account, offered on the premise that the spirit of his law can 
only be strengthened through criticisms of its letter. 
 
 
II. EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE REMORSE 
 
All rights are de facto limited by recipients’ lack of power to waive any 
correlative obligations. According to an influential legal tradition, rights are 
thereby akin to liberties whose exercise we may but need not pursue, having 
‘some measure of control over the correlative obligation’ [Holmes (1881), p. 
214; cf. Hart (1955), pp. 180-3 & (1973), pp. 171ff.]. So conceived, the right 
of offenders – decent or otherwise – to be treated as autonomous agents en-
tails a choice to be punished, and an opportunity to input into what the pun-
ishment should be [see, for example, Morris (1968)].
3  
In opposition to this tradition, it has been proposed that there are ‘rights 
which do not leave [the bearer] free to waive anything at all’, such as that of 
a team‘s right to a throw-in [White (1984), p. 108]. But is it not misleading to 
claim the team has a right to a throw-in if it has no choice but to take one? A 
team may have the right to claim a throw-in when none was given, but only if 
they were equally within their rights not to claim one. Similarly, an offender 
has a right to be punished if no sentence is given. In the case of a compulsory 
sentence, however, it seems misleading to insist that she had a right to it. At 
most, to have something that one is entitled to forced upon one is to have a 
right that one is prevented to exercise. A fortiori, if the reason for making 
punishment compulsory is to be that offenders have some kind of right to it, 
the right in question can only be one whose exercise they are denied a two-
way power over.  
One possible move here, inspired by Hegel, would be to maintain that 
in choosing to do something which they know they will be punished for of-
fenders are already choosing to be punished [cf. Hegel (1821), § 99R].
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position presumes a somewhat distorted notion of choice, eliciting responses 
such as the following one by John Deigh: 
 
At most, one who chooses to commit a criminal offense chooses to place him-
self in jeopardy of being punished or, if determination of his guilt is a foregone 
conclusion, to incur a liability to punishment [Deigh (1984), p.197].
5  
 
 
Perhaps the correct conclusion to reach is that no theory of why state-
sanctioned punishment is necessary can be built solely upon the notion of a 
‘right to punishment’. For it may be that what offenders have a right to is not 
punishment per se but, rather, the choice of publically condemning them-
selves. This is not to defend abolitionism, but merely to recognise the ethi-
cally significant difference between (a) making offenders do what they would 
choose to do if they were decent and (b) offering them a genuine opportunity 
to freely make amends, over and above whatever condemnation is expressed 
by the state. Conversely, victims have a right to receive genuine apologies, 
and this too can only happen if offenders are given the agential space to make 
their own amends.  
A valuable strategy between (a) and (b) is that of attempting to ensure 
that the offender realises that she needs to make amends. In Antony Duff’s 
conception of it, a political community: 
 
owes it to the victim, whose wrong it shares, and to the offender as a member of 
the normative community, to try to get the offender to recognize that wrong and 
to make a suitable apology for it...We owe it to victims and to offenders to 
make the attempt to secure repentance, self-reform, and reconciliation...that at-
tempt is worth making even if it is often likely to fail, since in making it we 
show that we do take crime seriously as a public wrong and address the of-
fender as someone who is not beyond redemption. [Duff (2001), pp. 114-5].
6 
 
There are numerous different ways of trying to facilitate such a recognition, 
some more orthodox than others. In the films The Yes Men and Yes Men Fix the 
World, for example, political activists Andy Bichlbaum and Mike Bonanno 
pose as CEOs of organisations such as DOW Chemical and Shell making pub-
lic apologies on their behalf. They ‘accept’ full responsibility for the past ac-
tions of the companies they pretend to represent, ‘offering’ vast sums in 
compensation to the victims of disasters which the companies have been im-
plicated in.
 The intended effect of these stunts is to put the organisations in 
question in the difficult position of having to either disassociate themselves 
from the offers made in their name, thereby worsening their public images, or 
allow themselves to be manipulated into parting with huge amounts of 
money, with the possible benefit of improving their ethical reputations (they 
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CEOs, namely that of wholeheartedly endorsing the apology made on their 
behalf, adding that they should have been pro-active of their own volition. To 
sincerely respond this way is to freely exercise the right to make amends. 
Victims are unlikely to be persuaded by apologies shown to have trig-
gered by hoaxes and will even less impressed in cases were apologies sanc-
tioned by the state, on pain of further punishment. Could offenders in such 
circumstances truly choose to be punished? According to Duff the answer is 
‘yes’, so long as we make the punitive procedure a form of inclusionary 
moral communication, allowing offenders the opportunity to fully co-operate in 
any legal action taken. Duff argues that, if administered correctly, a penitential 
punishment that is communicative – as opposed to merely expressive – can re-
tain a distance which infringes neither the autonomy nor the emotional privacy 
of those punished [Duff (2001), ch. 3.2ff; cf. Duff (1986), p. 240ff.]. On this 
view, offenders are free to treat their punishment as they please: a penance, a 
prudential deterrent, a cost they are happy to pay etc. [ibid, pp. 125-6]. After 
all, the argument goes, there is no such thing as forcing someone to apologise 
sincerely. It is up to them to decide what kind of punishee they are to become. 
In the first of his 2009 Reith lectures Michael Sandel describes the 
practice of treating a fine as a fee: 
 
A study of some Israeli childcare centres offers a good real world example of 
how market incentives can crowd out non-market norms...parents sometimes 
came late to pick up their children, and so a teacher had to stay with the chil-
dren until the tardy parents arrived. To solve this problem, the childcare centres 
imposed a fine for late pick-ups. What do you suppose happened? Late pick-ups 
actually increased [...] Introducing the fine changed the norms. Before, parents 
who came late felt guilty; they were imposing an inconvenience on the teachers. 
Now parents considered a late arrival a service for which they were willing to 
pay [...] Part of the problem here is that the parents treated the fine as a fee. It’s 
worth pondering the distinction. Fines register moral disapproval, whereas fees 
are simply prices that imply no moral judgement. When we impose a fine for 
littering, we’re saying that littering is wrong. Tossing a beer can into the Grand 
Canyon not only imposes clean-up costs; it reflects a bad attitude that we want 
to discourage. Suppose the fine is 100 dollars and a wealthy hiker decides it’s 
worth the convenience. He treats the fine as a fee and tosses his beer can into 
the Grand Canyon. Even if he pays up, we consider that he’s done something 
wrong. By treating the Grand Canyon as an expensive dumpster, he’s failed to 
appreciate it in an appropriate way [Sandel (2009), lecture 1]. 
 
We sometimes talk of ‘paying the price’ for our mistakes. But a person who 
literally views all penalties as prices is doomed to conclude that one can 
never be punished for breaking the law because, strictly speaking, one can 
never break it. Such a person may well choose to be ‘punished’ in choosing 
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nothing more than a list of the rates (monetary or otherwise) of performing 
certain actions or, even worse, the cost of being caught performing them. So 
construed, the law doesn’t say ‘don’t do A’ but ‘A will cost you x amount of 
time and/or money’. If nothing counts as breaking a law then, to paraphrase 
Wittgenstein, nothing could count as following it either, in which case it’s no 
law at all [Wittgenstein (1953), § 201]. 
The state may communicate to citizens its wish that penalties be treated 
as deserved punishments rather than advertised costs, but it cannot force them 
to treat them so. Offenders may apologise voluntarily for a variety of reasons 
(from true remorse to the hope of leniency through ‘good behaviour’), but 
they may also refuse to do so, thereby requiring authorities to threaten with 
further penalties or invoke force. As Harry Frankfurt’s initial scenario of 
Jones being threatened to do something which he had already decided to do 
‘no matter what’ demonstrates, not being able to do otherwise (in the relevant 
sense) does not in itself relieve one of the responsibility for doing what one is 
made to do [Frankfurt (1969), p. 3ff.]. It can, however, deprive the agent of 
autonomy. Not treating offenders as mere ‘dogs’ does not alone suffice to 
give them the ‘freedom and respect’ they are due [cf. Hegel (1821), § 99A]. 
One further worry with both Bennett and Duff’s proposals is that it is 
often impossible for the victim to know which motive the offender is acting 
from (carrot, stick, or remorse), at least until after any eventual release. In-
deed, the more sincere the offender, the less satisfied she will be with non-
voluntary punishment. As Bennett himself maintains: 
 
[a]n apology works when it is sincere: that is, when it expresses the wrong-
doer’s acceptance that what she did was wrong and her repudiation of it...the 
apology has to express the fact that the wrongdoer understands her action as 
wrong, that it matters to her [Bennett (2008), p. 115]. 
 
The above view is stated within the context of a discussion of informal resto-
ration, Bennett arguing further on that: 
 
the state [...] has no business giving out sentences the explicit aim of which is to 
make offenders genuinely penitent [Bennett (2008), p. 154-5]. 
 
Be that as it may, the opportunity to publically express genuine penitence is 
one owed to the offender, yet threatened by enforced ritualistic amends. The 
criteria for whether an offender has repented are counterfactual ones: what 
would the offender have done if the penalty hadn’t been enforced, and/or her 
sentence could not have been shortened for good behaviour? Ideally, offend-
ers should have the opportunity to make amends which are legally supere-
rogatory. Bennett’s favoured penal system does not prevent them from doing 
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nicating and effecting any desire to make amends in a way that is beneficial to 
the community harmed, as well as to the victim, would arguably be preferable.  
 
 
III. THE EXPIATION OF GUILT 
 
One of the many virtues of The Apology Ritual is that it presents a legal 
notion of punishment that is sensitive to moral concerns. Accordingly, Ben-
nett conceives of the ‘right to punishment’ to include the inward-looking pos-
sibility of redeeming oneself through suffering and guilt for blameworthy 
actions or omissions [Bennett (2008), pp. 115ff.].
7 He is here in broad agree-
ment with A. I. Melden, who writes: 
 
[...] what is important about the claim that there is a human right to punishment 
is...the idea that punishment serves to purge those upon whom it is imposed of 
their guilt and by thus redeeming them enables them once more to join their 
lives with others. Punishment as the means adopted to purge persons of their 
guilt is, in fact, a mark of the respect we have for those to whom it is applied, 
for even the guilty who need to be punished in order to be redeemed are to be 
respected for the rights that they have [Melden (1977), pp. 183-4]. 
 
 
This redemptive theme, familiar from Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
is explored in Woody Allen’s trilogy on unpunished murder, with unsettling 
results. In the first film, Crimes and Misdemeanours, the atheist life-saving and 
charity-donating doctor Judah Rosenthal literally gets away with murder. Ini-
tially ‘plagued by deep-rooted guilt’ and soon ‘on the verge of a mental col-
lapse-an inch away from confessing the whole thing to the police’, he one day 
awakens to find that ‘his life is completely back to normal’. Once in a while he 
has a bad moment, but ‘the killing gets attributed to another person-a drifter 
who has a number of other murders to his credit’ and ‘in time, it all fades’. Or 
so it seems. For the murderer finds himself in quasi-confession, the above quo-
tations all taken from a purported idea for a film that which he offers to an as-
piring film maker he meets at a cocktail party. The latter is unconvinced: 
 
Here’s what I would do: I would have him turn himself in, because then your 
story assumes tragic proportions, because in the absence of a god, or something, 
he is forced to assume responsibility himself. Then you have tragedy [Allen 
(1989)]. 
 
‘But that’s fiction’ the murderer replies, ‘you’ve seen too many movies’. In 
Gus Van Sant’s movie adaptation of Blake Nelson’s Paranoid Park, teenager 
Alex accidentally kills a security guard and keeps it secret until his guilt 
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Like Raskolnikov, and Allen’s modern-day variations on his type, Alex falls 
seriously short of being decent qua offender. Regardless of this, the question 
of whether and if so how he is to be purged is not one which can be answered 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The second film in Allen’s series, Match Point, opens with the follow-
ing narration by the Dostoyevsky-reading murderer Chris Wilton
8: 
 
The man who said “I’d rather be lucky than good” saw deeply into life. People 
are afraid to face how great a part of life is dependent on luck. It’s scary to 
think so much is out of one’s control. There are moments in a match when the 
ball hits the top of the net, and for a split second, it can either go forward or fall 
back. With a little luck, it goes forward, and you win. Or maybe it doesn’t, and 
you lose [Allen (2005)]. 
 
The visual accompaniment shows a tennis ball hitting the top of the net; the 
frame freezes and we do not see which side the ball comes down on. Towards 
the end of the film, Chris throws the incriminating evidence (some jewellery) 
into the river Thames, but a ring hits the top of a rail and bounces onto the 
road. If this were a game of tennis, the ‘match point’ would have been lost.  
As it happens, the result precipitates Chris’ not getting caught (the ring 
is picked up by a drug dealer who is soon after killed in a feud). But it does 
not follow that he has won the match point. Indeed, it is not clear what, if any-
thing, could count as ‘winning’ here, inviting the viewer to question the view 
that being lucky amounts to having it easy and/or ‘getting away’ with things. 
Chris attempts convince the apparitions of his two victims that he did 
what he did out of necessity, and is consequently able to suppress his guilt, 
telling them that ‘you have to learn to push the guilt under the rug and move 
on, otherwise it overwhelms you’. This is soon followed with him the fol-
lowed, however, with the following confessional statement: 
 
It would be fitting if I were apprehended [...] and punished. At least there would 
be some small sign of justice – some small measure of hope for the possibility 
of meaning [Allen (2005)]. 
 
One may cause an offender to suffer by refusing him official punishment. But 
such an act could only serve to purge his guilt if it is itself understood as an 
act of punishment. In not being caught or sentenced, Chris has lost the chance 
to receive the punishment he deserves (and has a right to), a victim of the fact 
that he is not decent enough to immediately turn himself in. The film’s final 
shot of him at a complete emotional loss makes it clear that this weakness 
will continue to plague him. 
Melden characterises the poverty of such a stance well: 
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the individual, blemished as he is, would be dishonest with others if, were he to 
live with them as he did before the blemish was revealed in his offence, and 
dishonest with himself were he to adopt the usual methods of concealing the 
moral flaw from himself. For such a person there is the need to suffer the pun-
ishment and only in this way to do the penance that is required. Remorse is not 
enough. What is required is the constant reminder of the fault manifested in the 
misdeed in order that the individual may attain that moral ratification within 
himself that is the expiation of his guilt [Melden (1977), p. 182].  
 
In the final part of the trilogy, Cassandra’s Dream, one of two murdering 
brothers, Terry, considers suicide but ultimately decides that the only way to 
‘wipe the slate clean’ and ‘straighten it out’ is to turn himself in and serve his 
punishment. Somewhat paradoxically, Melden paradoxically hold that the 
very suffering which causes offenders like Terry to seek punishment is itself 
punishment enough if the need for it is unmet: 
 
To demand one’s punishment as a matter of one’s right may well demonstrate 
that one has no moral need for, and ought not to be given, the punishment for 
which one clamours. For one who cries out for the punishment he deserves as a 
matter of right is already suffering the pangs of remorse and suffering the con-
trition of heart and repentance that punishment itself is designed to secure but 
which in that instance is sheer suffering that serves no useful purpose [Melden 
(1977), p.181].  
 
Peter Winch considers a similar objection to the attempt to tie punish-
ment to repentance:  
 
[...] if the offender truly has repented when he comes to be punished, then there is 
nothing more for the punishment to achieve in that regard. On the other hand, if 
the offender is not repentant, then whatever happens to him is not punishment (in 
the ‘ethical’ sense of the word I have tried to develop) [Winch (1972), p. 219].  
 
While the objection is onto something, Winch rightly notes that there is also 
something amiss with it. He illustrates through the following passage from 
Simone Weil, quoted with approval: 
 
In the life of the individual, the innocent must always suffer for the guilty; because 
punishment is expiation only if it is preceded by repentance. The penitent, having 
become innocent, suffers for the guilty, whom the repentance has abolished. 
Humanity, regarded as a single being, sinned in Adam and expiated in 
Christ. 
Only innocence expiates. Crime suffers in quite a different way [Weil 
(1970), pp. 115-16]. 
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The upshot of all this is that state-inflicted punishment cannot easily serve a 
purging function. Offenders do not need it to redeem themselves and it does 
not automatically bestow redemption on the unrepentant as a matter of course 
(though it is certainly possible for a ritualistic simulation to activate the real 
thing).
9 If, as Bennett seems to suggest, the ‘right to punishment’ is to include 
an ethical dimension of the sort alluded to be Winch and Weil, then it cannot 
simply be a right to suffer for one’s deeds. The ethically appropriate reaction 
to crime must also respect one’s right to be recognised as the criminal that 
one is, and be given a chance to voluntarily make public amends for it.
10 
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NOTES 
 
1 Being decent is a matter of degree rather than kind. Duff (2001) distinguishes 
between the morally persuaded offender [pp. 116-7], the shamed offender [pp. 117-8], 
the already repentant offender [pp. 118-120], and the defiant offender [pp. 121-25]. 
All but the last may qualify as relatively decent. 
2 Bennett keeps the phrase in scare quotes throughout his book. In what follows 
I shall consider certain understandings of it, but it would take a much lengthier piece 
(if not a book) to present anything that even approximates an exhaustive analysis of 
the main contenders. 
3 Morris takes the right to be treated as a person to be and ‘inalienable’ right ac-
quired simply ‘by virtue of being human’ [p. 127]. I do not agree, but none of what 
follows rests on either of us being right. 
4 This is not the place to engage in Hegel exegesis Still, it is worth noting that 
Hegel’s use of ‘Recht’ is much looser than any notion standardly associated with the 
term ‘right’. 
5 I return to a further possibility further below. 
6 As Duff subsequently notes, this is not an all-or-nothing question, and the ap-
propriate extent of resources to be devoted to such efforts will vary from case to case. 
7 Like Bennett, I leave aside here the issue of the appropriateness of apologising 
for things one is not to blame for, save to register that there is no reason to think that 
such apologies are purely a matter of etiquette and thereby immune from any guilt-
related norms [see Sandis (2010)]. 
8 At one point in the film we even see him consulting the Cambridge Companion 
to Dostoyevskii. The Public Expression of Penitence                                                             151 
9 The question is an empirical one and results will doubtlessly vary from one 
individual to another. No specific sentence can in itself be identical to the punishment 
that an offender has a right to.  
10 This paper was first presented at the 5
th Nomos Conference, on The Apology 
Ritual, University of Valencia, 27-8 January 2011. Many thanks to all the participants, 
especially Christopher Bennett, Josep Corbí, Fabian Dorsch, Antony Duff, Jules Hol-
royd, and Sandra Marshall for their incredibly helpful questions, criticisms, and sug-
gestions. Thanks also to David Dolby, Max de Gaynesford, Arto Laitinen, and Berta 
Pérez for very fruitful conversations and, especially, to Edgar Maraguat for insightful 
comments which helped to improve an earlier draft. 
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Replies to My Commentators 
 
Christopher Bennett 
 
 
 
First of all, I would like to thank the participants very much for their 
generous, thoughtful and searching discussions of my book. I have found the 
process of engaging with their criticisms very fruitful. In this section I will 
deal with each commentator in turn, attempting to state what I take to be the 
main points at issue, before turning to my response. This method may lead to 
some repetition in my responses, but dealing with matters in this way allows 
me to engage with the precise formulation of the commentator’s point. I have 
taken the commentators in alphabetical order. 
 
 
1. RESPONSE TO BERMEJO 
 
Bermejo rejects my claim that we should reform our criminal justice 
processes to increase their resonance with our extra-legal expectations about 
reactions to wrongdoing. He seeks to convict me of the errors of restorative 
justice theorists who argue for similar conclusions. Although I present my 
view as a third way between the traditional criminal justice and the restora-
tive alternative, drawing from the strengths of each, Bermejo argues that 
“principles of Bennett’s theory push the institutional demands much closer to 
the restorative models than Bennett avows” [p. 100] . 
First of all, Bermejo thinks that I am wrong to base my view on a con-
ception of the virtuous offender, because law is not concerned with a person’s 
virtue, but rather with their external conformity to law. Furthermore, “in a 
theory where the attitudes of blame and apology are contemplated as the right 
attitudes, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that repentance should be pur-
sued whenever it is possible and as much as possible” [ibid.]. Now I think 
that the claim that law is not concerned with virtue but only with external 
conformity has to be understood in a nuanced way. Some acts become crimi-
nal only when they have a certain motivation; some defences cite motiva-
tional factors as an exculpatory or mitigating factor (e.g. provocation) that 
might affect culpability; and some motivational features can be taken as ag-
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gravating or mitigating at sentencing (e.g. in hate crime). But setting this 
aside, my view does not require that the offender display “an internal attitude 
including an acknowledgement of the wrongness of the behaviour and some 
sincere states of shame, guilt and affliction” [p. 99]. Rather the task of crimi-
nal justice, as I understand it, is to make proportionate condemnation of the 
offender, dissociating itself from his action where remaining silent would 
imply acceptance. Therefore it is not the case that my view commits me to 
pursuing repentance as far as possible. Bermejo might then ask why I bother 
with the “apology” side of the apology ritual: “What would be the use of all 
the concern with the proper attitudes of the offender if punishment is just an 
expression of whoever condemns. An expressive theory could have dispensed 
perfectly with all this complex internal background” [p. 100]. The answer to 
this has to do with the symbolic aspects of condemnation that I claim justify 
imposing some determinate burden on the offender. Only because the virtuous 
offender would find such a burden meaningful if properly sorry is it meaningful 
to impose such a burden in order to express condemnation.  
Bermejo also points to the important fact that, in a pluralistic, democ-
ratic society, even criminal law is bound to be in part based on “political” 
consensus. The force of punishment, on my view, is that it proclaims that the 
offender should be sorry enough for the offence that they would willingly 
take on the burden the sentence imposes on them as penance. But would it be 
more honest for the law to openly admit its nature as a political compromise 
and thus drop the supposed appeal to conscience that (I claim) is part of the 
force of the criminal sanction?  
One response to this is to say that, even in the case of the conscientious 
civil disobedient, there is a wrong involved in taking himself to have the au-
thority to act as he did: his action neglects the fact that his act was rightly 
subject to the authority of law. However, this response still leaves a problem, 
which is that the punishment condemns the offender, not merely for the 
wrongful arrogation of authority, but for the wrongful destruction of human 
life (e.g. in abortion or euthanasia). The best response to this problem, it 
seems to me, is not to follow Bermejo in saying that the criminal law should 
admit itself to be a product of political consensus, but rather to explain why, 
or under what conditions, the criminal law can rightfully present itself as the 
political community’s authoritative collective view of what standards of be-
haviour citizens owe to one another. We need an argument for this view, 
which I admit in my book I do not provide.  
Bermejo also attacks my suggestion, at the end of the book, that a con-
demnatory institution of punishment could retain some of the advantages of 
restorative justice if the sentencer indicates the broad margins of the penalty, 
and victim and offender agree the precise nature of the activity. He argues 
that this is too close to private law principles of corrective or restitutive jus-
tice, or the paying of damages, and does not address the aspect of the crimi-
 Replies to My Commentators                                                                        155 
nal offence that is not material harm but “an objective violation of rights, or, 
in other words an attack against the most important moral values of the 
community.” However, Bermejo seems to assume that my talk of amends can 
only signify private restitutive amends. It is true that some writers on restora-
tive justice have sought to reform criminal justice in this direction [see e.g., 
Barnett (1977)]. My position, however, is that one who acts wrongly becomes 
liable to two sorts of amends, one being restitutive, the repair of material 
harm, and the other penitential. Penitential amends seek to address the 
wrongfulness of the action. My thought is that the imposition of penitential 
amends on an offender by a public institution as an act of collective condem-
nation would avoid the problems he notes with the private law model.  
Bermejo also attacks my suggested integration of censure and restora-
tive mediation in sentencing policy. He sees this as threatening “incoherence 
and arbitrariness”, and even jeopardising rule of law principles such as that 
there should be no punishment or crime in the absence of a duly enacted law 
in force at the time of the offence. However, on my proposal this restorative 
initiative enters into the criminal justice process only after conviction and 
sentencing. Only then can the restorative initiative be made compatible with 
the sentencing process doing its job of expressing some determinate degree 
of condemnation for the offence. I agree that the devolution of even limited 
sentencing powers would make it hard to achieve strict consistency in sen-
tencing. But, firstly, strict consistency is only achievable if one has a particu-
larly inflexible way of categorising offences and their accompanying 
punishments. Secondly, Bermejo notes that I allow that some loss of consis-
tency might be a price worth paying, but he does not say what I think it would 
be worth paying for. What I am concerned to preserve, and what Bermejo him-
self neglects, is that the criminal justice process might become something that 
its participants can experience as a meaningful enactment of the reactions 
they would take to be appropriate when the criminal act is viewed as the 
wrong it is. One thing I take to be valuable in the restorative justice move-
ment is its seriousness about crime and its rejection of the notion that crime 
should become the preserve of a bureaucracy that categorises offences in 
ways that are opaque even to the educated moral consciousness. 
 
 
2. RESPONSE TO DUFF 
 
Duff thinks that I go wrong in portraying blame as having an intrinsi-
cally exclusionary character. This is a particularly serious charge for me be-
cause, as Duff recognises, the argument for blame as withdrawal also plays a 
role in explaining why the wrongdoer who fully recognises the significance 
of what he has done can be expected to undertake penitential amends, and in 
explaining why penance has the character it does – that is, of something bur-
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densome. However, Duff thinks that such exclusion is incompatible with the 
equal concern and respect that members of a liberal political community 
should have for one another. 
In response, there are three points I would like to make. 1) Duff reads 
“withdrawal” from the offender as essentially involving “cutting the offender 
off” and excluding – and, to be fair, I have sometimes attempted to dramatise 
the essence of blame by giving such examples [see e.g. Bennett (2002)]. But 
withdrawal is a scalar notion, and the extent of the withdrawal should fit the 
nature of the crime. What I mean by proper “withdrawal” doesn’t have to in-
volve treating someone as though she were not there: that is, literally exclud-
ing her from community. I have (I think) always emphasised that the 
withdrawal should be partial and temporary. I am happy to allow that there 
can be many ways in which withdrawal can be registered. The key intuition 
that my talk of withdrawal is meant to pick up on is what I call the distancing 
intuition: that, whatever else happens, if you have done something intolerable 
then things can’t stay the same between us; the relationship has to alter in a 
way that reflects the seriousness of the wrong. If this way of phrasing the in-
tuition seems acceptable, we might then ask how the relationship must alter. 
And the answer presumably has to do with “not being on good terms” any 
longer. And this is the crucial thing I mean by “withdrawal of recognition”. 
My talk of withdrawal is not meant to commit me to the view that, whenever 
you are not on good terms with someone, you ought to cut them off. Rather it 
commits me to the view that, when wrongdoing has occurred, you ought not 
to be on good terms with the wrongdoer. We should then consult our best un-
derstanding of how we act towards wrongdoers when we are not on good 
terms with them. I suspect that when we look at what we do we will realise 
that cutting people off, though sometimes the best way to do it, can also 
sometimes be a blunt instrument. 
2) One of the reasons that cutting someone off is sometimes effective in 
symbolising moral distancing and sometimes not is because of the dual na-
ture of withdrawal. Duff is wrong to characterise me as holding that blame 
has an “intrinsically exclusionary character”. Rather my view is that it only 
makes sense to blame someone who is “one of us” and hence that blame is 
precisely a way of including someone in the moral community. This is one of 
the aspects of the meaning of the “right to be punished” strategy, which after 
all, attempts to show why, if one is bound to treat someone as a member of a 
community bound by shared normative expectations, it might also be neces-
sary to have certain retributive responses to her should she violate those ex-
pectations. The exclusionary treatment of blame is precisely the way to 
recognise the offender as a member of the moral community. The practical 
import of this claim is that, when we are trying to give form to our judgement 
of the offender’s moral position – that is, when we are trying to find a form 
of behaviour that does justice to her moral position – we have to find a form 
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that recognises his problematic position as a member of the moral community 
who has done one of those things that, qua member of that community, one 
must on no account do. 
3) My third point is more ad hominem. As Duff notes, the notion of 
withdrawal plays the important role in my account of providing an explana-
tion of why penance comes to seem necessary for the repentant offender. If, 
on the other hand, we follow Duff in rejecting talk of withdrawal, it raises the 
question what kind of justification penance can be given. Duff recognises that 
penance can be a vehicle for remorse and repentance; and that claim has 
some intuitive resonance. Emotional states do seem to have behavioural 
manifestations – what we sometimes call the expression of emotion. So it 
may be said that penance is simply the (appropriate) expression of remorse. 
But first of all, even if this claim about penance were widely accepted, we 
would still understand it better if we could say something about why penance 
is appropriately connected to repentance. And secondly, many people look on 
claims about penance askance and see them as a hangover from a Judaeo-
Christian period of European history that we would be better off without. My 
project has been to explore a characterisation of the repentant offender, to try 
to explain why penance might come to seem attractive to such an offender, 
and thus to address this need to give some justification for the claim that pen-
ance is the appropriate expression of remorse and repentance. This doesn’t, of 
course, show that my substantive story about penance as self-withdrawal is 
the right one. But the point is ad hominem: I think Duff needs to come up 
with some explanation of why penance is the appropriate vehicle for repen-
tance, and I don’t think that he has done so yet. 
Duff’s second concern has to do with the significance of apology within 
criminal justice. He argues that apology “is something that the apologiser does” 
and that, as a matter of the logic of the act, no one can do it for him – “nothing 
we do to him can constitute him apologising to us”. But, he thinks, this raises a 
puzzle as to how to integrate apology into criminal justice. Duff imagines a 
situation in which courts issue some formal condemnation that would include 
a demand for an apology – and this might include a demand for amends. This 
would be a system of “non-coercive self-punishment”. Criminal punishment, 
on the other hand, is coercively imposed “on an essentially passive offender”. 
Therefore “what is simply imposed, as punishments may in the end be im-
posed, cannot be an apology”.  
I think the question is why I cannot simply agree with this. Duff points 
out that I do talk about “imposing amends” on the offender. And he is right 
that this would be “incoherent” if my claim was that, in such a situation, they 
retained the moral character of voluntarily made amends. However, I would 
have to make that claim only if I were committed to the view that the of-
fender owes a public apology to his fellow citizens in the sense that he must 
make such an apology as a condition of his resuming the civil status that is 
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suspended after his conviction. But that is not my view. My view is that it 
may be true, morally speaking, that the offender owes his fellow citizens an 
apology. That may be something that affects his relations with (some) citi-
zens, as they might rightly blame him if he does not give such an apology. 
However, I argue that the offender’s making or not making of this apology is 
not something that the state should make a condition of the offender having 
or losing the basic civil rights and liberties that are at issue in punishment. If 
the state were to do that then it would be committed to having a concern with 
whether the apology was made sincerely or not, and I argue that this would 
be intrusive. Rather my view is that the offender can have his civil rights and 
liberties restored when he has been subjected to the relevant condemnation, 
regardless of how he has responded to that condemnation. Therefore I am not 
committed to the view that the offender’s amends have the same significance 
in punishment as they do in standard cases of apology. 
Why, then, do I use the language of amends? Because the way to find 
adequate symbols for condemnation, on my account, is to symbolise how 
sorry the offender ought to be for what he has done. How does one symbolise 
how sorry a person ought to be without imposing amends, or, as I might put it 
more carefully, imposing action on an offender of the sort that he might spon-
taneously undertake as amends were he properly sorry? 
Duff himself thinks that the way out of this problem is to present the 
imposition of punishment as communicative rather than simply condemna-
tory: part of our reason for imposing some burden as punishment, he thinks, 
is a reasonable hope that the offender come to see its justice and hence re-
ceive it as penance. Only when it is performed willingly can it have the char-
acter of penance. However, there are numerous reasons for rejecting this 
account. For instance: 1) If we have the aim of communication, awakening 
repentance, do we not invite the question whether the imposition of penance 
is the best way to make someone repentant? If the answer to this question is 
negative then we have lost our justification for punishment. 2) If the avowed 
role of criminal justice is communicative then why should punishment be 
bound to respect limits of proportionality rather than something more indi-
vidualistic punishment tailored for each criminal? 3) Doesn’t Duff’s story as-
sume some conception of the expressive role of the imposition of 
punishment/penance, in so far as he takes it that the offender can receive the 
punishment as the proper expression of condemnation? In other words, Duff’s 
account seems to rest on the suppressed assumption that the imposition of 
something that could be willed as penance has fitting expressive power as a 
mode of formal condemnation. If so, then it is not open to Duff to reject the no-
tion of the expressive function of punishment as one-way: certain forms of 
communication rest on the recognition of the expressive power of the vehicle 
of communication. It is this expressive power that needs to be explained. 
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Thus I attempt to explain something that seems at the heart of Duff’s 
account, namely how the undertaking of penance, or the imposition of what 
one would will as penance if truly sorry, can have expressive power. And I 
seek to make this central to a censure theory of punishment without taking on 
some of Duff’s problematic commitments e.g. that a highly expensive coercive 
state process should find its justification in aiming at the offender’s repentance. 
 
 
3. RESPONSE TO MARTÍ 
 
Martí also has concerns about the use to which I put the notion of apol-
ogy in my account. I hope I am capturing the main burden of his argument if 
I characterise it as follows: 1) Martí is sympathetic to my claim that it is im-
portant to place apology at the heart of criminal justice; 2) he thinks, how-
ever, that I lose what is important about apology by making the apology 
merely ritualistic; and 3) Martí rejects my reasons for thinking that the role of 
apology need be merely ritualistic.  
Before addressing some of Martí’s more specific points, I would like to 
clarify something about my quite specific interest in the notion of apology. I 
hope this will address some of Martí’s opening remarks. One of the overarch-
ing aims of my account of punishment has been to vindicate Duff’s use of the 
notion of penance in his own theory of punishment. One strand of this de-
fence comes in what in my précis I call the Penance Argument. But my de-
fence of the notion of penance also in part simply involves reminding readers 
that something like penance – some kind of symbolic amends – is part of 
what makes a successful apology – and that apology is a very familiar part of 
the furniture of the moral life. This “familiarisation” is important, because 
penance can be thought a strange notion, with unwelcome connotations. My 
point is to puncture this “gut” scepticism that many have by reminding peo-
ple how familiar we are with penance (though we may not call it such) in ac-
tual practice. Willingness to undertake, not merely restitutive, but penitential 
amends is one of the acts that is constitutive of being properly sorry. Being 
properly sorry is, in turn, one of the success conditions of an apology. Now it 
is particularly the notion of penitential amends that is central to my account, 
and in some respects I could have been clearer if I had talked about the peni-
tential amends ritual rather than the apology ritual. Thus I agree that there is 
much to the notion of apology that is not relevant to my account – for in-
stance, that an apology is normally addressed to a particular person, and nor-
mally asks for some response. Nevertheless, what I want to concentrate on is 
the essence of apologetic or remorseful action that applies in all cases of 
wrongdoing – for after all, many cases of wrongdoing have no direct victim, 
and therefore require no “requesting” apology; or cause no material damage, 
and therefore require no restitutive amends. Penitential amends is a universal 
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requirement of virtuous response across all cases of wrongdoing in a way that 
apology addressed to a victim is not: therefore it is the need to make such 
amends that I make central to my account. Nevertheless, I seek to leave open 
the possibility that, in cases where there is a victim, and victim and offender 
are willing, a meeting between the two can take place in which an apology 
can be given. 
The reason it makes sense to make penitential amends central, on my 
account, is that I am concerned to find a way to make state condemnation of 
crime meaningful. However, Martí thinks that this takes the attraction out of 
the appeal to apology:  
 
If [apology] is only a heuristic device to be used by officials, apology, actual or 
ritual, does not need to play a role at all in actual legal contexts. It is something 
that needs to take place only in judges’ heads. But this seems not to leave any 
role to rituality. Moreover, I cannot see then why Bennett insists ... that his the-
ory is close to a particular interpretation of restorative justice, one for which the 
actual communication between the wrongdoer and the victim becomes impor-
tant and has some important room for actual processes of apology” [p. 125]. 
 
Martí in this passage draws a distinction between two ways in which I might 
be appealing to the notion of apology: one, where apology is used merely as a 
heuristic thought process to help us imagine what is the appropriate sentence; 
and the other, where apology is something that ought actually to be given by 
the offender. One question that I might ask in response is whether this di-
chotomy is mutually exclusive. For instance, when Martí is explaining what 
he means by a heuristic device, he says it is something “that legislators and 
judges need to use in order to justify in abstraction and concretely determine 
the punishment to be inflicted in a particular case.” Now it depends what 
Martí means here by “justify in abstraction”, but one possibility is that this is 
a recognition that apology, on my account, does not simply play a role in 
helping us fix ideas about what sentence will fit a particular crime, but is cen-
tral to the story about why something like punishment is necessary at all. On 
my account, it is in part because something penitential has to be part of a 
morally satisfactory response of a perpetrator to a wrong that the imposition 
of something onerous on the wrongdoer (punishment) is necessary. So one 
role for apology/penance is justificatory. However, because it has this justifi-
catory role, the penitential amends are something that the offender does have 
to carry out: what the justificatory story is supposed to justify is the imposi-
tion of penance. That’s what it turns out that justified punishment is, on my 
account. And because of this, imagining a case in which some actual apology 
could be made is an important heuristic device for fixing a sentence. So I don’t 
see that I am forced to make a choice between the terms of Martí’s distinction. 
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My response to Martí so far rests on the claim that the fundamental 
state purpose in coercively imposing some penance is condemnation, rather 
than giving the offender the opportunity to say sorry to his victim, or to make 
amends, or to achieve reconciliation or forgiveness. As Martí points out, my 
reasons for thinking that the state’s business is limited to condemnation are in 
part to do with the importance of freedom of conscience: that it would be 
wrong for the state to force an offender to be party to a situation in which he 
would feel bound to express some sentiments, and present them as sincere, 
even if they are not. Now, Martí diagnoses my concern for freedom of con-
science as rooted in a commitment to state neutrality and avoidance of any 
comprehensive conception of the good. He points out, quite rightly I think, 
that if this were my position, I would be on shaky ground, for even the neu-
tral liberal might have grounds to “favour or even impose” a particular con-
ception of the right. Thus as long as the values being enforced are values of 
public reason rather than the values of some particular faction within the po-
litical community, the liberal can agree that such values can and should be 
promoted. I think that this is a good argument, and presumably is needed to 
explain why moral education can go on in schools in an avowedly neutral 
liberal state, and why the state can undertake all manner of public health edu-
cation campaigns, etc., aimed at adults.  
However, I think that Martí has given the wrong diagnosis of the impor-
tance of freedom of conscience by linking it with liberal neutrality: rather the 
key value that freedom of conscience defends is, as I will now explain, integ-
rity or authenticity. The question Martí’s criticism raises is whether it follows 
from the fact that the liberal or republican state should promote belief in cer-
tain values (which I agree with), that it is therefore also “entitled to seek that 
citizens recognise [a crime] as a wrong and feel sorrow and guilt when they 
commit it, and why not, that they express such feelings publicly when they 
are blamed for that wrong” [p. 127]. 
The first thing to note is that there are two things that can be meant by 
“seeking that citizens recognise the crime as wrong and experience appropri-
ate feelings.” Of course, any act of expressing condemnation claims validity 
for itself, and thus seeks the agreement of like-minded others, and in particu-
lar seeks the agreement of the person who committed the wrong. Expressive 
acts are always communicative in this sense: they are couched in a communi-
cative medium; they embody and respond to some conception of a situation 
that, it is claimed, others should likewise affirm. If guilt and sorrow can be 
seen as constituents of proper understanding then in that sense condemnation 
always seeks such a response from an offender. However, this way of fram-
ing the matter puts our reason to express condemnation in the dominant posi-
tion, and sees communication coming about as a result of the offender 
grasping the appropriateness of the expressive act. The expression is prior in 
the sense that it is the vehicle for communication (and thus we have to ex-
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plain how the expressive act is the proper bearer of some meaning before we 
can explain how communication can take place).  
However, another thing that might be meant by seeking that citizens 
recognise the crime as wrong and experience appropriate feelings is some-
thing more educative and individual-centred. If one’s main concern is, not to 
give form to one’s repudiation of the offender’s action (i.e. as an expressive 
act), but rather to help the offender to such a repudiation himself, one will be 
confronted with the question of the best way of achieving that goal. And 
while it may be the case that the best way to instil guilt and sorrow in the of-
fender is to express due condemnation, in many cases it surely will not be. 
One will have to look at each individual offender and her sensibilities in or-
der to judge what strategy to take. If communication is our aim then our ap-
proach must be individualised: the process must take the form, and the 
duration, necessary for each offender. If expression is in the dominant posi-
tion, on the other hand, as in the first option sketched above, then it is the due 
and proportionate expression that we are aiming at, rather than the instilling 
of some state of mind in the offender.  
My claim is that it is expression rather than communication that should 
be the state’s business in criminal justice. Now I need to make it clear how 
my point is compatible with all sorts of perfectly legitimate public education 
initiatives that might be carried out to disseminate and encourage understand-
ing and acceptance of the state’s values. One important difference between 
the two cases is that public education initiatives always leave the recipient 
free to dissent. This is not simply freedom in the sense that belief formation 
always requires a certain freedom – and that one can never be forced to form 
a certain belief. Rather the sense of freedom at issue is that the dissenter is 
not to be penalised for having failed to assent to the claim that he is presented 
with. Now it might be disputed that a public education campaign does leave 
the offender free in this sense. After all, perhaps the dissenter who decides 
not to look after himself by e.g. stopping smoking will then be judged to have 
been given “fair warning” and made to contribute to the costs of his own 
medical treatment. However, this would not be the same as incurring extra 
punishment as a result of the failure to assent to some claim. Whereas if the 
criminal process dispenses with proportionality and goes on until the offender 
is prepared to repent then clearly the failure to assent is what is being targeted. 
Of course, Martí might argue that the offender’s other rights, as well as 
considerations of efficient use of state resources, are likely to prevent great 
abuses of proportionality, or great intrusiveness. However, Martí might never-
theless propose that it is legitimate to put offenders in a situation in which – to 
paraphrase Duff – their attention might be forced on the wrongness of what 
they have done. This is something I allow on my model, but only if the of-
fender (and victim) consents. Where there is no consent, and the offender re-
jects e.g. the justice of the charge, or the authority of the state to hold him to 
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account, then according to my model the state can (and should) still impose a 
burden on the offender in order to symbolise condemnation, but must be con-
tent to accept the offender as having “done his time” once he has been sub-
jected to that burden, regardless of the spirit in which he does it. Martí’s 
objection to me raises the question whether the state could force offenders to 
attend e.g. a restorative justice meeting even when there is no consent. It 
seems if the fundamental aim of the criminal justice system is educative or 
communicative (in the sense I argue against) then the answer might be yes, if 
that is what it takes to communicate effectively. Martí will then ask me what 
would be wrong with doing this. My answer to this now appeals, not to lib-
eral neutrality, but to respect for basic integrity or authenticity: if offenders 
are placed in such a situation, where they have some reason to dissent from 
the verdict, they would be under psychological pressure to buckle under and 
give an apology that they didn’t believe in and which didn’t reflect their fun-
damental view of the matter. The issue here has to do with whether it would 
be humiliating for the person to have to do this. The key guiding thought on 
my account has to do, therefore, not with liberal neutrality, but with the fact 
that respecting the dignity of offenders requires a certain respect for their au-
thenticity, that is, their right that their public avowals and statements, those 
things in which they present themselves as expressing what they deeply be-
lieve in, should reflect what they really do deeply believe in. The decent state 
should not put citizens in a position in which they have to dissemble about 
their fundamental beliefs for fear of the consequences. It should not give 
them strong incentive to act in a way that they might afterwards reasonably 
regard as craven or humiliating.  
Therefore while we should welcome public education based on values 
to which the state is committed, we should reject the use of “educative” 
means in criminal justice that put offenders in a position of having to choose 
between presenting a false face on some weighty issue and enduring some 
hardship as the cost for their honesty. The problem here can be dramatised if 
we take a case of someone convicted for murder for having practised eutha-
nasia on a patient with an irreversible, painful and deteriorating condition. 
This act is criminal, but many think it morally permissible, or even right (in 
the case where euthanasia has been requested). This is only an example, but 
any realistic justice system will convict many people who are morally inno-
cent. Wouldn’t the system Martí advocates compound the wrong done to 
these people? 
Having said all this, I should acknowledge that there is an unresolved 
issue raised by Martí’s point. For it is one thing to say that the state cannot 
coercively impose remorse and another to say that being remorseful or not is 
irrelevant to the offender’s relations with the state. Now “relations with the 
state” can mean various things. The question my position raises is whether 
the offender’s being remorseful or not should be relevant to the offender’s 
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having the basic rights and liberties that are removed or altered in punish-
ment. The decent state should allow a diversity of opinions, even about the 
validity of the state’s criminal code, or its authority to rule, and people should 
be able to have these opinions without fear (perhaps within limits) – however 
much it might also be a legitimate state purpose to argue against or otherwise 
counteract those opinions. However, one might worry that my argument 
proves too much, since it might show that it was wrong to allow expressions 
of remorse to enter as relevant mitigating circumstances at sentencing, or in 
parole board hearings. On this issue, my feeling is that I need to do some fur-
ther work. 
 
 
4. RESPONSE TO ROSELL 
 
Rosell’s first objection to me is that, even if I am correct to argue that 
the presence of a certain amount of luck in the circumstances of human life 
does not preclude moral responsibility, it does call for a milder reaction to 
wrongdoing, since luck is unequally distributed. In other words, doesn’t the 
unequal distribution of luck have to be recognised somehow in retributive 
justice? Rosell’s point is a good one, and seems to me to merit further 
thought. I can only offer some suggestions here. 
If we want to accept Rosell’s point, there are various possibilities. One 
would be to follow Nussbaum in “Equity and Mercy” in arguing that recogni-
tion of the fact that we are not the “sole authors of our lives” should lead us, 
not to deny moral responsibility and desert of some sort of retributive re-
sponses, but rather to tone down our sense of what kinds of responses are 
proportionate to what offences [see Nussbaum (1993)]. Recognising the ex-
tent to which our actions are products of contingency rather than autono-
mous, self-causing will should lead us to take individual culpability less 
seriously. Another possibility would be to follow a view that might be attrib-
uted to Bernard Williams in seeing moral responsibility as more akin to strict 
liability in law: we see the person as guilty or polluted as a result of the of-
fence, but, knowing that his becoming so is largely a matter of luck as well as 
choice (and that choices themselves are largely conditioned by luck), our re-
action to his moral state, while perhaps retributive in some sense, can and 
should also be combined with something like pity for what he has become 
(and has not in any simple sense brought upon himself) [see Williams 
(1993)]. The argument for keeping the distinctively blaming, fault-ascribing 
aspect of our retributive reactions seems to me to stem from the intuition 
aroused by asking something like the question “What did he think he was do-
ing?” The act was one that the perpetrator came to see as good, as choice-
worthy, and yet its contrary aspects – its wrong-making features – could and 
should have been evident to him. It is the fact that he accepted this view of 
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the act as choice-worthy, and was prepared to set the stamp on it in action, in 
the face of everything that counts against it, that evokes our blame. I agree 
that this is a point that needs further attention, but I register my view that it is 
hard to imagine a real case in which we might come across someone who had 
willed such a wrongful action, and was capable of seeing its other sides, and 
yet not find ourselves asking, with the distinctive note of blame, “What did 
he think he was doing?” The important implied note is that it is a basic re-
sponsibility, for some “us”, to remain vividly aware that such an act is not 
choice-worthy at all. 
Rosell’s Chekhov example, which figures in his second objection, is a 
good one. The example seems to count against my view that a proper appre-
ciation of culpable wrongdoing must involve coming to see the action as 
changing the relationship that is possible between the relevant parties, and in 
particular that it must involve withholding some of the respect that is nor-
mally a concomitant of that relationship. With all such apparent counter-
examples, it is possible for me to respond either by convicting the apparently 
admirable non-retributive response of missing something important, or of 
claiming that the response does, despite appearances, involve something that 
would count as withdrawal or distancing. In response to this example I am 
tempted to take the first tack. I think that Rosell’s example makes it clear 
that, in The Apology Ritual, I don’t say enough about moral obligation and 
what is distinctive about being bound to do certain actions, and the role of 
obligations as distinctive sorts of reasons informing our retributive reactions. 
It is characteristic of the passage quoted that, insofar as Kutcherov uses con-
demnatory language, it is the language of virtue and vice: “Is this how decent 
men behave?” “You are unjust, my friends.” Kutcherov clearly thinks that 
Rodion has good reason to treat him and his wife humanely. But what we 
don’t get a sense of from this passage is that Kutcherov thinks that he and his 
wife have a right to that treatment, and that the Rodion is failing in an obliga-
tion owed to them. We get the sense that Kutcherov regards Rodion as an 
equal in the sense of being open to the relevant considerations, when those 
considerations are presented to him in the right way. But we don’t get the 
sense that Kutcherov regards Rodion as an equal in the sense that they share a 
duty or obligation to behave towards one another in accordance with certain 
standards. Indeed, it is perhaps hard to see what obligation would amount to 
if it were not connected with the thought that it is the minimal acceptable 
standard of treatment between (qualified and self-governing) persons in a 
given relationship, and that the violation of that standard makes one’s stand-
ing in that relationship problematic.  
The Chekhov example is also complicated by the fact that the question 
whether blame is a necessary response to wrongdoing is always more complex 
in first-personal cases. When one is oneself the victim, or one of the victims, 
then one can have a certain moral leeway to waive one’s right to be indignant. 
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But now re-write the Chekhov example so that Kutcherov is complaining, not 
about how Rodion has treated him, but rather about how he has treated a vul-
nerable third party who will not make any response herself. Are our intuitions 
still that blame in my sense can acceptably be foregone?  
In a further strand of this objection, Rosell rejects the relevance of my 
claim that, if one responds to wrongdoing with the assumption that something 
would need to be done to put things right, then that shows an acceptance of 
retribution. My line of thought is this. Where the amends that are taken to be 
appropriate include penitential and not merely restitutive amends, this must 
be because we think that the offender should blame herself – since, on my ar-
gument, penance stems from one’s treating oneself less well than one nor-
mally would, as a result of one’s wrong, just as blame involves withdrawal of 
the normal standards of treatment. Therefore an expectation of penance in-
volves the claim that self-blame is appropriate. But where self-blame is ap-
propriate, blame is pro tanto appropriate. Although blame can be expressed in 
various ways, and some of these can involve something less than “cutting the 
wrongdoer off” – i.e. literal withdrawal – the normal state of affairs is that the 
relationship with the offender must alter, especially as the wrongdoer fails to 
respond to exhortation. 
Rosell’s final objection is that punishment has some features that make 
it quite unlike blame, specifically that its effect as a cause of suffering is not 
dependent on the offender understanding and accepting its force; and there-
fore we should not expect the justification of punishment to be connected 
with the justification of blame. However, while I accept the premises, namely 
that punishment has features that make it quite unlike blame, I reject the con-
clusion, that the justification of punishment can be entirely divorced from 
that of blame. Blame and punishment share a fundamental part of their justi-
fication because they are both responses that aim to do justice to the signifi-
cance of wrongdoing by condemning it. Furthermore, the way in which 
blame and punishment operate differently as condemnation explains the other 
differences – they do not require that we abandon the view that punishment is 
condemnation. The fundamental thing that condemnation must do, on my 
view, is to capture the fact that the wrongdoer’s act has altered the relation-
ship that it is now possible to have with her. Therefore what we are looking 
for in the case of both blame and punishment is a response to the wrongdoer 
that embodies this new state of things. However, because of the context in 
which they are carried out, blame and punishment need to do this differently. 
Punishment is a formal procedure for the issuing of authoritative condemna-
tion on the behalf of some group or collective, by agents in a proper position 
to issue such condemnation on the group’s behalf. Blame takes place in the 
context of interactions with a person that are often reasonably intimate and to 
which the participants can be presumed to be committed. Therefore in blame 
the offender’s moral standing can be adequately captured and made clear by 
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various often subtle departures from the treatment the offender would nor-
mally think herself entitled to. Formal condemnation, on the other hand, is 
more of a performance, and has something of the ceremonial about it. In or-
der to avoid being merely ceremonial, however, it has to make its point with 
a greater splash – although it has the same end as blame, namely doing jus-
tice to the significance of the wrong. Making formal condemnation meaning-
ful therefore requires, I argue, the imposition of something on the offender 
that indicates how far from being in good standing her wrong has placed her. 
This is the role for imposed amends. These amends, because they are onerous 
and imposed, can be experienced as hardship even by an offender who does 
not accept their justice. But this does not show that the justification for blame 
and punishment is radically different. On the contrary, the differences stem 
from the fact that they do the same expressive job in different contexts. 
 
 
5. RESPONSE TO SANDIS 
 
Sandis opens his comment with the concern that no theory of state pun-
ishment can be built solely on the notion of a “right to punishment”. This is 
because the notion of having a right to something (say, some benefit or op-
portunity) implies that one be free to take it up or not; whereas punishment is 
coercively imposed. “At best, to have something that one is entitled to forced 
upon one is to have a right that one is prevented to exercise.” There is an im-
portant difference, Sandis points out, between a system that allows offenders 
freely to make amends and one that forces them to do what they would do if 
they were decent. Although my account may be justified in taking the latter 
approach, it should not claim to be the former. 
However, I am not pretending to introduce a voluntary element into 
punishment with my talk of the right to be punished. As others have ex-
plained, there are two ways of thinking about rights: rights as delineating 
proper respect for status; and rights as securing benefits or protection of in-
terests. John Deigh (1984) applies this dichotomy to the right to be punished. 
If we accept that at least some rights fall into the first category then there 
might be things that a person may have a right to that cannot be waived, for 
instance, if they are rights to respect for one’s basic moral status. The right to 
be punished, on this interpretation, would be a right that one would have – 
and could not waive – if it is constitutive of respect for a certain important 
moral status. It is this first tradition of thinking about the right to be punished 
that I seek to elaborate. In the book, I skirt round debates about rights and go 
straight for a defence of the claim that punishment, or rather some retributive 
response, is constitutive of respect for one’s status as a qualified moral agent. 
But it seems to me that one could equally well couch the claim in the lan-
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guage of rights, arguing that one has a right to be respected as a qualified 
moral agent, a right one cannot waive, and hence a right to be punished. 
As Sandis reads the right to be punished, however, it leads him rather to-
wards the idea that the state has a duty to provide her with the benefit of moral 
reconciliation (and hence that the right to be punished is the right to some bene-
fit rather than respect for status). He quotes Melden on “the idea that punish-
ment serves to purge those upon whom it is imposed of their guilt and by thus 
redeeming them enables them once more to join their lives with others.” Criti-
cising the view he attributes to me, Sandis then argues that state punishment 
cannot serve this purging function – e.g. not with repentant offenders. “Offend-
ers do not need it to redeem themselves, and it does not automatically bestow 
redemption on the unrepentant ...” He concludes that I need some further argu-
ment to explain why criminal must be given the chance to make public amends. 
However, I can agree that it is not the opportunity to make public 
amends that justifies state punishment, while claiming that there is still an 
important link between state punishment and the redemptive power of suffer-
ing. My argument is that punishment is the political community’s way of ex-
pressing condemnation of, and hence dissociating itself from, a wrongful 
action, and that the practice of apology and, specifically, making amends, is a 
(probably) uniquely powerful way of symbolising such condemnation and 
making it meaningful. On my view the political community has a duty to stand 
up for certain values, and to resist complicity with or implication in violations 
of those values, and for that reason it has a duty to condemn certain forms of 
wrongdoing. But my view rejects two more ambitious theses – that the state has 
a duty to “try to get the offender to recognise that wrong and make a suitable 
apology for it”; and that the state has a duty to give the offender the opportu-
nity to expiate the wrong. Both of these approaches see punishment as essen-
tially paternalistic, and motivated by the offender’s moral welfare. They are 
committed to a) the thesis that the offender is better off if he expiates his of-
fence; and b) the view that it is the place of the state, as an aspect of its 
proper concern for the offender, to seek to promote the offender’s moral wel-
fare, albeit subject to certain constraints. The advantage of my account is that 
it takes an argument for why someone who accepts and understands the sig-
nificance of their wrongdoing would find penance compelling, shows how 
state punishment derives its condemnatory force from the connection with 
penance, but remains uncommitted to a) or b). 
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